Why Americans Want Iran to Get the Bomb

I mentioned in my Dr. Stuxlove presentation early in 2011, and in later blog posts, it was American policy-makers who were behind the move for Iran to get nuclear capability.

The Washington Post probably said it best in 2005:

Ford’s team endorsed Iranian plans to build a massive nuclear energy industry, but also worked hard to complete a multibillion-dollar deal that would have given Tehran control of large quantities of plutonium and enriched uranium — the two pathways to a nuclear bomb.

[…]

After balking initially, President Gerald R. Ford signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete “nuclear fuel cycle” — reactors powered by and regenerating fissile materials on a self-sustaining basis.

That is precisely the ability the current administration is trying to prevent Iran from acquiring today.

The story is that Rumsfeld, Cheney and Wolfowitz came back in the Bush administration and sang a completely different tune compared to their work under Ford. The WashPo offers a possible explanation why.

Gary Sick, who handled nonproliferation issues under presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan, said the entire deal was based on trust. “That’s the bottom line.”

“The shah made a big convincing case that Iran was going to run out of gas and oil and they had a growing population and a rapidly increasing demand for energy,” Sick said. “The mullahs make the same argument today, but we don’t trust them.”

That doesn’t really get to the heart of weapons risk. Never mind the energy issue. There are other energy solutions. Why was Iran trusted in nuclear non-proliferation? Or for that matter, why was Pakistan trusted? As Gorbachev used to often tell President Reagan, trust but verify.

Analysis this month by famous political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz might better explain what President Ford’s crew was thinking. Competition between states, in Waltz’s self-described structural realist view, keeps them in check. He writes in “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” that proliferation would bring stability.

Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.

Perhaps Rumsfeld et al in the 1970s believed this and also held the view that competition would only ever be between Iran and Iraq — at the very most a limited regional affair. After all, Iran was an ally of Israel, sending oil supplies and collaborating on weapons development until the 1980s.

Ironically, the shah teamed with Israel to develop a short-range system after Washington denied his request for Lance missiles. Known as Project Flower, Iran provided the funds and Israel the technology. The monarchy also pursued nuclear technologies, suggesting an interest in a delivery system for nuclear weapons.

A joint Iran-Israel nuclear ballistic missile collaboration? It seems impossible now. But that’s the issue with nuclear proliferation. A long-term irreversible threat to the region let alone America must have occurred to Rumsfeld, Kissinger and anyone even vaguely familiar with Iranian history. We can say the world changed a lot but to work hard for Iran to get the bomb, and then try hard to stop Iran from getting the bomb…Rumsfeld never explained his reversal on an irreversible issue. It certainly puts Stuxnet in a different light when you look at the historic role America and Israel have had with regard to technology in Iran. Wonder if Waltz thinks malware is also good for stability.

2 thoughts on “Why Americans Want Iran to Get the Bomb”

  1. Anyone wanting to get a clue about the Iran nuclear issue needs to regularly visit http://www.raceforiran.com and http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/ as well as http://www.antiwar.com.

    Bottom line:

    1) There is ZERO evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.
    2) There is ALMOST ZERO evidence that Iran ever had a nuclear weapons program – all evidence suggests it was little more than a “paper studies” program back when they were afraid Saddam had one – which they stopped in 2003 once Saddam was gone, according to the DIA.
    3) Both the US and Israeli intelligence agencies agree that Iran does not now have a nuclear weapons program and that the leadership has not decided to get one.
    4) The Iranian leadership – as well as numerous observers both in Iran and abroad – have stated that they do not need, could not use, and do not want nuclear weapons – including in the religious sense.
    5) None of the issues brought up by the IAEA provide any evidence for an Iranian nuclear weapons program and all of the issues are either 1) bogus entirely, or 2) old issues from back before 2003, or 3) issues that are none of the IAEA’s business under the NPT.

    All of these points can be confirmed by one’s own research. The real issue is regime chance and US/Israel hegemony in the Middle East which Iran is complicating. The proper solution is to engage Iran in the manner that Nixon and Kissinger engaged China.

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