Trump Supreme Court Rules He Can Destroy Election Ballots He Dislikes

The Committees of Correspondence existed because the British Crown controlled colonial mail and used it for surveillance. The first thing revolutionaries built was a secure postal network outside royal control. Benjamin Franklin, fired as colonial postmaster for sympathizing with rebels, became the Continental Congress’s first Postmaster General in 1775. The Constitution puts postal authority in Article I, Section 8, alongside coining money and raising armies. The Post Office Act of 1792 criminalized mail tampering and subsidized newspaper delivery so political information reached every citizen. Mail sanctity was the precondition of the republic.

Kings intercept mail.

Kings destroy mail.

That’s what made them kings.

The entire American founding was organized around the principle that a government which controls who receives information and whose voice reaches the public square is a tyranny.

Trump thinks he will be king.

On Tuesday, the Supreme Court sided with his tin-pot crown.

The Ruling

The infamously corrupt Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a 5-4 majority in USPS v. Konan, held that Americans cannot sue the Postal Service when its employees deliberately steal or destroy their mail.

That’s right, under Trump Americans now have no recourse when their post office targets them and destroys or tampers with their mail.

The case began when Lebene Konan, a landlord in Euless, Texas, alleged that local carriers intentionally refused to deliver mail to her tenants for two years simply because a Black woman leased rooms to white people. She sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives government immunity for certain lawsuits but bars claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” The 5th Circuit ruled the obvious: that provision covers accidents. Congress wrote it to shield routine delays from litigation, and ONLY routine delays.

Thomas then performed the kind of linguistic integrity breach that would get a first-year law student failed. He tortured language until it served an authoritarian end.

He swapped in a synonym that changes the meaning, then pretended the synonym was there all along. “Loss” became “deprivation.” And since you can be deprived of something when someone steals it, stolen mail has merely been “lost.”

By this logic, a mugging is merely the involuntary transfer of assets. Slavery is simply waking up one day in chains.

Newspaper Archaeology

The “miscarriage” analysis was bolder. Thomas needed to show that ordinary English speakers use the word to describe intentional withholding of mail. The government’s lawyers found zero examples. So Thomas did his own research and produced two citations: an 1893 article from the Carbondale Leader and a 1911 piece from the Kansas City Star. Two newspaper clippings, twenty years apart, at least thirty years before the FTCA was enacted.

As Sotomayor noted in dissent, if this usage were common, better evidence would exist than century-old small-town journalism the justice dug up himself. The opinion reflects a decision made before the reasoning was assembled.

The Quiet Part

Every Republican-appointed justice signed on except Neil Gorsuch, who joined Sotomayor’s dissent. The ruling arrives eight months before midterm elections in which millions of Americans will vote by mail. USPS processed nearly 100 million mail ballots in 2024. Several states conduct elections entirely by mail.

The FTCA created a deterrent: if a postal worker destroyed your ballot, you could sue. The lawsuit was the mechanism of accountability — it uncovered misconduct, generated public records, and created professional consequences. That deterrent is gone. A court will dismiss the case before any investigation begins.

Trump has installed his own man atop the Postal Service. He controls the Justice Department. The federal agencies that would normally investigate ballot destruction answer to a president who has openly telegraphed his intent to undermine the next election. The Supreme Court just removed the one remaining civil remedy available to individual voters whose ballots are deliberately destroyed.

Thomas Against Thomas

Thomas has previously written about the “risk of fraud” posed by mail voting, specifically citing the danger of “stealing absentee ballots.” He identified the correct threat vector. Then in Konan, he eliminated one of the few legal tools designed to deter exactly that threat.

This is a pattern. The same court that treats hypothetical fraud as grounds for restricting voting rights treats actual fraud — committed by government employees against voters — as immunized activity. The risk is only legible when it justifies making voting harder. When it justifies accountability, it disappears.

Margaret Schaack laid this out in the University of Chicago Law Review last year: a ruling for the government in Konan would deny “direct recourse to potential litigants whose ballots are stolen,” embolden postal workers to interfere with elections, and disincentivize USPS from preventing intentional misconduct.

The court ruled for the government anyway.

The founders built a republic on the principle that mail belongs to the people, and a government that tampers with it is a tyranny.

