All posts by Davi Ottenheimer

Sailing, Security

AC34 Team Oracle Caught Cheating…Again

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This is the third incident, as far as I can tell. The first incident, spying on competitor designs, resulted in a penalty for Oracle. The second incident was when Oracle tried to use the Artemis incident to force competitors to change their design, and was rebuffed. Now Oracle is accused of yet another design-related incident.

Skipper Max Sirena of Italy’s Luna Rossa is the latest America’s Cup competitor to accuse defending champion Oracle Team USA of cheating in what potentially could be one of the biggest scandals in the regatta’s 162-year history

As I’ve said before it’s obvious Oracle’s design is inferior. Team New Zealand has out-innovated the American team and Oracle is cheating to try and catch up.

There is irony in these incidents. The Oracle captain recently said in an interview that their design changes were done, they were focused on sailing. In fact, he emphasized that making design changes at this late date could interfere with his ability to focus and become a better sailor; arguing that design change could actually have a trade-off or hurt their chances.

There also is a question of what Team Oracle management is going to do about being caught cheating on design, yet again. Here’s how their CEO has responded:

“I don’t think it’s right that if a few people break a rule on a team of 130 people, that the whole team gets branded as cheats,” Coutts said in his first public comments in the week since Oracle announced that it was forfeiting its overall championships from the first two seasons of the ACWS after the violations were discovered.

[…]

Coutts used the latest performance enhancement drug scandal in Major League Baseball as an analogy, saying that if certain players were suspended, “does that mean the whole team are cheaters? I don’t think that’s right to draw that conclusion.”

That is an interesting ethical question for the CEO to pose. I would rather hear him say “I take responsibility for the actions of my team” or “I am in charge and this is unacceptable, this will not be tolerated and will not happen again.”

Instead, we hear that Team America is going to play victim to their own team? In risk management terms, that should be a giant red flag. This is precisely why the U.S. government moved forward the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation. Too many CEOs had claimed they had no idea about fraud under their watch and objected to “the whole team” being branded cheaters.

It is possible that some rogue member of the team was acting independently. That seems unlikely given that it is not an isolated incident. It also seems unlikely, given the response from the CEO is to play victim and tell other teams to stop pointing fingers.

I don’t think it’s right that other teams should use this as an orchestrated PR campaign to slander another team when there’s a jury process going on and the facts haven’t been established.

Strange perspective. Cheating doesn’t require PR orchestration. Fraud doesn’t require PR orchestration. When it’s discovered, when an investigation begins, the expectation and the norm is negative press. It would require orchestration to do the opposite, for competitors to be complimentary and supportive; to say “don’t judge” or “don’t blame management, everyone has bad apples”.

More to the point when the CEO of UCLA tried to say that patient privacy breaches were the result of isolated staff it turned out to be exactly the opposite. A sting operation by Farah Fawcett and her Doctor proved that management wasn’t taking responsibility. Widespread and systemic security failures continued despite firing “isolated staff”. Eventually outside investigators were brought in and not long after the state of California passed two new laws to hold executive management accountable.

The sad fact is Team Oracle management is not talking about how they abhor cheating or how they will stake their reputation on a fair game. They are most likely trying to cheat their way through a design failure. They’ve tried spying, they’ve tried blocking the other designs, and now they’re accused of making unauthorized changes.

After decades of Americans trying to hold top management accountable for the actions of their entire team, it is the statements by the CEO of Team Oracle that are making America look bad.

Coutts admitted last week that someone with the syndicate illegally placed weights in the bows of three 45-foot catamarans without the knowledge of the skippers or management. One of the boats was loaned to Olympic star Ben Ainslie, who is sailing with Oracle Team USA this summer in hopes of launching a British challenge for the 35th America’s Cup.

Coutts said then that it was “a ridiculous mistake” because the weights “didn’t affect the performance.” Oracle forfeited its results from the four ACWS regattas in question, and its two overall season championships.

Someone made a mistake. Don’t blame the team. There was no real need to cheat. These are not phrases that engender trust. Quite the opposite, they lead to distrust of management.

Coutts’ risk approach does not sound far from what the utility industry once used to skirt regulations — hire a “designated felon” to the team. A CEO could claim she/he was “without the knowledge” of violations and basically pay someone else to go to jail or take the fall on their behalf.

History, Sailing, Security

#AC34Fatigue “Look at My Penis Go”

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Seems like most people I run into lately in SF ask me what I think of the America’s Cup. Maybe it’s a generic conversation starter. I take it as a serious question. Usually the conversation centers around the lack of public interest, the huge amount of money…

I thought it was hard to sum up the event until a friend described it like this:

It’s a “Look At My Penis Go!” event

That, in a nutshell, is what we have now. Who wants to watch? Oracle seems to have created a giant embarrassment.

But seriously, the sailing community has left the show, the general public isn’t coming. Some members of the teams even tell the public the event for them is “like being in jail”…so what is going on? Here’s a few guesses based on recent experience.

