What was the Dust Bowl Disaster?

The term Dust Bowl was coined in 1935 when an AP reporter, Robert Geiger, used it to describe the drought-affected south central United States in the aftermath of horrific dust storms. Although it technically refers to the western third of Kansas, southeastern Colorado, the Oklahoma Panhandle, the northern two-thirds of the Texas Panhandle, and northeastern New Mexico, the Dust Bowl has come to symbolize the hardships of the entire nation during the 1930s.

I know it’s fashionable to call security breaches Pearl Harbor, but what if we use an industrial-scale economic disaster of American history instead to describe the SolarWinds news?

Here’s an image and story that might help explain. Unix seems natural. Microsoft has always been about rapid returns from mass digital agriculture.

Aside from a risk of us overlooking likely criminals to blame, we also avoid the greater risk of falsely labeling something cyber war. In my mind the Dust Bowl makes for a better analogy because Microsoft for so many years worked on an extremely expedited model with minimal security or ecosystem investment inviting a predictable disaster.

Bill Gates admitted this in his infamous 2001 memo saying he shouldn’t have ignored all the warnings and suffering for so long.

Gates thus seems to be rich because he very shrewdly under-invested in safety, pushing competitors unfairly out of the market while transferring the burden of care to others to clean up what has been his disastrous legacy.

When people ask “what is the US government going to have to spend to fix this” everyone should keep in the back of their mind how Gates is still extremely wealthy. In other words, for all his supposed “charity” work, he hasn’t lifted a finger to help those suffering from his own top-down handiwork.

Maybe send a Dust Bowl Disaster cleanup bill to Bill?

On the heels of remembering the 1968 massacre of civilians by American soldiers in Vietnam, I was prompted to read an Air War College Research Report from the 1980s called “Parallels in Conflict: American Revolution and Vietnam War”.

The TL;DR is Lt Col Robert Daly II arrives at a simple tautology.

…military commanders should advocate military force only when the political situation will support a decisive military campaign early in the conflict.

To me that reads like telling people only fight when you know you are going to immediately win, which isn’t at all what getting into a fight is about. I mean fighting for the sole purpose of early victory is such an easy decision as to be no decision at all.

Aren’t there cases where getting into conflict is based on a higher calling such as fighting for the right reasons and sticking it out through hard times? Did America believe it would have a decisive military campaign early in the Civil War, for example?

Let’s flip this analysis around and say that the British could have fought against the American Revolution expressly to prohibit expansion of slavery, as some settlers operated under a false pretense whites couldn’t survive without blacks doing all their work for them.

Oglethorpe realized, however, that many settlers were reluctant to work. Some settlers began to grumble that they would never make money unless they were allowed to employ enslaved Africans.

Slavery had been abolished 1735 in Georgia colony and then became a bitter fight. By 1775 England could have rolled into America in full force to end the practice and liberate blacks from the American settler white police states (Vermont abolished slavery in 1777). Instead the British oversaw huge emigration of blacks out of Georgia (e.g. into Jamaica or to the Spanish territory of Florida) as the British evacuated, leaving behind backwards thinking American pro-slavery settlers.

Then by 1808 (American ban on import of slaves) Georgia switched to state sanctioned rape of black women, setting a stage for the 1812 war that again Britain could made authentic claims to liberating blacks from tyranny. Instead white men like Jackson used blacks in America to do their work for them against Brits, then stole their valor and stripped them of rights.

I see parallels to Vietnam here, but in a different way than probably intended by Daly. America in 1955 was establishing a repressive regime in South Vietnam under a blinkered anti-nationalist policy of Eisenhower (really Dulles and Dulles), which was violently deposed in 1963. That pulled America into a civil war. It would be like Britain backing a tyrannical regime in America to fight against France or Spain, but then getting pulled into America fighting with itself for control of the American government (e.g. the actual Civil War, not Revolution).

I don’t think I have to explain what this post is about. Everyone knows about My Lai in 1968, right?