Mail theft is a federal crime.

The Supreme Court just ruled that when the government commits it, the people have no recourse.

The Crown wins, apparently. The midterms are in November.

Fishing Nets Reverse Russian Drone Kill Zone

The most important detail in the Financial Times’ investigation of Ukraine’s front lines isn’t the kill zone, the fiber-optic drones, or the soldiers trapped for 165 days without rotation. It’s the fishing nets.

French and Swedish fishing nets, suspended over roads, hospitals, and critical infrastructure in Kherson, are intercepting 95% of incoming Russian drones. Up from 80% last May. Not with radar-guided missiles, not with electronic warfare, not with AI-powered counter-drone systems. Nets. The oldest barrier technology in human history is defeating precision-guided munitions at a cost ratio that inverts everything the defense industry has been selling for decades.

Simple Economics as Strategy

An FPV drone costs a few hundred dollars. A fiber-optic variant under $1000. Russia produces them by the million. And soon they’ll be 3D printed by field teams themselves. The standard counter-drone response of jamming, directed energy, and kinetic intercept costs orders of magnitude more per engagement than the drone itself. That’s an attacker’s economy. The defender bleeds money and time faster than the attacker spends it.

Fishing nets flip the ratio back. The cost per meter of industrial netting is trivial. Once installed, it works continuously with zero per-engagement cost. No operator, no ammunition, no power supply. A drone hits the net, tangles, detonates harmlessly or falls. The net gets repaired or replaced for almost nothing. The attacker has to keep spending thousands per attempt against a barrier that costs pennies per interception.

That’s an economic advantage that’s sustainable.

Who Built It First

Kherson has been the laboratory. The city’s population dropped from 250,000 to 60,000 under relentless Russian drone strikes, with over 9,500 attacks on civilians by December 2024. Governor Prokudin responded with what he calls a “drone dome”: layered netting over critical routes and buildings, combined with EW systems, sensors, and civilians trained with shotguns. In some districts the sky is barely visible through the mesh.

The FT describes the same approach spreading across the front. Thousands of kilometers of nets now form tunnels over main highways, stopping suicide FPV drones from diving at vehicles. The Pentagon recently issued guidance recommending nets, barriers, and camouflage as low-cost physical defenses against small drones. Taiwan is building its T-Dome program directly from Kherson’s experience.

Nets Answer the Drone Zone Question

Last November I wrote about Ukraine’s quartermaster problem in Pokrovsk — the 20km death zone where centralized linear logistics had become suicidal under persistent drone interdiction. The FT’s kill zone report confirms that condition now covers the entire front. Two soldiers held position near Orikhiv for 165 days, thirty relief attempts failed, fog saved them. Supplies move by cargo drone and UGV. Troops crawl under thermal cloaks for days.

I compared the problem to Grant’s quartermaster insight: you don’t counter interdiction with better tactics, you build a supply architecture more resilient than the enemy’s ability to disrupt it. Multiple independent routes, pre-positioned caches, expendable logistics with losses built into planning ratios.

Nets are one such logistics architecture. Cover the supply routes with physical barriers, and the kill zone starts to shrink. Vehicles can move under netting. Positions can be resupplied. The 30 failed relief attempts become possible when the approach route is physically shielded. The engineering problem I described, to sustain forces inside a drone-saturated environment, has an inexpensive answer.

Machine Guns and Barbed Wire

The defense establishment keeps comparing drones to the tank of 1916 as if a new offensive capability awaiting doctrinal innovation. That’s backwards. Drones are the machine gun. They destroyed the old paradigm of conventional movement.

The kill zone is no man’s land. And nets are barbed wire’s inversion.

In WWI, barbed wire made from surplus telegraph supplies was cheap passive defense that made the kill zone lethal for attackers. Nets are cheap passive defense that makes the kill zone survivable for defenders. Same principle. Physical barriers that cost almost nothing defeat expensive offensive systems, by working in the opposite direction. Wire aided the machine guns. Nets defeat the drones.

The 40km fiber-optic cables, the dynamic mining, the electronic warfare stalemate — all of that is real and accelerating. But the counter already exists. It’s sitting in declining or dormant fishing ports. Defense spending could revive coastal economies instead of enriching bumbling contractors.

