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In Defense of Microsoft’s Active Defense Against No-IP

The Microsoft take-down of malicious DNS has stirred a healthy debate. This is the sort of active defense dilemma we have been presenting on for years, trying to gather people to discuss. Now it seems to be of interest thanks to a court order authorizing a defense attempt against malware: take-over and scrubbing of name resolution.

Over the past several days I have been in lengthy discussions with numerous lawyers on mailing lists about legal and technical details to the complaint and action. Some have asked me to put my thoughts into a blog, so here you have it.

This dialogue with both lawyers and security experts has crystallized for me that a community trying to increase freedom on the Internet should be, and some already are, supportive of elements in Microsoft’s action.

There is an opportunity here for guiding courts to course-correct and increase the effectiveness of individuals or even groups using active defense to reduce harm with minimal impact to freedoms. One exception in the security community stands out; some said the organization implicated in harm was sufficiently responsive before Microsoft action and should have been left alone to continue dispensing at current rates. Hold that thought.

Throughout my entire career, just to put this in some perspective, I have been an outspoken critic of Microsoft. My site name, flyingpenguin, started in the mid-1990s as homage to Linux and in belief that it would ultimately bypass Microsoft. This was in part due to coming from a VMS and Unix background and then being asked in my first professional job to lock-down and defend Windows NT 3.51 from compromise. It was hairy bad.

Anyone remember Bill Gates saying NT would ship but security can wait? Or remember Microsoft’s founder telling the UNIX community they have to explain to him how to make a billion dollars with security? My 2011 Dr. Stuxlove presentation started with some of those stories.

Ok, a full confession: I was offered PCs with Microsoft Word at home but I preferred WordPerfect and switched to Apple as soon as I could (1990, although I stopped using Apple in 2010). Despite preferences, I also accepted my fate as a security professional, which has meant 20 years spent working on ways to protect Microsoft customers.

To me, for as long as I can remember, Microsoft really seemed like a law firm started with lawyerish intentions; it just happened to also write and sell software. I might have further hardened these views due to years I spent watching legal trickery used like cannons to sink all the competing software boats; obvious hostility and attempts to knock holes into hobbyist and free software movements.

That legally-led-and-defended direction against competition didn’t last forever for various reasons outside the scope of this post. But Microsoft gradually was forced by external factors to realign their definition of malice away from competitors and hobbyists and towards clearly malicious software as well as some glaring flaws in their accountability department. The change started around 2000. By 2005 I was invited inside for a meeting where I was told “we now have five people full-time on security”. Five, in the entire company; don’t know if that was accurate but apparently 1/5 of the Microsoft security group saw me almost fall out of my chair.

Today, despite the thick jade-colored glasses you might think I wear when looking at Microsoft, I can see a different company taking very different approaches to security. Microsoft is *cough*, I can’t believe I have to say this, emerging as a leader and committed to improving safety in some balanced and thoughtful ways.

I was surprised to be invited to another internal meeting in 2013 but was even more surprised to see how thoroughly a security message is working its way through the organization. Don’t count me a full supporter yet, however. I’m still a skeptic, but I have to admit some noticeable changes happening that I wanted to see. Either they’re really getting it or my bullshit detector is failing. Of course both are possible but I believe it is the former.

Microsoft in the past few months appears to have rotated their massive legal cannons to fire volleys of legal briefs upon those they find willingly causing catastrophic harm to Microsoft-made vessels. Am I using the “letter of marque” analogy too liberally here? Microsoft is asking the legal authority for permission to fire, opening their plans for assessment by that authority, and claiming they will act responsibly within limits defined by the authority. We might actually want this to happen more. After all, if Microsoft does not try to actively help in the defense of their users from harm, who should we turn to and ask for a better job with less risk?

Let me try with another analogy. This one might resonate closer to home (pun not intended). Microsoft builds houses and people move in thinking it will be safe. Nearly 24 million people residing in these homes are soon reported sick or dead, causing huge cost and outages. Several independent reports confirm publicly that a service provider is involved in harm. And this provider has been taking little or no significant action to block distribution of harm despite overwhelming evidence; confirmed impact to at least 8 million people. The service provider not only shows no response to public reports of harm, the harm continues to rise.

Microsoft, (now) showing concern about the safety of its homes, tells the court that numerous independent investigations show over 90% harm comes from one service provider. Microsoft asks the court for authority to act on this because, well, logic. They suggest they are in the best position to lead a takeover to continue services without interruption while filtering out harm to tens of millions of people that the court wants to protect. The courts grant this limited authority for the purpose of efficiently cleaning harm.

Unfortunately, this proposal fails. Microsoft’s service has been oversold (surprise) and unable to perform at a level anticipated. Moreover, it turns out to be difficult to prove whether only those causing harm are inconvenienced or also others using the service.

Critics argue as many as 4 million might be inconvenienced (without qualifying as malware or not); but those critics do not measure benefits, or put in perspective of the potentially 24 million harmed over the past year. Critics also argue insufficient notice was given to the service provider before Microsoft moved services to clean them. Remember how I told you to keep in mind that some people said the provider was very responsive to reports of malware? I believe this responsiveness argument backfires on critics of Microsoft. Here’s why:

24 million (worst case) or even 8 million (best case) victims in a year, reported by multiple sources, makes it hard to argue the provider was “responsive” to the issue at hand. They may have been responsive for some particular request, but what did they do about the 24 million problem?

Technically people are right that formal notice is required and necessary. Many in the security community point out however that the provider was a known source of harm being *regularly* notified, which tends to contradict those in the community saying they felt responsiveness adequate for a narrow band of their request. The context often missing from critics of Microsoft is whether reasonable action had been taken in response to public notice about problem in the millions.

A basic review of those who claim responsiveness sufficient suggests the business of remediation and profit from insufficient responses to malware may color their judgment. We can probably balance the question of responsiveness by asking those assessing damage at the full scale of harm whether response was adequate. The courts were maybe considering notification from that angle?

The take-over clearly brought to light some mistakes. I remain skeptical about the action taken, as I said, but I recognize Microsoft for doing what appears to be the right thing. Microsoft obviously needs to be held accountable, just like we would want the DNS service provider to be held more accountable for harm. In fact, it will be interesting to see how harm from the take-over will be demonstrated or documented, as that could actually help Microsoft make their next complaint.