Sailing community

Ellison told the esteemed St Francis Yacht Club many years ago he wanted to take over and run the Cup his way. When the local club balked at total-control negotiation, he walked a few steps to the next club. Golden Gate actually heard the fight and invited him over. Golden Gate openly admits they did it for the money; Ellison could do whatever he wanted if he gave them enough money to stay open.

Some have tried to describe this union as a poor guy and a rich guy working together, or the community working with a big company; but everyone knows Oracle doesn’t play that way. They took the place over and run it their way.

Oracle’s split from the St Francis community could have been a chance to pressure an old stodgy club to become more relevant to experimentation and innovation, becoming more inclusive. That would have been interesting. Instead, it looks like Ellison fell out with them for the opposite reason. St Francis is not exclusive enough — it has people he doesn’t want to listen to!

It’s perhaps worth adding here that when the AC45 were racing in front of the St. Francis clubhouse I walked up to the entrance with my reciprocal membership card in hand. A old man at the door stopped me and said “sorry, when the America’s Cup is here we don’t honor reciprocal membership status.”

Annoyed but not dissuaded I walked 100 feet away and sat on the rocks by the water with 100s of other people gathering. Soon I became the unofficial announcer for the shoreline. I explained why China’s roundings were slow and uncoordinated, people asked me for blow-by-blow sports-casting…it turned out to be an amazing experience helping the public understand what was happening.

The strangest part of all, perhaps, is when a guy I had sailed with on long-distance coastal races walked up (he was rejected from St. Francis also) and started to ask me about the dynamics of multi-hull speed and handling. I realized at that moment the most experienced, seasoned mono-hull racers didn’t see what I could see after years of racing an A-Cat. We became a sort-of sports-cast team, he would ask general sailboat racing questions and I would color with specifics and stories. The crowd loved it.

Who is the Steve Madden of sailing? We need one. Someone funny, who gets the game, who speaks at the common person’s level; someone who can’t be and doesn’t want to be locked up inside some exclusive club for hat-less VIPs. The club commodore since then (perhaps after realizing there was low demand) has sent a letter inviting us lowly reciprocal members to come visit during the races.

After the club denied me access I had a great time sharing the Cup experience outside with the unwashed, the uninitiated, the non-sailors. There was no sailing community connection. Even professional sailors I contacted to come watch at the club were off sailing in other events, unimpressed with the AC34 races.

General public

Number 3 (just behind LA and Muni) in the list of Things SF Love to Hate is Larry Ellison:

There really aren’t many beloved billionaire CEOs out there, but the Oracle one takes the booby prize. If his lavish lifestyle and conspicuous mansions weren’t enough to sour his standing in the city, Ellison’s campaign to bring the America’s Cup to town has done the trick. There’s been more headache than economic benefit from the Cup so far.

I walked down to the waterfront recently. A very active and respected member of the local sailing community asked me to have lunch. As I arrived, an AC72 ambled in the water nearby. There was no crowd. The general public simply didn’t come.

He was looking out across the empty water when I asked “what happened to race day”. He laughed and said “We hoped for twelve boats but with only four total and three working…nobody wants to watch a race of one. Today is no different than any other day — there you see a boat sailing on the Bay. The crowds won’t come. So let’s eat…”

Insiders

To put it bluntly, I was invited to the America’s Cup backstage. I brought with me someone instrumental to America’s Cup history and present success — a legend in sailboat racing. I was honored to be there with him. In fact, I couldn’t believe this was happening.

For 30 seconds it was momentous, as if my entire life of sailing had led up to this moment. We arrived and shook hands with an official of the AC34 sales team. And then we were asked…”have you ever heard of the America’s Cup before?”

*screeching record needle*

Awkward. We then were told by this used-car salesman looking guy with a giant diamond ring and popped white collar that the Cup is under new management and they’re doing things right now — they are lining up a target audience of “generic sports enthusiasts who can pay $40K for exclusivity seats and don’t really care what they’re watching.”

*car driving off cliff and exploding fireballs*

I flew out of that meeting like an AC72 downwind in the Bay on an August afternoon. St Francis seemed quaint and community-focused compared to this nauseating group that stood for what? Where did the love of sailing go? Who was this idiot talking with me (I still have his card) and his sidekick (she later turned her back on us, literally, to give us the sign we should leave).

Don’t get me wrong, I love the America’s Cup, I love sailing. In fact, my entire house has been decorated for decades with the history of America’s Cup contenders (Tommy Sopwith’s 1934 Endeavour, Vanderbilt’s 1903 Reliance, the amazing Enterprise of 1930). And I’ve grown up sailing, and been fortunate enough to have sailed with and raced against many of the people working on the current campaigns.

In fact, I may still write up a detailed explanation of how the boats work, the amazing transformation in technology and teams, or do some impromptu race commentary. There’s so much to talk about.

But WTF Larry? We’re losing the audience, including me.

Security

Putting and End to the End of Active Defense

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Today jerichoattrition wrote a provocative blog post called “Putting an end to ‘strike back’ / ‘active defense’ debate…” The magic phrase offered is this:

Ending the Debate In One Easy Line

If a company can’t do defense correctly, why do you think they can do offense right?