The question is whether militaries will scale it as infrastructure or keep chasing expensive technological and ideological unicorns while soldiers crawl through the mud under thermal blankets.

General Grant would have ordered net production over six months ago.

De Oppresso Liber Was a Trust Doctrine: SOF Can’t Get Back There From Venezuela

Sitting on my desk is a ship in a bottle my father gave me, made by Bill Donovan. When I look at the tiny masts, their delicate rigging, above the blue painted waves, I’m reminded how the precise qualities of an operator used to be measured.

And then I look over at Seth Harp’s book.

He explains Special Operations missions in the GWOT as:

…covertly liquidating the male population base of recalcitrant ethnic and tribal groups that resist U.S. military occupation.

Ouch.

The book gets reviewed plainly by some as an emerging revelation about how badly things turned out under Bush. The far more important exposure actually needs to be about what’s developing post-GWOT.

SOF operators increasingly hint towards decoupled regional commands, district-style zones of interest, an end to the global sharing frameworks that defined twenty years of allied operations. Everyone points to the Delta operation in Venezuela using narrow cartel designations as proof the model works without foundational coalition architecture.

This is regressive doctrine dressed as adaptation. It’s like how people invoke Monroe as cover for the exact opposite doctrine. I mean, look at what “special” has meant and what operators increasingly want it to mean next.

Tailored and Relative Defense

The original Special Forces mission that we study, such as Bank, the OSS lineage, and de oppresso liber all defined “special” as being tight and tailored. Small teams shaped to specific cultural contexts, building indigenous defensive capability relative to local threats. The operator learned the language, lived in the village, measured success by what the partner force could do after Americans left. The 12-man ODA existed to enable durable local resilience. Medic as community entry point, intelligence sergeant building networks through relationships, team sergeant as institutional memory.

“Special” meant fit to context and oriented toward defense that enabled populations to protect themselves. Force multiplication structure, training, selection all followed from this. The screens were for cultural adaptability, communication aptitude, comfort with ambiguity, patience measured in years.

Universal and Industrialized Offense

GWOT flushed all that away with a rush to produce body tags. McChrystal’s F3EAD cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate) redefined “special” as universal champions of death tolls. One kill chain applied anywhere and everywhere. Track a target, kill him and every military-age male nearby, seize documents, generate more names, repeat again hours later. Speed through targets, shoot first, and only ask questions so you can start shooting again. The same process in Anbar, Helmand, Mogadishu, the Sahel. Context didn’t exist beyond the shape of the kill zones. Cultural knowledge didn’t matter beyond the direction the door kicked in. The machine was industrialized offense, optimized for speed and volume of kills on a full sprint.

This required total information access across allied networks and worked because Five Eyes plus NATO SOF plus partner nations operated as a single organism with shared targeting databases. The global architecture made universal application possible.

It also inverted de oppresso liber completely. Indigenous partners became consumable inputs to the targeting machine. Afghan commandos serviced American kill lists. A force designed to enable tailored local defense was reoptimized into universal industrial offense that depopulated resistance. And the more the thoughtless machinery depopulated areas, the higher the percentage of resistance. Just like Vietnam. Go figure.

Decoupled and Unleashed

The operators calling for regional decoupling lately think they are wisely preparing for a world where the U.S. no longer has authority. Turkey running SOF against the American-trained forces in Syria. France pushed out of the Sahel by Wagner. Gulf states with SOF relationships that bypass JSOC. The global sharing framework broke when Hegseth used it for war crimes in the Caribbean, so formalize it.

What they actually propose is a third model worse than either predecessor. Not tailored defense. Not even universal offense with its coalition constraints. It’s a decoupled offense of regional fiefdoms operating under their own legal authority, political cover, and information control, answerable to whoever holds the designation authority in their district.

“Special” stops meaning tailored or even universal. It means unleashed, above the law because loyal to the directed mission only. A force pointed at whatever target the political sponsor designates, with no doctrinal requirement to build anything, no allied framework providing oversight, and no cooperative architecture satisfying the SOF truths that most special operations require non-SOF assistance.