Lessons from this event will help inform how to make improvements for future active defense and set standards of care or definitions of reasonableness. It really kind of annoys me that Microsoft was not able to prove successful their solution for DNS scrubbing. Had they done better engineering or had some proof of service levels, we would be having a completely different discussion right now.

Instead I hear people saying Microsoft was a vigilante (acting without proper authority). That is incorrect. Microsoft asked and was granted authority. Those saying only the government can be an enforcement agent either do not understand public-private relationships or have not thought about the technical challenges (let alone social) of asking the US government to run safe DNS services. Talk about a scary proposition.

Those saying companies are getting a green light to takeover others also are incorrect. Microsoft put together a detailed and compelling complaint with a systemic fix recommendation to reduce a massive amount of harm, linked to multiple current independent sources of research and verification. A green light is very different from the complicated hurdles overcome by Microsoft’s legal team. As in history, their legal prowess unfortunately outdid their engineering.

What this really boils down to is some interesting ethics questions. People are asking for a more trusted Internet, but how do we get there unless someone closest to the harm takes responsibility and proposes solutions within a legal framework (oversight)? Solutions to these types of “wicked problems” require forward thinking in partnerships, as several of us from different industries explained in a recent panel presentation.

So let’s talk about whether Microsoft should be allowed to claim safety of their consumers and users fits within a definition of self-defense. I’m obviously side-stepping the part where Microsoft said they were suffering reputation harm from malware. You can probably tell how I might respond to that claim.

What I really want the community to decide is whether Microsoft can be authorized to perform actions of “self-defense”. They are not policing the Internet. They seem to be asking for the right to block harm to their users in the most efficient, least intrusive way. Perhaps we should ask instead can Microsoft, if we don’t accept a self-defense argument, be authorized to defend consumers and users of theirs who request protection?

It has been very interesting to hear what people think. I really have been doing my best to engage the legal community these past few days and measure as broad a reaction as possible. I am writing this more publicly in the hope to cut through some of the noise about what the security community thinks and point out that even I feel Microsoft is not being fairly credited for reasonable efforts to find cures to some of the problems they helped create.

Posted in Security.


2014 Things Expo: New Security Models for the Internet of Things

Thank you to my interactive audience at the 2014 Things Expo in NYC. Really appreciate everyone attending my “New Security Models for the Internet of Things” session to close out the conference. Excellent feedback and I am pleased to see such interest in security!

Please find a PDF version here.

Posted in Security.


Cyber-Colonialism and Beliefs About Global Development

Full disclosure: I spent my undergraduate and graduate degree time researching the ethics of intervention with a focus on the Horn of Africa. One of the most difficult questions to answer was how to define colonialism. Take Ethiopia, for example. It was never colonized and yet the British invaded, occupied and controlled it from 1940-1943 (the topic of my MSc thesis at LSE).

I’m not saying I am an expert on colonialism. I’m saying after many years of research including spending a year reading original papers from the 1940s British Colonial office and meeting with ex-colonial officers, I have a really good sense of how hard it is to become an expert on colonialism.

Since then, every so often, I hear someone in the tech community coming up with a theory about colonialism. I do my best to dissuade them from going down that path. Here came another opportunity on Twitter from Zooko:

This short post instantly changed my beliefs about global development. “The Dawn of Cyber-Colonialism” by @GDanezis

If nothing else, I would like to encourage Zooko and the author of “dawn of Cyber-Colonialism” to back away from simplistic invocations of colonialism and choose a different discourse to make their point.

Maybe I should start by pointing out an irony often found in the anti-colonial argument. The usual worry about “are we headed towards colonialism” is tied to some rather unrealistic assumptions. It is like a thinly-veiled way for someone to think out loud: “our technology is so superior to these poor savage countries, and they have no hope without us, we must be careful to not colonize them with it”.

A lack of self-awareness in commercial views is an ancient factor. John Stuart Mill, for example in the 1860s, used to opine that only through a commercial influence would any individual realize true freedom and self-governance; yet he feared colonialists could spoil everything through not restraining or developing beyond their own self-interests. His worry was specifically that colonizers did not understand local needs, did not have sympathy, did not remain impartial in questions of justice, and would always think of their own profits before development. (Considerations on Representative Government)

I will leave the irony of the colonialists’ colonialism lament at this point, rather than digging into what motivates someone’s concern about those “less-developed” people and how the “most-fortunate” will define best interests of the “less-fortunate”.

People tend to get offended when you point out they may be the ones with colonialist bias and tendencies, rather than those they aim to criticize for being engaged in an unsavory form of commerce. So rather than delve into the odd assumptions taken among those who worry, instead I will explore the framework and term of “colonialism” itself.

Everyone today hates, or should hate the core concepts of colonialism because the concept has been boiled down so much to be little more than an evil relic of history.

A tempting technique in discourse is to create a negative association. Want people to dislike something? Just broadly call it something they already should dislike, such as colonialism. Yuck. Cyber-colonialism, future yuck.

However, using an association to colonialism actually is not as easy as one might think. A simplified definition of colonialism tends to be quite hard to get anyone to agree upon. The subjugation of a group by another group through integrated domination might be a good way to start the definition. And just look at all the big words in that sentence.

More than occupation, more than unfair control or any deals gone wrong, colonialism is tricky to pin down because of elements of what is known as “colonus” and measuring success as agrarian rather than a nomad.

Perhaps a reverse view helps clarify. The exit-barrier to colonialism is not just a change in political and economic controls. Successful colonies are characterized by active infiltration by people who settle in and through persistent integration displace and deprive control of anyone they find in order to “gain” from their acquired assets. It is an act of displacement coupled with active and forced reprogramming, early explorations of corporations for profit.

Removing something colonus, therefore, is unlike removing elements performing routine work along commercial lines. Even if you fire bad processors/workers colonialism would remain. Instead removal means to untangle and reverse steps that were meant to output a new commercially-driven “civilization”. De-occupation is comparatively easy. Removing control, cancelling a deal or a contract, is also easy. De-colonization is hard.

If I must put it in terms of IT, hardware that actively tried to take control of my daily life and integrate into my processes that I have while reducing my control of direction is what we’re talking about. Not just a bad chip, it is an entire business process attack. It would be like someone infecting our storage devices with bitcoin mining code that they not only profit from but also use to permanently settle in our environment and prevent us from having a final say about our own destiny. Reformulating business processes is messy, far worse than a bug in any chip.

