Category Archives: Energy

The Base Case: Russian Assets Burned San Francisco Power Grid

December 3rd, Rinaldo Nazzaro—founder of The Base, ex-Pentagon contractor, current St. Petersburg resident, alleged Russian intelligence asset—released an audio message calling for “acceleration teams” to conduct “targeted attacks on essential infrastructure” in the United States.

December 20-21, a fire at PG&E’s Mission Street substation knocked out power to 130,000 San Francisco customers. One of the largest urban blackouts San Francisco has experienced.

The Base, fundamentally a Nazi group operated from Russia, is a designated terrorist organization in Canada, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union.

The Base, a Nazi terror group banned in most countries but not the USA, marches through Columbus, Ohio. Source: USA Today and JPost

It is not designated in the United States.

The FBI under President Trump, as a matter of historical fact, is acting today like how President Wilson did 100 years ago. Director Patel has expressly refused to investigate foreign assets and domestic terrorists threatening Americans:

…openly rerouted resources away from investigations of far-right extremists.

The following is an analytical case that San Francisco just experienced a Russian-directed domestic (insider) infrastructure attack.


Context

The Bay Area has been hit by sophisticated infrastructure attacks for sixteen years. None of the related and wider major incidents have been solved:

  • 2009: Coordinated fiber optic cuts at four locations. 52,000 customers affected, 911 knocked out across three counties. Required specialized tools, heavy equipment, knowledge of underground vault locations. $250,000 reward. Never solved.
  • 2013: Metcalf substation. Fiber cables cut first, then 100+ rifle rounds fired at 17 transformers over 19 minutes. $15 million in damage. DHS assessed “likely an insider.” $250,000 reward. Never solved.
  • 2014-2015: Eleven to fourteen fiber optic cuts over 14 months. Attackers dressed as telecom workers. FBI insisted attacks were “not linked” to Metcalf despite identical methods. Never solved.
  • 2022: Moore County, North Carolina. Two substations hit with rifle fire. 45,000 without power for five days. One woman died when her oxygen machine failed. DHS had issued a warning three days prior. $100,000 reward. Never solved.

The attacks that have been solved share a common feature: amateur tradecraft.

Peter Karasev googled “explosive materials” and “infrastructure attacks” before bombing two PG&E transformers—and got ten years. The Washington Christmas attack was an ATM robbery scheme. Brandon Russell recruited a co-conspirator who turned out to be an informant.

Professional operations with insider knowledge remain ghosts.

Europe Knows

Europe is experiencing identical attacks. The difference: they’re investigating.

Russian sabotage operations in Europe nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024, after quadrupling between 2022 and 2023. Targets include energy infrastructure, communications cables, defense manufacturing, and transportation systems.

The operational signature matches: low-tech, high-impact, plausible deniability, locally recruited perpetrators, communications cut before primary attacks.

The institutional response differs entirely. European governments attribute attacks to GRU coordination. They arrest perpetrators. They designate The Base as terrorists. NATO describes the threat level as “record high.”

The United States has the same attack signature, the same organization openly calling for infrastructure attacks, the same founder operating from Russian soil—and the FBI response is to deprioritize.

The Base is Foreign Run Domestic Terrorism

The Base recruits through a Russian email address. It operates cells in Appalachia, the Mid-Atlantic, and the Midwest—photos from 2025 show masked men with rifles and skull masks in American forests. Its Ukrainian wing claimed the July assassination of an intelligence officer in Kyiv. Its Spanish cell was just rolled up by Europol.

Nazzaro’s December audio was explicit:

Our long-term strategic goal is to accomplish something similar to what al-Qaida and IS accomplished in Syria. Form an organized, armed insurgency to take and hold territory.

He named only two countries with the “necessary prerequisites”: Ukraine and the United States.

The VKontakte post was operational doctrine:

…targeted attacks on essential infrastructure and resources [that] contribute to the political fragmentation of the country over time if the attacks remain consistent.

Less than three weeks later, 130,000 San Francisco customers lost power.

American Accountability Gap

PG&E’s response to the December 20th fire: hire Exponent.

