Vuoi Vuoi Me (Henrik Schwarz Remix)

A Sámi song by Mari Boine, remixed by Henrik Schwarz.

From the album “It Ain’t Necessarily Evil – Mari Boine Remixed Vol II”

And below is my remix of the translation from a language once banned:

Sami languages, and Sami song-chants, called yoiks, were illegal in Norway from 1773 until 1958…in Russia, Sami children were taken away when aged 1-2 and returned when aged 15-17 with no knowledge of their language and traditional communities.

language and song were considered such a risk that they were banned for centuries.

The Sami chant, the yoik, traditionally had a dual function. On the one hand, it was, and still remains, the distinctive musical expression of the Sami. The yoik is used “to remember people”, to characterize individuals, animals and landscapes. It can be described as a melodic-rhythmic lecture, in which rhythm is paramount and less emphasis is put on the verbal description of the lyrics. The yoiker’s task is to use music and images to create an emotion or atmosphere that then evokes the person, animal or place yoiked. In the pre-Christian religion, the yoik formed an important part of religious ceremonies. In such ceremonies, the shaman added a rhythmic accompaniment to the yoik by beating his drum. This dual function is the reason why some people even today see the yoik as sinful and therefore incompatible with Christian religious life.

As early as the 17th century the yoik was banned by law. Anyone breaking the law was to be punished severely. The reason the yoik was banned and condemned at this time was that the period saw the beginning of Christian missions among the Sami, and the yoik was seen exclusively as an expression of pre-Christian religion.

Finnmark protests 1981Mari Boine explains in the video below how and why she started to recognizes and reclaim her own heritage and sing the yoik.

She mentions the protests and violence in the news at the beginning of the 1980s, as seen in the photo to the right, had a strong effect on her sense of identity; the controversial construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the Alta river in Finnmark, Northern Norway created feelings of anger and rage for her as a Sámi.

Vuoi mu gollelottas
Vuoi mu beaiveidjalottas
giehka ja goaskin
Vuoi mu spalfu
Vuoi mu spalfu
miellevuol besiinis
Vuoi mu idjaloddi
ravddahis geahcastagainis
Vuoivuoi mu
Vuoivuoi mu

Vuoivuoi daid iluid
Vuoivuoi daid iluid
skeaikkigavnnasmeriidisguin
Vuoi daid morrasiid
Vuoi daid morrasiid
salteganjalmearaidisguin
Vuoivuoi daid buollasiid
Vuoivuoi daid buollasiid
vuoi gesiid mearehis bahkaid
Vuoivuoi mu
Vuoivuoi mu

   Vuoi my little yellow bird
Vuoi my summer night bird
cuckoo and eagle
Vuoi my swallow
Vuoi my swallow
with nest under riverbanks
Vuoi night owl
with limitless vision
Vuoivuoi me
Vuoivuoi me

Vuoivuoi joy
Vuoivuoi joy
with hearty laughter
Vuoi sorrow
Vuoi sorrow
with oceans of salty tears
Vuoivuoi winter frost and cold
Vuoivuoi winter frost and cold
vuoi summer with burning hot days
Vuoivuoi me
Vuoivuoi me

Ethiopia Anti-Terror Law: Journalists jailed for 11 years

Two journalists from Sweden illegally entered the eastern region of Ethiopia by crossing the border from Somalia. This has not been disputed.

What happened next is now the center of a brewing controversy over whether a journalist should be considered a terrorist if he is reporting on one.

The two journalists, Martin Schibbye and Johan Persson, apparently met with the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front), a group of Oromo classified by the Ethiopian government as a terrorist organization, to enter Ethiopia and investigate claims that civilians are being forcibly removed from PetroTrans Exploration Areas. Here is a video from them as they prepare for the trip.

The journalists, as they traveled with the ONLF this past July, were caught in battle with the Ethiopian military. They were then captured (as you can see at the end of the video above). Now they have just been sentenced to 11 years in jail under recently passed anti-terrorism laws.

Amnesty International says Ethiopian authorities have been using anti-terror laws as a pretext to arrest and silence politicians and journalists who criticize government policies.

In a report released Friday, the human rights group said at least 114 opposition politicians and six journalists have been arrested since March.

Amnesty said, in many cases, calls for peaceful protests or attempts to conduct investigative journalism have been interpreted as acts of terrorism or other criminal wrongdoing.

While journalists and politicians in Ethiopia have been subject to arrests in the past, the report said the recent increase in terror charges represents “a new level of repression” in the government’s efforts to stifle political dissent.

Amnesty also criticized several senior Ethiopian government officials, including Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, for making public comments that imply that all terror suspects are guilty.

The Oromo liberation movements in Ethiopia are as old as the Eritrean and Tigrean ones. However, they have not achieved the same results and so they stand out as the ethnic group most at risk of government anti-terror campaigns.

While the Eritreans were able to create an independent state and the Trigreans have taken power in Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi, the Oromo movement has been less effective. Perhaps because of the Oromo population being the largest in Ethiopia it lacks the unified effort like the Eritreans and Tigreans; it is fractured by internal social/language, political and religious differences. The ONLF thus is just one of several Oromo groups still active and considered terrorists.

The arrest by the Ethiopian government of independent journalists who claim to be working on human rights issues (documenting ethnic-based mistreatment) could thus be based on fear that their work could bring the Oromo factions closer together; the larger population of Oromo might react to reports and turn against any minority group in power. But this is merely speculation. On the flip side the Oromo factions also could be closer together when they see journalists being arrested.

In any case the bottom line is that no real proof or explanation of a link to terrorism so far has been demonstrated for these two journalists yet they face 11 years in prison. The closest seems to be a video of them with guns while in presence of the ONLF, which does not seem like a normal standard of proof.