My study in undergraduate and graduate school really tried to make sense of the end of colonialism and the role of foreign influence in national liberation movements through the 1960s. This was not a study of a patching mechanism or a new source of materials. I never found, not even in the extensive work of European philosophers, a simple way to describe the very many facets of danger from always uninvited (or even sometimes invited) guests who were able to invade and completely run large complex organizations.

Perhaps now you can see the trouble with colonialism definitions.

Now take a look at this odd paraphrase of the Oxford Dictionary (presumably because the author is from the UK), used to setup the blog post called “The dawn of Cyber-Colonialism“:

The policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over another country’s cyber-space, occupying it with technologies or components serving foreign interests, and exploiting it economically.

Pardon my French but this is complete bullshit. Such a definition at face value is far too broad to be useful. Partial control over another country by occupying it with stuff to serve foreign interest and exploiting it sounds like what most would call imperialism at worst, commerce at best. I mean nothing in that definition says “another country” is harmed. Harm seems essential. Subjugation is harmful. That definition also doesn’t say anything about being opposed to control or occupation, let alone exploitation.

I’m not going to blow apart the definition bit-by-bit as much as I am tempted. It fails across multiple levels and I would love to destroy each.

Instead I will just point out that such a horrible definition would result in Ethiopia having to say it was colonized because of British 1940 intervention to remove Axis invaders and put Haile Selassie back into power. Simple test. That definition fails.

Let me cut right to the chase. As I mentioned at the start, those arguing that we are entering an era of cyber-colonialism should think carefully whether they really want to wade into the mess of defining colonialism. I advise everyone to steer clear and choose other pejorative and scary language to make a point.

Actually, I encourage them to tell us how and why technology commerce is bad in precise technical details. It seems lazy for people to build false connections and use association games to create negative feeling and resentment instead of being detailed and transparent in their research and writing.

On that note, I also want to comment on some of the technical points found in the blog claiming to see a dawn of colonialism:

What is truly at stake is whether a small number of technologically-advanced countries, including the US and the UK, but also others with a domestic technology industry, should be in a position to absolutely dominate the “cyber-space” of smaller nations.

I agree in general there is a concern with dominance, but this representation is far too simplistic. It assumes the playing field is made up of countries (presumably UK is mentioned because the blog author is from the UK), rather than what really is a mix of many associations, groups and power brokers. Google, for example, was famous in 2011 for boasting it had no need for any government to exist anymore. This widely discussed power hubris directly contradicts any thesis that subjugation or domination come purely from the state apparatus.

Consider a small number of technologically-advanced companies. Google and Amazon are in a position to absolutely dominate the cyber-space of smaller nations. This would seem as legitimate a concern as past imperialist actions. We could see the term “Banana Republic” replaced as countries become a “Search Republic”.

It’s a relationship fairly easy to contemplate because we already see evidence of it. Google’s chairman told the press he was proud of “Search Republic” policies and completely self-interested commerce (the kind Mill warned about in 1861): he said “It’s called capitalism

Given the mounting evidence of commercial and political threat to nations from Google, what does cyber-colonialism really look like in the near, or even far-off, future?

Back to the blog claiming to see a dawn of colonialism, here’s a contentious prediction of what cyber-colonialism will look like:

If the manager decides to go with modern internationally sourced computerized system, it is impossible to guarantee that they will operate against the will of the source nation. The manufactured low security standards (or deliberate back doors) pretty much guarantee that the signaling system will be susceptible to hacking, ultimately placing it under the control of technologically advanced nations. In brief, this choice is equivalent to surrendering the control of this critical infrastructure, on which both the economic well-being of the nation and its military capacity relies, to foreign power(s).

The blog author, George Danezis, apparently has no experience with managing risk in critical infrastructure or with auditing critical infrastructure operations so I’ll try to put this in a more tangible and real context:

Recently on a job in Alaska I was riding a state-of-the art train. It had enough power in one engine to run an entire American city. Perhaps I will post photos here, because the conductor opened the control panels and let me see all of the great improvements in rail technology.

The reason he could let me in and show me everything was because the entire critical infrastructure was shutdown. I was told this happened often. As the central switching system had a glitch, which was more often than you might imagine, all the trains everywhere were stopped. After touring the engine, I stepped off the train and up into a diesel truck driven by a rail mechanic. His beard was as long as a summer day in Anchorage and he assured me trains have to be stopped due to computer failure all the time.

I was driven back to my hotel because no trains would run again until the next day. No trains. In all of Alaska. America. So while we opine about colonial exploitation of trains, let’s talk about real reliability issues today and how chips with backdoors really stack up. Someone sitting at the keyboard can worry about resilience of modern chips all they want but it needs to be linked to experience with “modern internationally sourced computerized system” used to run critical infrastructure. I have audited critical infrastructure environments since 1997 and let me tell you they have a very unique and particular risk management model that would probably surprise most people on the outside.

Risk is something rarely understood from an outside perspective unless time is taken to explore actual faults in a big picture environments and the study of actual events happening now and in the past. In other words you can’t do a very good job auditing without spending time doing the audit, on the inside.

A manager going with a modern internationally sourced computerized system is (a) subject to a wide spectrum of factors of great significance (e.g. dust, profit, heat, water, parts availability, supply chains), and (b) worried about presence of backdoors for the opposite reason you might think ; they represent hope for support and help during critical failures. I’ll say it again, they WANT backdoors.

It reminds me of a major backdoor into a huge international technology company’s flagship product. The door suggested potential for access to sensitive information. I found it, I reported it. Instead of alarm by this company I was repeatedly assured I had stumbled upon a “service” highly desirable to customers who did not have the resources or want to troubleshoot critical failures. I couldn’t believe it. But as the saying goes: one person’s bug is another person’s feature.

To make this absolutely clear, there is a book called “Back Door Java” by Newberry that I highly recommend people read if they think computer chips might be riddled with backdoors. It details how the culture of Indonesia celebrates the backdoor as an integral element of progress and resilience in daily lives.

Cooking and gossip are done through a network of access to everyone’s kitchen, in the back of a house, connected by alley. Service is done through back, not front, paths of shared interests.

This is not that peculiar when you think about American businesses that hide critical services in alleys and loading docks away from their main entrances. A hotel guest in America might say they don’t want any backdoors until they realize they won’t be getting clean sheets or even soap and toilet-paper. The backdoor is not inherently evil and may actually be essential. The question is whether abuse can be detected or prevented.

Dominance and control is quite complex when you really look at the relationships of groups and individuals engaged in access paths that are overt and covert.

