As a long time advocate and expert in cyberattacks, I call bullshit on Venezuela operations.
150 aircraft. City-wide blackout. Substations reduced to rubble. Over 40 dead. All this just to arrest one guy and his wife at a known location, after months of constant expensive CIA surveillance.
This is the most obnoxious attack I’ve ever studied in forty years, including Hegseth’s flaccidly failed Houthi attacks, clearly disproportionate and (I’m not a lawyer) apparently illegal. Someone wanted to destroy infrastructure and prevent it being used again. Were they expecting the contract to rebuild, or expecting to sell it?
Calling this precision is like reclassifying a gold-plated toilet as a disposable cup when taxpayers complain about cost. Throwing records of billions wasted into a shredder doesn’t make anything better. We all saw the gold-plated toilet, right?
And when did the NYT turn into a laundry for dirty government tricks?
Cyberattack in Venezuela Demonstrated Precision of U.S. Capabilities
Oh did it? I see the debunked atomic bomb theory of victory. American politicians (i.e. military-industrial-congressional complex) want everyone to buy into expensive new technology and ignore what actually happened on the ground. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria is what compelled Japan to surrender in WWII. But Americans apparently are still being treated by the NYT as suckers for a “clean tech” narrative. Their false “demonstrated precision” story serves the same function today as 1945.
Let me explain, for those not inside cyberattack circles, because this is some disturbing revisionism by the NYT.
Back in 2019 the NYT told us that Maduro was lying about US cyberattacks – no evidence, just poor maintenance. The largest power outage in the country’s history. At least 43 deaths. Infrastructure decay.
Now in 2026 the NYT says US cyberattack “demonstrated precision of capabilities” because 150 aircraft pounded the city into rubble in a loudly claimed American demonstration of might.
The same paper that dismissed Maduro’s 2019 accusations as paranoid dictator propaganda is now laundering the actual 2026 attack as a technical achievement.
You can’t use hundreds of planes to bomb critical infrastructure to rubble and call it a demonstration of “precision, reversible” cyberattack.
More to the point, you can’t heavily bomb a city’s power grid to serve an arrest warrant and call it light police work.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Criteria
| Test | Standard | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Military Necessity | Force must be necessary to achieve a legitimate military objective. Less destructive alternatives must be unavailable or impractical. | Hague Conventions; Customary IHL Rule 14 |
| Distinction | Parties must distinguish between combatants and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects. Attacks may only be directed at military objectives. | Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, Art. 48, 51-52 |
| Proportionality | Expected civilian harm must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. | Additional Protocol I, Art. 51(5)(b), 57 |
| Precaution | All feasible precautions must be taken to minimize civilian harm. Advance warning must be given unless circumstances do not permit. | Additional Protocol I, Art. 57-58 |
| Humanity | Weapons and methods that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering are prohibited. | Hague Convention IV; Additional Protocol I, Art. 35 |
Jus ad Bellum Criteria (Right to War)
| Test | Standard | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Just Cause | Use of force requires self-defense against armed attack or UN Security Council authorization. | UN Charter Art. 2(4), 51; Chapter VII |
| Right Authority | Only legitimate authorities may authorize military force. Unilateral action without UNSC approval is presumptively unlawful. | UN Charter Art. 39-42 |
| Right Intention | Force must be used for stated legitimate purpose, not territorial gain, regime change, or resource acquisition. | Customary International Law |
| Last Resort | All reasonable peaceful alternatives must be exhausted before force is employed. | UN Charter Art. 2(3), 33 |
| Proportionality (ad bellum) | Overall harm caused by intervention must not exceed harm prevented. Scope of force must match scope of threat. | ICJ Nicaragua v. United States (1986) |
| Reasonable Chance of Success | Military action must have reasonable prospect of achieving its stated objectives. | Just War Theory; Customary IL |
Applied: Operation Absolute Resolve (Venezuela, January 3, 2026)
| Test | Assessment | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Just Cause | US claims law enforcement action on narcoterrorism indictment. No armed attack by Venezuela. No UNSC authorization. “Inherent constitutional authority” is domestic legal theory, not international law. | FAIL |
| Right Authority | No UN Security Council authorization. No congressional declaration of war. Executive action only. | FAIL |
| Right Intention | Trump stated US will “run the country” and rebuild oil infrastructure. María Corina Machado (democratic opposition leader) dismissed. Suggests resource/regime objectives beyond stated law enforcement purpose. | FAIL |
| Last Resort | Trump claims phone call to Maduro offering surrender. No evidence of exhausted diplomatic channels, sanctions review, or international negotiation. | FAIL |
| Military Necessity | Objective: arrest two individuals at known, surveilled location. Method: 150 aircraft, city-wide blackout, infrastructure destruction. Less destructive alternatives clearly available given intelligence penetration. | FAIL |
| Distinction | Civilian power grid deliberately targeted. Substations serving residential areas destroyed. “Lights of Caracas were largely turned off” per Trump. | FAIL |
| Proportionality (in bello) | 40+ killed including civilians. 3+ million affected by blackout. Hospitals, water systems, communications disrupted. Ongoing infrastructure damage 12+ days later. Military advantage: custody of two individuals. | FAIL |
| Precaution | No advance warning to civilian population. Operation conducted at 2 AM to maximize surprise. Media asked to suppress information. | FAIL |
| Proportionality (ad bellum) | Scale of intervention (invasion-level force) vastly exceeds stated threat (criminal fugitives). Precedent: any nation can now militarily extract foreign leaders under domestic indictments. | FAIL |
| Reasonable Success | Maduro kidnapped, yet stable transition cancelled and regime apparatus uncertain, with Maduro’s own replacement now president. | UNCERTAIN |
Venezuela wasn’t political intercourse with other means; it was intentionally and unnecessarily overwhelming force dressed up as law enforcement dressed up as cyber precision. That’s three layers of misdirection and disinformation.
Note on “Law Enforcement” Framing: The Trump administration rebranded to a “War Department,” called bombing civilians in small boats a “Drug War,” and now calls invading a sovereign nation “law enforcement with military support” under a theory of inherent presidential authority that no international body recognizes. International law does not permit military operations in sovereign territory to execute domestic criminal warrants. Even the Noriega invasion (1989), widely condemned as illegal, had trigger events and threats, OAS consultation, congressional notification, and a treaty basis that Venezuela entirely lacks. Rebranding defense to a War Department and then calling their planes and bombs “law enforcement” doesn’t change legal character under IHL or the UN Charter.
Soviet invasion propaganda called Molotov’s inhumane cluster bombs “bread baskets” for Finnish civilians; Trump calls his illegal invasion bombs “law enforcement” to arrest one criminal in a well-known location.
Same technique, same function: euphemism as war crime laundering.
Sources: Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (1949, 1977); UN Charter (1945); Hague Conventions (1899, 1907); ICJ Nicaragua v. United States (1986); ICRC Customary IHL Database; Rome Statute of the ICC (1998).