Exponent is the infamous firm that defended tobacco companies, manufactured doubt about asbestos to deny cancer, and specializes in producing uncertainty for clients facing liability. They have even argued, to block crash victim claims, that seatbelts don’t reduce injuries. Exponent means this is not an investigation. This is PG&E narrative preparation, where the underlying pattern is clear:

  • The infrastructure is undefended (55,000 substations, effectively zero guards)
  • The threats are explicit (Nazzaro’s audio, The Base’s VKontakte posts)
  • The agency responsible has been captured (FBI deprioritizing under Patel)
  • The accountability mechanism has been privatized (Exponent)

We know the 1990 OTA (Putin KGB timeframe) found that losing three substations could blackout a region. A later leaked FERC assessment concluded losing nine substations plus a transformer manufacturer would collapse the entire grid for eighteen months.

We know from industry reports that intentional infrastructure attacks exceeded 15,000 incidents between June 2024 and June 2025 (Putin President timeframe).

We know The Base, a Nazi front group for Russian assets, called for exactly this kind of attack, from Russian soil, days before it happened.

Back to Preparedness Day

On July 22, 1916, a bomb exploded during San Francisco’s Preparedness Day parade, killing ten people. The attack was never solved.

Source: SFGate

But it was used.

Tom Mooney and Warren Billings, political organizers with no connection to the bombing, were targeted and convicted by President Wilson’s corrupted justice department on fabricated evidence and unfairly imprisoned for decades.

The institutional utility of the unsolved attack, for President Wilson, was it could be attributed to whoever served under his white nationalist agenda, which aligned at the time with German assets infiltrating America to bomb infrastructure.

Screen capture from 1915 movie “Birth of a Nation”, which President Wilson screened at the White House to restart the KKK and incite violence across America

The December 2025 blackout will likely follow the same trajectory.

Not solved, but enabled and used.

Exponent’s track record speaks for itself: 500 automotive lawsuits, zero findings of defect. Over $100 million from Ford for litigation defense. Tobacco industry work in the 1990s to keep people smoking. It will produce a shallow report that creates reasonable doubt about any specific cause to protect PG&E from any real investigation. The FBI will no longer hunt Nazis while ignoring The Base’s explicit calls for this exact attack. The pattern of unsolved professional operations is expected to continue under Trump’s puppet-like performances.

So don’t bother asking whether we can prove The Base conducted this specific attack or any others.

Ask instead why is a Nazi group openly calling for American infrastructure attacks from Russian territory, through Russian communications channels, led by an alleged Russian intelligence asset while sitting undesignated as a terrorist organization in the country that it explicitly targets.

The answer is the same as it was in 1916 when the KKK ran the White House as “America First”: the unsolved attack by foreign assets is more useful than the solved one.

The conventional narrative frames President Wilson and Henry Ford as naive pacifists, when they were the exact opposite. Ford refused to sell munitions to Britain and France, and “disappeared” millions in taxpayer money, while Germany couldn’t buy anyway due to the blockade; proving functional support aligned with the German war machine.

Ford received over $21 million in government contracts during WWI and delivered effectively nothing; $14 million for Eagle boats that were “either useless or not constructed,” $1.3 million for tractors never delivered, $5.5 million for spare parts never delivered. That’s not pacifism, because it’s sabotage through contract fraud, exactly paralleling what German military intelligence was doing with shell companies during the same period. Ford redirected $30,000 into Wilson’s 1916 re-election campaign at Joe Tumulty’s personal request, which nobody denied when challenged in the Congressional Record.

The history clearly shows that Wilson and Ford actively undermined America by sabotaging infrastructure for Allied preparedness, even enabling German agents to bomb San Francisco to kill Americans. Wilson knew. He was briefed. His fake “neutrality” rhetoric, funded by Ford, was disinformation to cover their foreign alignments.

Woodrow Wilson adopted the 1880s nativist slogan “America First” for his 1915 Presidential campaign and soon after the infamous white robe costumes appeared, based on the film “Birth of a Nation” that he heavily promoted to white-only audiences.
Nick Fuentes, a self-admitted white supremacist, claims MAGA means that 40% of staff in the White House are America First.

The “America First” administrations, both then and now, know foreign-directed sabotage is spreading, suppress investigations, and use overheated “immigrant” rhetoric to obscure right-wing extremist domestic terror cells operating with impunity.

MIT Operationalizes CIA Robotic Insects: Precision Lethality at Paperclip Scale

MIT has materialized what the CIA has wanted since early in the Cold War: deniable, unattributable, precision lethality.