So back to the paragraph we started with, I would say a manager is not surrendering control in the way some might think when access is granted, even if access is greater than what was initially negotiated or openly/outwardly recognized.

With that all in mind, re-consider the subsequent colonization arguments given by “The dawn of Cyber-Colonialism

Not opting for computerized technologies is also a difficult choice to make, akin to not having a mobile phone in the 21st century. First, it is increasingly difficult to source older hardware, and the low demand increases its cost. Without computers and modern network communications is it also impossible to benefit from their productivity benefits. This in turn reduces the competitiveness of the small nation infrastructure in an international market; freight and passengers are likely to choose other means of transport, and shareholders will disinvest. The financial times will write about “low productivity of labor” and a few years down the line a new manager will be appointed to select option 1, against a backdrop of an IMF rescue package.

That paragraph has an obvious false choice fallacy. The opposite of granting access (prior paragraph) would be not granting access. Instead we’re being asked in this paragraph to believe the only other choice is lack of technology.

Does anyone believe it increasingly is difficult to source older hardware? We are given no reason. I’ll give you two reasons how old hardware could be increasingly easy to source: reduced friction and increased privacy.

About 20% of people keep their old device because it’s easier than selling it. Another 20% keep their device because privacy concerns. That’s 40% of old hardware sitting and ready to be used, if only we could erase the data securely and make it easy to exchange for money. SellCell.com (trying to solve one of the problems) claims the source of older cellphone hardware in America alone now is about $47billion worth.

And who believes that low demand increases cost? What kind of economic theory is this?

Scarcity increases cost, but we do not have evidence of scarcity. We have the opposite. For example, there is no demand for the box of Blackberry phones sitting on my desk.

Are you willing to pay me more for a Blackberry because low demand?

Even more suspect is a statement that without computers and modern network communications it is impossible for a country to benefit. Having given us a false choice fallacy (either have the latest technology or nothing at all) everyone in the world who doesn’t buy technology is doomed to fail and devalue their economy?

Apply this to ANY environment and it should be abundantly clear why this is not the way the world works. New technology is embraced slowly, cautiously (relative terms) versus known good technology that has proven itself useful. Technology is bought over time with varying degrees of being “advanced”.

To further complicate the choice, some supply chains have a really long tail due to the nature of a device achieving a timeless status and generating localized innovation with endless supplies (e.g. the infamous AK-47, classic cars).

To make this point clearer, just tour the effects of telecommunications providers in countries like South Africa, Brazil, India, Mexico, Kenya and Pakistan. I’ve written about this before on many levels and visited some of them.

I would not say it is the latest or greatest tech, but tech available, which builds economies by enabling disenfranchised groups to create commerce and increase wealth. When a customer tells me they can only get 28.8K modem speeds I do not laugh at them or pity them. I look for solutions that integrate with slow links for incremental gains in resilience, transparency and privacy. When I’m told 250ms latency is a norm it’s the same thing, I’m building solutions to integrate and provide incremental gains. It’s never all-or-nothing.

A micro-loan robot in India that goes into rough neighborhoods to dispense cash, for example, is a new concept based on relatively simple supplies that has a dramatic impact. Groups in a Kenyan village share a single cell-phone and manage it similarly to the old British phone booth. There are so many more examples, none of which break down in simple terms of the amazing US government versus technologically-poor countries left vulnerable.

And back to the blog paragraph we started with, my guess is the Financial Times will write about “productivity of labor” if we focus on real risk, and a few years down the line new managers will be emerging in more places than ever.

Now let’s look at the conclusion given by “The dawn of Cyber-Colonialism

Maintaining the ability of western signals intelligence agencies to perform foreign pervasive surveillance, requires total control over other nations’ technology, not just the content of their communication. This is the context of the rise of design backdoors, hardware trojans, and tailored access operations.

I don’t know why we should believe anything in this paragraph. Total control of technology is not necessary to maintain the ability of intelligence. That defies common sense. Total control is not necessary to have intelligence be highly effective, nor does it mean intelligence will be better than having partial or incomplete control (as explained best by David Hume).

My guess is that paragraph was written with those terms because they have a particular ring to them, meant to evoke a reaction rather than explain a reality or demonstrate proof.

Total control sounds bad. Foreign pervasive surveillance sounds bad. Design backdoors, Trojan horses and tailored access (opposite of total control) sound bad. It all sounds so scary and bad, we should worry about them.

But back to the point, even if we worry because such scary words are being thrown at us about how technology may be tangled into a web of international commerce and political purpose, nothing in that blog on “cyber-colonialism” really comes even close to qualify as colonialism.

Posted in History, Security.


US Wants to Help Africa on the Rise

I am happy to see Secretary of State, John Kerry, saying in the Washington Post that America needs to help Africa with difficult decisions that lie ahead:

The best untold story of the last decade may be the story of Africa. Real income has increased more than 30 percent, reversing two decades of decline. Seven of the world’s 10 fastest-growing economies are in Africa, and GDP is expected to rise 6 percent per year in the next decade. HIV infections are down nearly 40 percent in sub-Saharan Africa and malaria deaths among children have declined 50 percent . Child mortality rates are falling, and life expectancy is increasing.

Reading between the lines Kerry seems to be watching America lose influence at a time when it should be pulled in by the Africans. He is advising Americans to start thinking of Africa in broader terms of partnership rather than just a place to impose pentagon-led “protective” objectives (e.g. stability for corporate margins, access to infrastructure projects for intel to chase and find our enemies, humanitarian assistance to verify our intel access to infrastructure is working).

A shift from pentagon objectives to state department ones, unless I’m being naive there still exists a significant difference, sounds like a good idea. Kerry does not back away from highlighting past American efforts as he moves towards imposing an American view of how to measure success:

The U.S. government has invested billions of dollars in health care, leading to real progress in combating AIDS and malaria. Our security forces work with their African counterparts to fight extremism. U.S. companies are investing in Africa through trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. As a friend, the United States has a role to play in helping Africans build a better future.

Many of the choices are crystal clear. African leaders need to set aside sectarian and religious differences in favor of inclusiveness, acknowledge and advocate for the rights of women and minorities, and they must accept that sexual orientation is a private matter. They must also build on their economic progress by eliminating graft and opening markets to free trade.