During the 6 September hearing, the prosecutor screened a propaganda video in support of the charges. The video, which showed the two journalists holding guns, had been posted on the pro-government Caakara News website a few days after their arrest. The defence strongly objected to the fact that sounds of shooting had been added to the soundtrack.

After the trial opened on 18 October, the charge of “participating in terrorism” was dropped on 3 November but the other two charges, supporting a terrorist group and entering the country illegally, were maintained.

It appears that conviction through any association is what Ethiopia intends to do with their new anti-terrorism laws. Digital Journal points out the judge used reverse logic in his harsh ruling and demanded journalists have to prove they are not helping terrorists.

…Judge Shemsu Sirgaga said the two “have not been able to prove that they did not support terrorism.” International media groups called attention to Judge Sirgaga’s remarks as a symptom of a deeper problem in the region. “Instead of proving their guilt, the judge accuses them of failing to prove their innocence. This is back-to-front,” wrote the secretary general of Reporters without Borders, Jean-Francois Julliard.

Digital Journal goes on to point out that the prime minister of Ethiopia has publicly stated a similar line of reasoning, that a distinction between journalists and their subjects has not been proven.

“Why would a journalist be involved with a terrorist organization and enter the country with a terrorist organization, escorted by armed terrorists, participating in fighting in which a terrorist organization was involved? If that is journalism, I don’t know what terrorism is,” [Meles Zenawi] said.

Note that he is quoted saying “participating in fighting” although the charges were merely “supporting” a group. In related news Ethiopia could again require (i.e. like the days of the Red Terror) all citizens to prove they are not going to overthrow the government.

AWS Object Expiration

Amazon has announced that you can schedule the deletion of objects in Simple Storage Service (S3); it also warns that there can be a delay between a scheduled expiration and an actual deletion, and that if you leave an empty prefix in an expiration rule then it will expire all your objects.

Some objects that you store in an S3 bucket might have a well-defined lifetime. For example, you might be uploading periodic logs to your bucket. After a period of time, you might not need to retain those log objects. In the past, you were responsible for deleting such objects when you no longer needed them. Now you can use Object Expiration to specify a lifetime for objects in your bucket.

With Object Expiration, when an object reaches the end of its lifetime, Amazon S3 queues it for removal and removes it asynchronously. There may be a small lag between the expiration date and the date at which Amazon S3 removes an object. You are not charged for storage time associated with an object that has expired.

It begs the question whether an expiration action is reversible, since the object technically has not been deleted. This is not just important from a forensics point of view but also for sneakily avoiding charges.

Final ATSB Report on 2008 Qantas flight QF72

The Australian Transportation Safety Bureau has released a comprehensive set of reports with an impressive amount of detail on the “In-flight upset – Airbus A330-303, VH-QPA, 154 km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008

Although the FCPC [flight control primary computer] algorithm for processing AOA [angle of attack] data was generally very effective, it could not manage a scenario where there were multiple spikes in AOA from one ADIRU [air data inertial reference unit] that were 1.2 seconds apart. The occurrence was the only known example where this design limitation led to a pitch-down command in over 28 million flight hours on A330/A340 aircraft, and the aircraft manufacturer subsequently redesigned the AOA algorithm to prevent the same type of accident from occurring again.

Each of the intermittent data spikes was probably generated when the LTN-101 ADIRU’s central processor unit (CPU) module combined the data value from one parameter with the label for another parameter. The failure mode was probably initiated by a single, rare type of internal or external trigger event combined with a marginal susceptibility to that type of event within a hardware component. There were only three known occasions of the failure mode in over 128 million hours of unit operation. At the aircraft manufacturer’s request, the ADIRU manufacturer has modified the LTN-101 ADIRU to improve its ability to detect data transmission failures.

The failure caused the aircraft to take two abrupt “pitch-down” moves as depicted in a (5MB AVI) report video below. The sudden dive injured over 100 passengers and 75% of the crew; 39 were treated in hospital.

The simple explanation is that frequent data spikes had not been anticipated in the ADIRU. Now that the FCPC algorithms to process AOA have been updated for this rare issue the report is classified as complete.

However, the report leaves open the possibilities of a “rare type of…trigger event”. It does not, for example, completely rule out speculation about interference from Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt — “the most powerful [kilohertz] transmission station in the Southern hemisphere” — near Learmonth Airport. Note the locations of the three similar spike issues.

The closest the report comes to final word on a trigger event is to say possibilities were “found to be unlikely”

…the failure mode was probably initiated by a single, rare type of trigger event combined with a marginal susceptibility to that type of event within the CPU module’s hardware. The key components of the two affected units were very similar, and overall it was considered likely that only a small number of units exhibited a similar susceptibility.

Some of the potential triggering events examined by the investigation included a software ‘bug’, software corruption, a hardware fault, physical environment factors (such as temperature or vibration), and electromagnetic interference (EMI) from other aircraft systems, other on-board sources, or external sources (such as a naval communication station located near Learmonth). Each of these possibilities was found to be unlikely based on multiple sources of evidence. The other potential triggering event was a single event effect (SEE) resulting from a high-energy atmospheric particle striking one of the integrated circuits within the CPU module. There was insufficient evidence available to determine if an SEE was involved, but the investigation identified SEE as an ongoing risk for airborne equipment.

Although the threat may continue to be unknown, the ATSB report is complete based on confidence that the vulnerability has been resolved by changes to the FCPC algorithms. It’s a good counter-example to my occasional point that to be secure is to be vulnerable. Here is a case where the risk from a vulnerability is so high, while the cost of a fix is so low, it had to be patched.