The GWOT model, for all the horrors that Harp documents in his book, at least maintained the structural possibility of allied pushback. Partners who share a common operational picture can object. Decoupled districts eliminate that. Each zone operates in its own information silo, like Chad or Guatemala under Reagan. Nobody outside sees the full picture until criminal tribunals investigate decades later.

De oppresso liber is a trust doctrine.

Populations considering partnership with American SOF watched what happened to the Montagnards, the Kurds, the Hmong, the Afghans. The institutional record is politically conditional treatment. Decoupled regional commands with rotating political sponsorship will only make that worse. What serious opposition figure in Venezuela or anywhere else will invest in a relationship with a force that has no doctrinal commitment to their survival and no allied framework holding it accountable?

Tailored relative defense built things that lasted. Universal industrialized offense destroyed them. The new trend towards decoupled and unleashed doesn’t even pretend to try.

Putin’s Advisors Warn of Russia Collapse Summer 2026

Alexandra Prokopenko, a former Russian central bank adviser now at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, published an op-ed in The Economist comparing Russia’s wartime economy to a mountaineer’s death zone. She invokes life at an altitude above 8,000 meters where the body consumes itself faster than it can repair. Fortune’s summary carries the headline that Russia is “eating its own muscle to survive.”

She’s right. Oil revenue crashed 50% year-over-year in January. Interest payments on government debt now exceed education and health spending combined. CSIS estimates 1.2 million military casualties.

The economy has split into a well-fed defense sector with a short lifespan, and a starving civilian one with a short lifespan, producing GDP figures that measure only the manufacture of assets designed for death and destruction. This is fact, uncontroversial. Russian officials have themselves warned Putin a financial crisis is likely to arrive this summer.

Stating that a malnourished nearly dead patient is dying is the easy part.

Prognosis or treatment options are where analysis is supposed to go. Prokopenko plays it safe precisely because it remains diagnostic. She documents the obvious symptoms with admirable precision, then concludes that Russia “can probably continue waging war for the foreseeable future“. Well, in fact, that’s a sentence her own evidence contradicts.

The Question She Should Ask

What happens when three converging failure modes intersect this summer? A banking system under stress from consumer loan defaults and corporate credit starvation; a military that now loses personnel faster than it can recruit, pushing Putin toward forced mobilization (the political third rail he avoided for three years); and oil revenue below the budget floor that forces binary choices between funding the war and funding the state.

These variables accelerate each other. Forced mobilization pulls workers from the civilian economy, accelerating loan defaults. Oil revenue decline constrains the budget, sharpening the choice between military and civilian spending. The banking system is the connective tissue. When it seizes, three problems merge into one big systemic event.

Russia had exactly this in 1998. We do not have to pretend it is theoretical.

The Question Everyone Should Want Answered

There is a second deafening silence in the analysis, more consequential than the first. Naming specific failure triggers immediately raises the matter of agency. If the collapse mechanisms are so clearly visible (banking contagion, recruitment shortfall, oil revenue floor) then so are the policy levers that could accelerate or shape them. Controlled prairie burns are far better than just waiting for lightning storms.

Tighter sanctions enforcement. Secondary sanctions on buyers of Russian crude. Further restrictions on financial system access. Coordinated pressure at the points where the three failure modes converge.

This is what “controlled burn” looks like in historical practice. Russia’s economy breaks. Russian officials are already telling their own president it breaks this summer. The question is whether external actors shape the manner of the burn or whether, as in so many previous cases, everyone waits for a lightning strike and then pretends the blaze was unforeseeable.

Prokopenko chose the mountaineering metaphor. Mountains are geological. Inevitable. Natural and beyond human agency.

Meh. At least she didn’t say here be dragons.

The more accurate framing is a large dam under pressure: the engineering failure modes are visible, the materials are known and stress points measured, and the difference between a controlled release and a catastrophic breach is whether anyone with authority decides to act before the structure does what is expected.

Green Berets know what I’m talking about.

The history of economic collapses in wartime states is a history of phase transitions. It is rapid, nonlinear, and in retrospect obvious. It is preceded by a long period in which analysts trying to protect themselves described trajectory without taking the risk of naming a destination.

Authoritarian systems by definition starve their populations and then in crisis exhibit the cognitive signatures of hypoxia: degraded emotional processing, loss of positive bias, impaired decision-making. It’s science not fiction.