…tiny flying robots could be deployed to aid in the search for survivors trapped beneath the rubble after a devastating earthquake. Like real insects, these robots could flit through tight spaces larger robots can’t reach, while simultaneously dodging stationary obstacles and pieces of falling rubble. So far, aerial microrobots have only been able to fly slowly along smooth trajectories, far from the swift, agile flight of real insects — until now. MIT researchers have demonstrated aerial microrobots that can fly with speed and agility that is comparable to their biological counterparts.

Insect sized robots at MIT, offering autonomous targeted micro lethality. Reminiscent of 2018 Micro Air Vehicle Lab (MAVLab) bird-sized versions. Source: MIT

The “humanitarian” framing is the… beard. All the “cameras and sensors” they mention as “future work” is sheer euphemism. A payload at this scale doesn’t need to be explosive; a guided needle, a directed toxin, a micro-charge at close range even inside of critical infrastructure.

The evolution from surveillance drone to armed drone to precision kinetic strike happened over roughly two decades. In terms of recent Lebanon and Caribbean strikes, we’re talking about people who market the R9X Hellfire (“Ninja”) blades as precision reducing collateral damage — amputation and destruction as humanitarian language.

Same rhetorical pattern here.

The argument that smaller and more precise is more ethical has been the justification for every escalation in targeted killing capability starting even before “Tarzon” (TAllboy, Range and aZimuth ONly) bombs or shoulder-fired mini-nuclear “Davy Crockett” rockets were claimed to be how America should win the Korean War cleanly.

The American racial encoding of this “frontier” weapon named after a genocidal folk hero (M28/M29 Davy Crockett) entered service in May 1961. It was promoted as a “surgical” strike, in photos like this one, where a white soldier poses as a “big dick” who needs soldiers of color to load and unload him. The Crockett rocket fired an “atomic watermelon” with 20 tons radioactive TNT equivalent up to 3 miles away.

This new technology announcement compresses the “precision” death timeline even more significantly because:

  • Scale advantage: A paperclip-weight robot is essentially undetectable. No radar signature. Visual acquisition nearly impossible.
  • Penetration capability: Explicitly designed to go where “traditional quadcopters can’t” — through rubble, gaps, screens, gates, grills, broken windows
  • Autonomous targeting: The saccade movement they’re celebrating mimics how insects localize and identify — that’s targeting behavior, not just navigation

And look at the funding: Office of Naval Research, Air Force Office of Scientific Research. The search-and-rescue framing is a dual-use press release. The money trail tells you the most likely uses and customers.

The CIA failed in the 1970s to get their Insectothopter (let alone robotic birds of Project Aquiline) operational, for precisely the reason this MIT team solved: crosswind instability.

The Insectothopter. Source: CIA Archives

The 1970s robotic dragonfly design couldn’t handle more than a light breeze, an important context for everything MIT just demonstrated:

  • Wind disturbances of >1 m/s handled
  • Aggressive maneuvers with <5cm trajectory deviation
  • Autonomous control (AI) architecture that compresses decision-making to distributed and real-time

Sarah Bergbreiter explicitly notes in the news release by MIT that while the controller still runs externally, they’ve demonstrated onboard execution.

“This work is especially impressive because these robots still perform precise flips and fast turns despite the large uncertainties that come from relatively large fabrication tolerances in small-scale manufacturing, wind gusts of more than 1 meter per second, and even its power tether wrapping around the robot as it performs repeated flips,” says Sarah Bergbreiter, a professor of mechanical engineering at Carnegie Mellon University, who was not involved with this work. “Although the controller currently runs on an external computer rather than onboard the robot, the authors demonstrate that similar, but less precise, control policies may be feasible even with the more limited computation available on an insect-scale robot. This is exciting because it points toward future insect-scale robots with agility approaching that of their biological counterparts,” she adds.

That’s the tell.

External computation means tethered, lab-bound demonstrations with oversight. Onboard computation means operational without oversight. She’s essentially confirming a roadmap to fly around and find out.

Search-and-rescue framing isn’t just cover for academic institutions appropriating funds, it’s how the Lincoln Laboratory gets graduate students to create weapons without moral injury or considering what happened when MIT’s death machines, known as Operation Igloo White, illegally destroyed Cambodia (Operation Menu).

Scene from “Bugging the Battlefield” by National Archives and Records Administration, 1969
Cambodia Genocide Map: US Bombing Points 1965-73, Source: Yale

Aussie Hull Cleaning Robots Reduce Ship Fuel 13%

These numbers are straightforward enough. Deploy a robotic pool cleaner to the bottom of ships to reduce drag, and save huge amounts of fuel.