I am not sure these two things are compatible if Africa is looking to find the best partner for decisions ahead. To put it another way, has America proven itself a help or a hindrance for the past decade with humanitarian issues? How does it advocate for rights of women and minorities yet send drones with a high civilian casualty rate? The fundamental question of how to reconcile offers of assistance with foreign strings and caveats seems underplayed.

My experience in Africa is the Chinese and Saudis push much more aggressive assistance programs with tangible results, everywhere from power plants and water supplies to schools and hospitals, without overt pressure on values alignment. Whereas a Saudi hospital might require women to cover their skin, which seems to America a horrible insult to women, Africans treat this a minor and perhaps even amusing imposition to disobey. Meanwhile an American hospital where anonymity is impossible and patients are said to be removed without warning and “disappeared”…creates an environment of resistance.

Allow me to relate a simple example of how the US might be able to both provide assistance while also find values alignment:

Global efforts to help malaria in Africa are less likely to fail because of the complicated nature of the disease and rather because of fraud. Kerry calls it graft. In Africa there is an unbelievable amount of graft tied directly to humanitarian efforts and I doubt there is anyone in the world who would say fraud is necessary or good.

I have run the stats given to me by leaders of humanitarian projects and I even have toured some developments on the ground. Conclusions to me seem rather obvious. Since 1989 my studies of humanitarian/ethical intervention in Africa, particularly the Horn, have looked into reasons for failure and one universal truth stands out. Graft shows up as a core issue blocking global efforts to help Africa yet I’m not sure anyone who isn’t looking for it already really notices. Here’s a typical story that tends to have no legs:

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has suspended funding for two malaria grants in Mali and terminated a third for tuberculosis (TB) after finding evidence that $4 million has been embezzled, the organisation said on Tuesday.

Grants to Mali and four other countries – Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Mauritania and Papua New Guinea – have been put under closer scrutiny with tighter restrictions on cash movements.

[…]

The suspensions in Mali concern a $14.8 million malaria grant to buy and distribute insecticide-treated nets for pregnant women and young children; a $3.3 million grant for anti-malaria drugs; and a $4.5 million TB grant targeted at treating prisoners, people in mining communities and patients with multidrug resistant strains of TB among others.

Please verify and see for yourself. Seek answers why assistance declines in areas most in need or is rejected despite demand increasing. Disease can not be eradicated if we back away when economic friction heats up. You may find, as I did, that projects stall when we can not detect supply chain threats, report vulnerabilities and enforce controls.

On the flip side of this issue, imposing a solution from top-down or outside only exacerbates the problem. Nobody wants an outsider to come in and accuse insiders of fraud if there exists any internal methods. Outside pressure can shut down the relationship entirely and block all access, as well as undermine internal footholds, which is why you rarely find diplomats and humanitarian project leaders touching on this issue.

I have proposed technical solutions to solve some of these supply chain issues blocking Africa’s “rise” although I doubt anyone is in a rush to implement them because politically the problem has been allowed to trundle along undefined. I am glad Kerry mentioned it as a footnote on America’s plan as it needs to be picked up as more of a headline. It would be great to see “America helps Senegal reduce fraud in fight to eradicate disease” for example. Until someone like Bill Gates says the problem we must overcome is weak systems that allow graft, we could just keep pumping assistance and yet see no gain or even see reversals. In fact Africa could distance itself from America if our aid goes misdirected while we attempt to impose our broader set of values on those who are not receiving any benefits.

American leaders now may want to help Africa rise and they have to find ways to operate in a market that feels more like a level playing field. We need to step in more as peers in a football match, rather than flood the field with referees, showing how we have solved similar problems while empowering local groups to solve them in ways that may be unfamiliar to us. Once we’re following a similar set of rules with a clear opponents like fraud and malaria, we need to find ways to pass the ball and score as a team. Could Kerry next be talking about delivering solutions integrated with African values rather than pushing distinctly American ones as preconditions?

IT is a perfect fit here because it can support peer-based coalitions of authorities to operate on infrastructure without outside controls. Imagine a network of nodes emerging in Africa the same way the Internet first evolved in America, but with modern technology that is energy efficient, mobile and wireless.

A system to detect, report and block graft on a locally derived scale instead of promoting a centralized top-down monitoring system seems unlikely to happen. Yet that could be exactly what will make America a real partner to Africa’s rise. It begs the question whether anyone has positioned to deliver NFC infrastructure for nets and vaccines while also agreeing to step back, giving shared authority and responsibility to track progress with loose federation. America could be quite a help, yet also faces quite a challenge. Will Kerry find a way for Africans to follow a path forged by America in ways he may not be able to control?

Posted in Energy, History, Security.


2014 Österreich Stammtisch: The UnCERTainty of Attribution

I have been asked to post a copy of my presentation at the Stammtisch in Vienna. Vielen Dank an alle fürs Kommen und für die ausgezeichnete Diskussion.

Please find a PDF version here.

Posted in Security.


2014 SOURCE Boston: Delivering Security at Big Data Scale

Several people asked for a copy of my presentation slides at the April 2014 SOURCE conference in Boston. Thanks to everyone for coming and the great feedback!

Please find a PDF version here.

Posted in Security.


Yet “Unother” heartbleed Perspective (YUhP)

With so many people talking about heartbleed and offering their insights (e.g. excellent posts from Bruce Schneier and Dan Kaminsky) I could not help but add my own. That is not entirely true. I was happy to let others field questions and then reporters contacted me and wanted insights. After I sent my response they said my answers were helpful, so I thought I might as well re-post here.

So this is what I recently sent a reporter:

What is Heartbleed?

Heartbleed is a very small change made to small part of code that is widely used to protect data. You might even say it is a flaw found in the infrastructure that we all rely upon for privacy. It is not an understatement to say it impacts just about everyone who has a password on the Internet. It’s basically like discovering all your conversations for the past two years that you thought were private actually could have been heard by someone without any effort. This is very dangerous and why it had to be fixed immediately. Potential for harm can be huge when trusted systems have been operating with a flaw. It is hard to quantify who really has been impacted, however, because the damage is a leak rather than an outage. We could look for evidence of leaks now, because people trying to take advantage of the leak will leave particular tracks behind, but it is very unlikely tracks will have been preserved for such a long time, since the code change was made. The change unfortunately was not recognized as dangerous until very recently.

How is it related to encryption and the websites I use?

The simple explanation is that encryption was used on websites (as well as many other sites, including email) to protect data. Encryption can prevent someone from seeing your private information. A change in code, known as OpenSSL, used for encryption actually undermined its ability to protect your data. Heartbleed means someone from a remote location can see data that was believed and intended to be private. Your password, for example, would have been seen by someone who knew of this OpenSSL flaw.