That simple, that logical.

Security experts are fond of saying security is a process not a destination. Continuous improvement is the aim, like balancing a bicycle, rather than aiming for a specific event and calling it done.

It is similar to keeping healthy or fit. As soon as you achieve a goal you set another and continue with your measurements and training.

But what if we could find a secret formula to settle our debates about security once and for all? What if we could utter one magical phrase to make everyone see things the way we see them — our vision of security as the final destination. Would anyone want that?

Sounds like a Twilight Zone episode to me. Someone wishes everyone would stop debating and just agree. Then, as soon as this dream comes true, the protagonist realizes a giant mistake has been made.

The camera pulls back and we see a man running frantically through the street, begging someone, anyone to debate or disagree. Instead, surrounded by smiling faces all he hears is “I agree!”

I agree. I agree...
I agree! I agree!

Do we really want that? What is simple or logical about saying good offense depends on good defense? This debate is far from over and that’s a good thing…

Jericho’s post does not explain away the fact that the two can be, and often are, mutually exclusive. The very foundation of a deterrence policy, for example, is an offense so effective that defensive capability becomes less relevant.

I’m tempted to point out the many sports teams with good offense and bad defense.

Instead, sticking with IT, a large enterprise that struggles to upgrade defenses still can have an effective offensive team. An offensive team in fact may be built faster/better/stronger to focus back on the enterprise itself to help pinpoint and improve slower/worse/weaker defenses.

Defense often is saddled with dependencies, depreciation issues, complexity, politics, etc.. Meanwhile an offensive team can quickly come directly into modern and advanced capabilities. In other words, building a highly effective offensive team is sometimes a strategic investment that can push an ineffective defensive team ahead.

A mismatch, with a better offensive team, means flaws can be found with visibility into risk posture, blasting through obstacles that held back better defense investments. This imbalance should be no stretch of imagination. It’s common and has been happening for many years. Think of it as a football team that pits its lagging defense against its own top-ranked offensive line to pinpoint holes and improve defensive capabilities. Companies are hiring top red-team talent even when their blue-teams aren’t top tier.

Back to the point of active defense, a highly-effective offensive team that is better than a defensive team simply could switch focus towards targets outside. That is why it is easy to see how a company that can’t do defense right can do offense right.

The blog post also tries to warn us of a lack of solid definition for “active defense.”

…note that recon is not ‘defense’. By port scanning, pinging, or tracerouting the remote system that attacked you, it does not help you defend your network. It is the first stage of an active response. Strictly based on the terminology of “active defense”, activity such as changing a configuration or creating real-time decoys to increase the cost of attack. Even today’s news, covering an entire talk on the legal risks of “active defense”, does not even define the term.

Recon is a part of defense, “it is the first stage”, but it is not alone a defense. Agreed. But why are we worried that the definition isn’t easy? That seems normal to me. Or why worry that a definition isn’t found in one talk?

After reading the post I see more room for debate, more uncertainty and fear without solid explanation or supporting argument. Here are just four examples from where debate can easily continue:

If you can easily and positively attribute, they shouldn’t have breached your defenses. You have no business attacking them when you were negligent on defense 101.

Containment is more complicated than this view. Attribution may come later, as part of a decision process for limiting damage. Whether easy and positive attribution could be found within 1 minute or 1 day they would be post breach. Not every breach can be anticipated, which is why a common phrase responders use is “always prepared, never ready”.

If you think you can positively attribute, you cannot, you are out of your element.

Again, overly simplistic view. Attribution is hard for some, easier for others. Hiding is effective for some, impossible for others. Most important is that practice makes attribution more accurate and there are many public cases of positive/successful attribution.

Even if you can miraculously attribute the human at the keyboard, regardless of how many hops back, you cannot positively attribute who hired them to hack you.

This is a decision-point rather than a dis-incentive. Responders can positively attribute deeper than just front line attacks. Anti-mob and anti-terror efforts reach source all the time. We can be just as effective.

If you attribute the person, and not the motive, by hacking back, you violated the law just as they did.

I have to point out here that legal advice from a non-lawyer is specious. Meet with a lawyer if you want to know when and how you will violate the law. As David Willson has written on this blog and presented many times, active defense is not a crime.

Energy, Security

Red Means Go, Green Means Slow

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While riding in late night taxis in Brazil I noticed they hit the accelerator through red lights. When we approached a green light, they would slow down and look around for people running the reds.

I had to ask why. The drivers said this is a risk mitigation strategy.

Because of assault danger, Brazilian drive through red traffic lights during night, just as a warning.

Since stopping at a red light, especially late at night, makes you an easy victim for car-jacking or robbery…we didn’t stop.

And because everyone there knows drivers run red lights to stay safe, drivers with green lights slow down before crossing an intersection.

Just another example of why we should seriously reconsider stop-lights and their overall impact to risk (inefficiency of idling, yellow-light behavior, etc.)