A recent trial between the NRMA and the Rozelle-based hull-cleaning robot manufacturer revealed a 13 per cent fuel reduction on the diesel-powered NRMA Manly Fast Ferry fleet.

Using its arsenal of 4K cameras (mounted on the top, front and rear), dedicated lighting, sensors and propellers, the Hullbot successfully replaced the role of human divers during the trial to deliver a more regular, time-efficient hull cleaning maintenance.

Doing so reduced the amount of underwater drag created by biofouling (the accumulation of marine growth on ship hulls), which in turn made the circa 24-metre long vessels more efficient through the water.

Furthermore, the AI-powered robots performed critical cleaning duties on the hull exteriors that eliminated the need for antifouling paints.

The buried lede is the reduction in deadly paints. Antifouling is another word for toxicity, because the “fouling” stuff is being killed. These robots reduce a need to pollute, saving even more money on both paint and cleanup from the paint effects.

No wonder Hullbot just raised over $10M in a series A.

EU Solar Wins: Infrastructure Warfare Prep in Plain Sight

EU Energy Revolution is a National Security Upgrade

June 2025 marked a quiet turning point: solar became the EU’s single largest electricity source for the first time, generating 22% of the grid’s power. Not the largest renewable—the largest source, period.

Nuclear came in second at 21.6%—a position it’s going to have to get used to. With 350 GW installed and another 60+ GW being added annually, future solar has crossed from an “alternative” to the present “foundational infrastructure.”

Slovakia is in the best position to accelerate this further. The country currently sits at 22.1% renewable generation—among the EU’s lowest. But with rapid solar deployment options now on the table, Slovakia could leapfrog directly to the distributed generation model that’s reshaping Europe’s grid.

This transition is strategically sound: solar eliminates fuel logistics, severs dependency on energy imports, and distributes generation across millions of sites that can’t be targeted kinetically. No one misses worrying whether Russian billionaires will turn off pipelines from emotion, US billionaires will explode pipelines from neglect, or undersea infrastructure will be undermined.

At the same time we would be remiss to ignore how speed of technology adoption has outpaced security oversight (as usual). The gaps are creating risks and opportunities for controls that most existing frameworks weren’t designed to address.

What Changes in Transition

The shift to distributed solar fundamentally improves energy security—but in ways that require rethinking safety of power infrastructure.

Physical resilience through distribution: You can bomb a gas plant or a pipeline. You can’t meaningfully attack millions of distributed panels at scale. Solar is a genuine upgrade. Wars destroy centralized infrastructure; distributed generation systems simply reroute and carry on in scenarios that would cripple traditional grids.

No fuel supply chain: Once installed, solar has zero operational dependencies. No rail cars to intercept, no tankers to blockade, no refineries to sabotage. The strategic autonomy is real. No mines to send explosive drones into and shut down permanently, burning all the workers to death with a horrific fireball—you know, that famously clean coal dust Trump told the UN about. But I digress…

Faster recovery: A destroyed solar installation can be replaced in days or weeks. Rebuilding power plants takes many years. At scale, this means better grid resilience even if individual assets are compromised. Distributed resilience works under pressure—just look at Tokyo under occupation in 1948, which deployed hundreds of electric cars charging from hydro when the city had no fuel.

Nissan’s car making origin story is this Tama electric vehicle from 1947 with rapid “bomb bay door” rapid battery replacement on both sides.

These advantages are why the transition makes sense. But solar also introduced something new: millions of internet-connected control points with unclear security ownership.

The New Architecture Exposed

The computing analogy is familiar: mainframes had physical security and limited access. PCs introduced millions of endpoints requiring patches and antivirus. Mobile phones added cellular networks and location tracking. Each transition improved capability while requiring new security paradigms.

Solar’s transition is from physically secured, professionally operated generation to IoT devices managed by homeowners, monitored by installers, and remotely accessible by manufacturers.

The SPE report (SPE 2025 Solutions for PV Cyber Risks to Grid Stability) documents the concentration: thirteen manufacturers maintain remote access to over 5 GW each. Seven control more than 10 GW. Huawei alone shipped 114 GW to Europe between 2015-2023, with estimated remote access to 70% of that installed base. Chinese firms overall supplied 78% of global inverter capacity in 2023.