If possible, how can I protect myself now that it’s happened?

You can protect yourself going forward with two simple steps. First verify the sites you use have fixed the heartbleed flaw. Often they will push a notice saying they have addressed the problem, or they will post a notice that is easy to find on their site, or you can consult a list of sites that have been tested. Second, change your passwords.

Another way to protect yourself is to get involved in the debate. You could study the political science behind important decisions, such as when and how to trust changes, or the economics of human behavior. You also could study the technical details of the code to join the debate on how best to improve the quality that everyone may rely upon for their most trusted communication.

The reach of this story is amazing to me. It is like information security just became real for every person in every home. I sat on a bench in an airport the other day and listened to everyone around me give their (horribly incorrect) versions of heartbleed. Some thought it was a virus. Some thought it was related to Windows XP. But whatever they said, it was clear they suddenly cared a lot about whether and how they can trust technology.

I was probably too bullish on the traces/trail part of my answer. It is hard to stay high level while still figuring out some of the details underneath. I haven’t yet built a good high-level explanation for why the attack is not detectable by the system itself but that attack traffic has some obvious characteristics that can be captured by the system.

Anyway, this clearly boils down to code review. It is a problem as old as code itself. A luminary in the infosec space recently yelled the following on this topic:

THIS IS CALLED A BOUNDS CHECK. I SAW CODING ERRORS LIKE THIS IN THE 70’S

We know there are people very motivated to pore over every memcpy in an OpenSSL codebase, for example, to look for flaws. Some say the NSA would have found it and used it, but in reality the threat-scape is far larger and the NSA officially has denied awareness.

We also know that finding a really bad bounds check does not necessarily mean any obligation to report it in a “fair” way that minimizes harm, which is a harsh reality that begs the question of human behavior. Before looking to deeply at the technical aspects of the problem, consider Bruce’s perspective:

This may be a massive computer vulnerability, but all of the interesting aspects of it are human.

If you are Bruce, of course you would say that. He finds human aspects interesting, with all due respect, because it is the less familiar angle to him — the focus of his new research. However, most people are unfamiliar with technology, let alone encryption and keys, so the human aspects are the less interesting angle and they want the technical problem explained. XKCD sees this latter demand. That’s why we now have the following beautiful explanation of technical aspects:

heartbleed

With that in mind I still actually agree with Bruce. The industry really needs to dig deep into the following sequence of events related to trusted infrastructure change controls and bug discovery. This is what I’ve gathered so far. We may learn more and revise this in the future, but I hope it helps illustrate the sort of interesting human aspects to sort out:

  1. OpenSSL code that created heartbleed is committed an hour before midnight on New Years Eve 2011
  2. Codenomicon in early 2014 started tested an alpha piece of their Defensics fuzz product called Safeguard — their automated tool in April finds a flaw in the authentication layer of OpenSSL messaging
  3. Flaw is privately communicated by Codenomicon to CERT in Finland
  4. Someone at Google finds the same flaw and notifies OpenSSL
  5. OpenSSL issues a patch and flaw goes public, leaving many scrambling to respond on an immediate basis

One other thought. I alluded to this in my answer to the journalist but I want to make a finer point here. Some are calling this a maximum level danger event. That perspective begs whether data being destroyed, changed or denied could ever been seen as more dangerous. To a cryptography community the 11 out of 10 event may be different to the availability community. That actually seems to be one of the reasons I have seen management allow encryption to fail — availability risks were seen as more dangerous than confidentiality risks when unfortunately there was a trade-off.

Updated to add: Google staff have started to actively dispute claims anyone found the bug earlier than their company did. Microsoft and Facebook offered money to the Google person who proved the bug to them first, but the money was redirected to a charity rather than accepted.

A timeline favoring Google’s interpretation of events, with the vague discovery listed as “March 21 or before,” has been published by a paper in Sydney. Note the author request:

If you have further information or corrections – especially information about what occurred prior to March 21 at Google – please email the author…

This makes it sound like Google needs help to recall events prior to March 21, or doesn’t want to open up. Codenomicon claims were that it had been testing months prior to discovery. In any case, everything seems to initiate around September 2013, probably not by coincidence and begging the question of human issues more than technical ones.

Posted in Security.


Troubled Audit Waters: Trustwave and the Target Breach

My last post is probably overkill on the Microsoft topic so here’s a TL;DR version of one aspect of that story.

Microsoft mentions an independent auditor will help them avoid risk in the future. In order to not violate privacy of their customers without due cause, they will ask a specific 3rd party attorney of their choosing for opinion on the matter.

That does not give me much confidence. It seems only slightly less likely to fail, at least in obvious terms of independence.

Take a look at an important related story in the news: Target’s QSA (qualified security assessor) Trustwave, who was meant to help stop privacy violation of payment cardholders, is being sued by banks.

There are two parts to the story. One is that an assessor is in a complicated responsibility dance with their client. Did the client fail in their burden to disclose details to the assessor? Did the assessor fail to notice this failure? Did the assessor intentionally overlook failures? The debate over these problems is ancient and the lawsuits are likely to draw from a large body of knowledge, driven in some part by the insurance industry.

The other part of the story is that Trustwave apparently was running a portion of security operations at Target, not just assessing them for adequacy of controls. This is the more interesting angle to me because it seems like a relatively easy risk to avoid.

An assessor is meant to test controls in place. If the control in place is run by the same company as the one assessing its adequacy, then independence is dubious and a conflict-of-interest test is required.

For example, assessor Alice finds Retailer has inadequate IDS. Alice recommends Retailer replace existing and buy new IDS service from service provider Bob. Bob sets up IDS services and then Alice says Retailer has adequate IDS controls. Then Retailer is breached and people notice Alice and Bob work for the same company. Lawyers ask if Alice was conspiring with Bob to sell IDS and rubber-stamp assessments, without regard to actual compliance requirements.

Companies have internal auditors test internal controls all the time, so it’s not impossible or improbable to have a single authority sit above and manage both roles. Independence is best served transparently. However, one of the primary benefits of bringing in a 3rd party independent assessment is the most clear form of independence from any operational influences.

Bottom-line is Trustwave was known for selling services and assessing those services in order to maximize income opportunities and grow their practice size; they found a more lucrative but far less clean business model that now begs the question of adequate separations. If the Target investigations question the model then it could change the industry.