So here’s just an interesting take on things from Thompson — the American helicopter pilot credited with saving civilian lives.

“One of the ladies that we had helped out that day came up to me and asked, ‘Why didn’t the people who committed these acts come back with you?’ And I was just devastated. And then she finished her sentence: she said, ‘So we could forgive them.'” Thompson said he himself could never forgive the Americans who killed those civilians. “I’m not man enough to do that,” he said.

I also want to reflect on a post I wrote a while ago about Operation Dingo in Mozambique, November 1977, which had many of the same chilling hallmarks of the My Lai Massacre (and was based on similar “kill rate” tactics) except nobody ever talks about it.

American perpetrators of the My Lai massacre, as revealed in their memoirs, were using phrases in 1968 almost identical to those by the Rhodesian white separatist forces in Mozambique a decade later.

Calley later described his training as intense and lacking in nuance. “Nobody said, ‘Now, there will be innocent civilians there,’…”and I told myself, I’ll act as if I’m never secure. As if everyone in Vietnam would do me in. As if everyone’s bad.” […] Calley and other members of Charlie Company set out for My Lai by helicopter. They started shooting even before the helicopters had landed. “Everyone moved into My Lai firing automatic,” Calley later wrote. “And went rapidly, and the GIs shot people rapidly. Or grenaded them. Or just bayoneted them: to stab, to throw someone aside, to go on.”

Thompson always should remain the focus of this sad story, despite refusing to be called a hero, because he took such huge risks to stand up to Calley and stop the massacre of innocent civilians.

Thompson continued to fly observation missions in Vietnam, despite suspicions he’d been assigned missions purposely to get him killed. He was hit by enemy fire a total of eight times and in a final crash after his helicopter was brought down by enemy machine-gun fire, he broke his back. In 1998, the Army did an about-face. Thompson and his crew were awarded the Soldier’s Medal in a ceremony near the Vietnam Memorial.

On a similar note, Lt Gen William Peers investigated the My Lai massacre under mixed orders from the US Army Chief of Staff.

Peers was a decorated veteran of World War II, a founder of the Green Berets and special forces who conducted counterintelligence and covert operations during the Korean War, and a former Vietnam corps commander. He was chosen to head the investigation because he was not a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. […] “You do this for me, and I’ll make sure you get that fourth star,” Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland told him, according to Peers’ daughter, Chris Neely. Instead, Peers next assignment was as a deputy commander in Korea — serving under a four-star the Army brought out of retirement. “He made the Army look bad. He got punished and the guys that murdered people didn’t,” Neely said. “He was appalled by that.”

Peers might have been appalled by that, yet the enticement of that fourth star for the report allegedly corrupted his independence on Westmoreland’s role.

But what the press and public have never understood is that the Peers Commission was involved in an even bigger cover-up: It exonerated the commander of US forces in Vietnam, Gen. William Westmoreland, from any responsibility for My Lai, despite the fact that the policy Westmoreland conveyed to his subordinates was to treat civilians who remained in long-term Vietnamese Communist, or Viet Cong (VC), base areas like My Lai as enemy combatants. […] The directive actually allowed the creation of free-fire zones in hamlets and villages under long-term Viet Cong control such as My Lai, in which the civilian population would have no protection whatsoever. Although the official MACV directive did not explicitly state that civilians living in “specified strike zones” were not to be given any protection, it clearly implied that this was indeed the policy.

“Free-fire zones” is a crucial phrase here. While it starkly describes America intentionally killing innocent civilians in the Vietnam War, it also sets the stage for veterans shifting into Mozambique ten years later to assist with “Fire Force” tactics doing much of the same.

However in Mozambique there was no Peers, and definitely no Thompson. Their significance today is that while the My Lai massacre has documentation such that historians don’t dither about it (or dare I say Sand Creek, the My Lai massacre of 1864), white insecurity extremist groups instead invoke stories of similar tactics and massacres in Mozambique to bypass censorship.