Individually, a compromised home solar system means nothing. Collectively, manufacturers have remote access to capacity equivalent to multiple large power plants. The report’s grid simulations found that coordinating just 3 GW of inverters to manipulate voltage through reactive power switching could trigger protective relays on nearby generators—potentially cascading into broader outages.

This mirrors early botnet dynamics: individual compromised PCs were nuisances until aggregated into DDoS networks capable of taking down critical services.

“No Operator” Problems

Traditional power infrastructure has clear security ownership. A nuclear plant has a security team, regulatory oversight, 24/7 monitoring. A rooftop solar installation has… a homeowner who set it up once and moved on.

Current EU cybersecurity frameworks (NIS2, the Cyber Resilience Act, Network Code on Cybersecurity) assume there’s an entity responsible for critical infrastructure security. For distributed solar, that entity often doesn’t exist legally. The installer completed their short job. The manufacturer is headquartered abroad. The homeowner thinks it’s appliance-level technology that someone else is responsible for, which would be fine if their Chinese-made-and-controlled toaster couldn’t accidentally destabilize the entire German power grid, but here we are.

During World War II, Deming was a member of the five-man Emergency Technical Committee. He worked with H.F. Dodge, A.G. Ashcroft, Leslie E. Simon, R.E. Wareham, and John Gaillard in the compilation of the American War Standards (American Standards Association Z1.1–3 published in 1942) and taught wartime production. His statistical methods were widely applied during World War II and after (foundational to Japanese auto manufacturing)

The SPE report further states that only 1 of 5 tested inverters supported basic security logging. Default passwords are common. Firmware updates are irregular. Network segmentation is rare. This isn’t malicious—it’s what happens when residential-scale deployment moves faster than security standards.

New Model, New Requirements. Ambiguity means neglect.

The technology doesn’t need to slow. The security framework needs to catch up. This is familiar territory for any director of security with a few years of direction under their belt.

Clear responsibility assignment: Either manufacturers are liable for their installed base security (like automotive recalls), or grid operators assume responsibility, or third-party security operators emerge as a market.

Communication architecture that matches the threat model: Germany’s approach with smart meter gateways is instructive—critical control functions (start/stop, power setpoint changes) route through regulated infrastructure. Monitoring and maintenance can remain direct. This applies standard IT security principles (network segmentation, controlled access) to distributed generation.

Supply chain transparency without protectionism: The issue isn’t where hardware is manufactured—it’s that concentration creates leverage, and remote access by entities outside regulatory jurisdiction creates enforcement gaps. Solutions range from Lithuania’s 2025 law (requiring EU-based intermediaries for systems >100 kW) to hardware/software separation (devices source globally, control software must be auditable and locally hosted).

Standards reflecting actual deployment: Current inverter security standards treat them like industrial control systems. But a device installed by a contractor, connected to home Wi-Fi, and managed via consumer apps isn’t an industrial system. It needs consumer electronics-level security: automatic updates, secure defaults, encrypted communications, no exposed credentials.

State-run Opportunity and Patterns

Rapid deployment in lagging states doesn’t have to repeat the security debt accumulated elsewhere. The country could mandate security baselines upfront: require certified communication gateways for grid-connected systems, establish clear responsibility chains, ensure data localization for operational telemetry.

This isn’t exotic technology. It’s applying lessons from mobile computing and IoT security to distributed generation. The components exist—Hardware Security Modules, Trusted Execution Environments, regulated intermediaries, cryptographic firmware signing. What’s missing is regulatory clarity and enforcement.

Every infrastructure revolution creates security debt paid down over time. Early automobiles had no seatbelts. Early internet had no encryption. Early mobile phones had no app sandboxing.

Solar is mid-transition. Capability deployment happened fast (Europe added 60+ GW in 2024 alone). Security retrofit is lagging. That’s normal but fixable.

The unique aspect: solar’s security model should be superior. Distributed systems are inherently more resilient. But only if distribution is real. When remote access reconcentrates control with manufacturers, you’ve recreated centralized vulnerability while losing traditional plants’ physical security and professional operation.

Europe’s solar buildout is strategically sound. The cybersecurity gap is solvable with existing technology. What’s missing is regulatory clarity on responsibility and baseline security requirements for distributed generation at scale.

Any future rapid deployment can be a model—showing that speed and security aren’t trade-offs when architecture is right from the start. Or it could simply balance out tech debts and provide resilience while others catch up.

The tech works, for national security. The economics work, for national security. The climate math even works, for national security. Now the security model also needs to catch up and work… for national security.