Update March 29: Trustwave’s CEO Robert McCullen has posted an announcement, specifically mentioning the conflict-of-interest issue.

In response to these legal filings, Trustwave would like to reassure our customers and business partners that these claims against Trustwave are without merit, and that we look forward to vigorously defending ourselves in court against these baseless allegations.

Contrary to the misstated allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaints, Target did not outsource its data security or IT obligations to Trustwave. Trustwave did not monitor Target’s network, nor did Trustwave process cardholder data for Target.

As I said, this is a key issue to watch in the dispute.

Posted in Security.


#Hotmailgate: Where Don’t You Want to Go Today?

I thought with all the opinions flowing about the Hotmail privacy incident I would throw my hat into the ring. Perhaps most notably Bruce Schneier has done an excellent job warning people not to believe everything Google or Facebook is saying about privacy.

Before I get to Bruce’s article (below) I’d like to give a quick summary of the details I found interesting when reading about the Microsoft Hotmail privacy incident.

How it Begins

We know, for example, that the story begins with a Microsoft employee named Alex Kibkalo who was given a less-than-stellar performance review. This employee, a Russian native who worked from both Russia and Lebanon, reacted unfavorably and stole Microsoft pre-release updates for Windows RT and an Activation Server SDK.

Russia? Lebanon?

Perhaps it is fair to say the software extraction was retaliatory, as the FBI claims, but that also seems to be speculation. He may have had other motives. Some could suggest Alex’s Russian/Lebanese associations could have some geopolitical significance as well, for example. I so far have not seen anyone even mention this angle to the story but it seems reasonable to consider. It also raises the thorny question of how rights differ by location and nationality, especially in terms of monitoring and privacy.

Microsoft Resources Involved

More to the point of this post, from Lebanon Alex was able to quickly pull the software he wanted off Microsoft servers to a Virtual Machine (VM) running in a US Microsoft facility. Apparently downloading software all the way to Lebanon would have taken too long so he remotely controlled a VM and leveraged high speeds and close proximity of systems within US Microsoft facilities.

Alex then moved the stolen software from the Microsoft internal VM to the Microsoft public Skydrive cloud-based file-sharing service. With the stolen goods now in a place easily accessible to anyone, he emailed a French blogger.

The blogger was advised to have a technical person use the stolen software to build a service that would allow users to bypass Microsoft’s official software activation. The blogger publicly advertised on eBay the activation keys for sale and sent an email, from a Hotmail account, to a technical person for assistance with the stolen software. This technical person instead contact Microsoft.

Recap

To recap, an internal Microsoft employee used a Microsoft internal VM and a Microsoft public file-sharing cloud to steal Microsoft assets.

He either really liked using Microsoft or knew that they would not notice him stealing.

The intended recipient of those assets also used a Microsoft public cloud email account to communicate with employee stealing software, as well as with a person friendly to Microsoft senior executives.

When All You Have is a Hammer

Microsoft missed several red flags. Their internal virtual environment as well as their public cloud clearly was not detecting a theft in progress. A poor-performance review could be tied to sensitivity of network monitoring, watching for movement of large assets or pointing to communication with other internal staff that may have been working on behalf of the employee. Absent more advanced detective capabilities, let alone preventive ones, someone like Alex moves freely across Microsoft resources to steal assets.

A 900-lb gorilla approach to this problem must have seemed like a good idea to someone in Microsoft management. I have heard people suggest a rogue legal staff member was driving the decisions, yet this doesn’t sound plausible.

Having worked with gigantic legal entities in these scenarios I suspect coordinated and top-down the investigation and legal teams. Ironically, perhaps the most damaging steps to customer trust might have been done by a team called Trustworthy Computer Investigations (TWCI). They asked the Office of Legal Compliance (OLC) for authorization to compromise customer accounts. That to me indicates the opposite of any rogue effort; it was a management-led mission based on an internal code-of-conduct and procedures.

Hotmail Broken

The real controversy should be that the TWCI target was not internal. Instead of digging around Microsoft’s own security logs and controls, looking at traces of employee activity for what they needed, Microsoft compromised a public customer Hotmail account (as well as a physical home) with the assistance of law enforcement in several countries. They found traces they were looking for in the home and Hotmail account; steps that explained how their software was stolen by an internal employee as well as signs of intent.

The moral of the story, unfortunately, seems to be Microsoft internal security controls were not sufficient on their own, in speed or cost or something else, which compelled the company to protect themselves with a rather overt compromise of customer privacy and trust. This naturally has led to a public outcry about whether anyone can trust a public cloud, or even webmail.

Microsoft, of course, says this case is the exception. They say they had the right under their service terms to protect their IP. These are hard arguments to dispute, since an employee stealing Microsoft IP and using Microsoft services, and even trying to sell the IP by contacting someone friendly with Microsoft, can not possibly be a normal situation.

On the other hand, what evidence do we have now that Microsoft would restrict themselves from treating public as private?

With that in mind, Microsoft has shown their hand; they struggle to detect or prevent IP-theft as it happens, so they clearly aim to shoot after-the-fact and as necessary. There seems to be no pressure to do things by any standard of privacy (e.g. one defined by the nationality of the customer) other than one they cook up internally weighted by their own best interests.

Note the explanation by their Deputy Counsel:

Courts do not issue orders authorizing someone to search themselves, since obviously no such order is needed. So even when we believe we have probable cause, it’s not feasible to ask a court to order us to search ourselves.

They appear to be defining customers as indistinguishable from Microsoft employees. If you are a Hotmail user, you are now a part of Microsoft’s corporate “body”. Before you send HR an email asking for healthcare coverage, however, note that they also distinguish Microsoft personal email from corporate email.

The only exception to these steps will be for internal investigations of Microsoft employees who we find in the course of a company investigation are using their personal accounts for Microsoft business.

So if I understand correctly Microsoft employees are allowed an illusion of distinguishing personal email on Hotmail from their business email, which doesn’t make any sense really because even public accounts on Hotmail are treated like part of corporate body. And there’s no protection from searches anywhere anyway. When Microsoft internal staff, and an external attorney they have hired, believe there is probable cause then they can search “themselves”.

And for good measure, I found a new Google statement that says essentially the same thing. They reserve the right to snoop public customer accounts, even journalists.

“[TechCrunch editor Michael Arrington] makes a serious allegation here — that Google opened email messages in his Gmail account to investigate a leak,” Kent Walker, Google general counsel, said in a statement. “While our terms of service might legally permit such access, we have never done this and it’s hard for me to imagine circumstances where we would investigate a leak in that way.”

Hard perhaps for Kent to imagine, but with nothing stopping them…is imagination really even relevant?

Back to Schneier

Given this story as background, I’d like to respond to Bruce Schneier’s excellent article with the long title: “Don’t Listen to Google and Facebook: The Public-Private Surveillance Partnership Is Still Going Strong

These companies are doing their best to convince users that their data is secure. But they’re relying on their users not understanding what real security looks like.

This I have to agree with. Reading the Microsoft story I first was shocked to hear they had cracked their own customer’s email account. Then after I read the details I realized they had probable cause and they followed procedures…until I reached the point where I realized there was nothing being said about real security. It begs a simple question:

Should the lack of Microsoft ability to detect or prevent a theft, utilizing their private and public services, a reasonable justification for very broad holes in customer terms-of-service?

Something Just Hit the Fan

Imagine you are sitting on a toilet in your apartment. That apartment was much more convenient to move into compared to building your own house. But then, suddenly the owner is standing over you. The owner says since they can’t tell when widgets are taken from their offices (e.g they can’t detect which of their employees might be stealing) and they have probable cause (e.g. someone says you were seen with a missing widget) they can enter your bathroom at any time to check.

Were you expecting privacy while you sat on your toilet in your apartment?

Microsoft clearly disagrees and says there’s no need to even knock since they’re entering their own bathroom…in fact, all the bathrooms are theirs and no-one should be able to lock them out. Enjoy your apartment stay.

Surveillance, Not Surveillance

Real security looks like the owners detecting theft or preventing theft in “their” space rather than popping “your” door open whenever they feel like it. I hate to say it this way but it’s a political problem, rather than a technical one: what guide should we use to do surveillance in places that are socially agreed-upon, such as watching a shared office to reduce risks of theft, rather than threaten surveillance in places people traditionally and reasonably expect privacy?

So here is where I disagree with Schneier

Google, and by extension, the U.S. government, still has access to your communications on Google’s servers. Google could change that. It could encrypt your e-mail so only you could decrypt and read it. It could provide for secure voice and video so no one outside the conversations could eavesdrop. It doesn’t. And neither does Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, Apple, or any of the others. Why not? They don’t partly because they want to keep the ability to eavesdrop on your conversations.

Ok, I actually sort of agree with that. Google could provide you with the ability to lock them out, prevent them from seeing your data. But saying they want to eavesdrop on your conversations is where I start to think differently from Bruce. They want to offer tailored services, marketing if you allow it. The issue is whether we must define an observation space for these tailored services as completely and always open (e.g. Microsoft’s crazy definition of everything as “self”) or whether there is room for privacy.

Give Me Private Cloud or Give Me Encryption…OK I’ll Take Both

Suddenly, and unexpectedly, I am seeing movement towards cloud encryption using private-keys unknown to the provider. Bruce says this is impossible because “the US government won’t permit it”. I disagree. For years I worked with product companies to create this capability and was often denied. But it was not based on some insidious back-door or government worry. Product managers had many reasons why they hated to allow encryption into the road-map and the most common was there simply was not enough demand from customers.

Ironically, the rise of isolated but vociferous demand actually could be the reason we now will see it happen. If Google and Apple move towards a private-key solution, even if only to fly the “we’re better than Microsoft flag,” only a fraction of users will adopt (there’s an unknown usability/cost factor here). And of those users that do adopt eagerly, what is the percentage that the government comes knocking for with a warrant or a subpoena to decrypt? Probably a high percentage, yet still a small population. Given that the cloud providers properly setup key management they should be able to tell the government they have no way to decrypt or access the data.

Economics to the Rescue

This means from a business view the cloud provider could improve their offering to customers by enhancing trust with privacy controls, while at the same time reducing a cost burden of dealing with government requests for data. It could be a small enough portion of the users it wouldn’t impact services offered to the majority of users. This balance also could be “nudged” using cost; those wanting enhanced privacy pay a premium. In the end, there would be no way a provider could turn over a key that was completely unknown to them. And if Bruce is right that the government gets in no matter what, then all the more reason for cloud providers to raise the bar above their own capabilities.

We should have been headed this way a long time ago but, as I’ve said, the product managers really did not believe us security folks when we begged, pleaded and even demanded privacy controls. Usability, performance and a list a mile long of priorities always came first. Things have changed dramatically in the past year and #Hotmailgate really shows us where we don’t want to go. I suspect Microsoft and its competitors are now contemplating whether and how to incorporate real private-key systems to establish better public cloud privacy options, given the new economic models and customer demands developing.

Posted in Security.


Mining and Visualizing YouTube Metadata for Threat Models

For several years I’ve been working on ways to pull metadata from online video viewers into threat models. In terms of early-warning systems or general trends, metadata may be a useful input on what people are learning and thinking about.

Here’s a recent example of a relationship model between viewers that I just noticed:

A 3D map (from a company so clever they have managed to present software advertisements as legitimate TED talks) indicates that self-reporting young viewers care more about sewage and energy than they care about food or recycling.

The graph also suggests video viewers who self-identify as women watch videos on food rather than energy and sewage. Put young viewers and women viewers together and you have a viewing group that cares very little about energy technology.

I recommend you watch the video. However, I ask that you please first setup an account with false gender to poison their data. No don’t do that. Yes, do…no don’t.

Actually what the TED talk reveals, if you will allow me to get meta for a minute, is that TED talks often are about a narrow band of topics despite claiming to host a variety of presenters. Agenda? There seem to be extremely few outliers or innovative subjects, according to the visualization. Perhaps this is a result of how the visual was created — categories of talks were a little too broad. For example, if you present a TED talk on password management and sharks and I present on reversing hardware and sharks, that’s both just interest in nature, right?

The visualization obscures many of the assumptions made by those who painted it. And because it is a TED talk we give up 7 minutes of our lives yet never get details below the surface. Nonetheless, this type of analysis and visualization is where we all are going. Below is an example from one of my past presentations, where I discussed capturing and showing high-level video metadata on attack types and specific vulnerabilities/tools. If you are not doing it already, you may want to think about this type of input when discussing threat models.

Here I show the highest concentrations of people in the world who are watching video tutorials on how to use SQL injection:

Posted in Energy, Food, Security.