Scoopenomics: Space Rogue’s Shame Embargo

Quiet! Quiet! The Carnival Barkers Want Quiet in the Tent

Space Rogue says shame works. He says it in a blog post about embargo breakers that leaves the offender… unnamed and unshamed.

“Embarrassment works,” he writes of the full disclosure years. The data says it works only when a firm’s own customers are the ones harmed. Regular readers of this blog will note that I do not tend to withhold names. But his main offender stays unnamed for his whole post, while he argues that naming is the whole point. That is a shame embargo, on the premise that shame works, while complaining embargos should not be broken. It reminds me of Dr. Strangelove pointing out that a Doomsday machine kept secret deters nobody.

As a likely peer, who was doing the same things at the same time, I always saw the L0pht route to success as dubious. They were the best at promotion, like stage performers, rejecting the norm of silence for attention. In the late 1990s I was pentesting bulk energy across the midwest. One day I popped thousands of routers across five states. The report went into a meeting and a remediation plan. Never public. Meanwhile, on May 19, 1998 seven of the L0pht crew sat before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs under hacker handles and told senators they could make the entire Internet unusable within 30 minutes. I mean, plaintext auth such as Telnet was still the default everywhere. It was as obvious as it was a decade earlier when CFAA landed.

By their own account the flaw behind the 30-minute claim was already patched, and the plan was to release it at the hearing. Space Rogue says the handles “had to have been for show”.

Security experts at the time called the claim possible hyperbole. Those of us testing networks knew it was plausible. The difference was the norms of disclosure back then: to go to the press and say what is what, risked being shameless. When we could get fixes in without the noise, without attracting shame, who benefited most from it? The L0pht vigorously broke the thing that folks like me did not, and they basked in the limelight for it. In January 2000 their success with that attention merged into @stake, a new consultancy run by Internet executives.

Scholars of “the scene” have plainly described what they found. Matt Goerzen and Gabriella Coleman’s history of 1990s hackers credits part of a rise in standing to “PR stunts, media collaborations, and rhetorical interventions”. Their talk on the research carries the title Security by Spectacle.

But that is the literal opposite of my “quiet professional” training, where attention is not the objective and usually is avoided. Was I not in the club? Did I miss out by not trying to be shamed?

Carnival barkers built a market that pays whoever shouts first and loudest. The blog post by the old barker seems to object that a younger act is now shouting earlier. On the day of his post, Calif.io announced Java4Shell with a joke that PHP had too small an audience, so they targeted:

something a little more familiar: Java

That in itself is a laugh. PHP is far more familiar, while Java is unfortunately still around. It is like saying gasoline cars have too few drivers so they are targeting garbage trucks. Haha, so funny.

The economics of all this indeed is the most interesting part. And it has been measured for a long time. Karpoff and Lott found large reputational losses hit the firms that defraud their own customers. Makes sense. However, with Wehrly they found the reputational penalty negligible for environmental violations, where outsiders carry the harm. We tend to talk about the “externality” of harm. An embargo breaker’s customers see speed (and hopefully accuracy) where harm lands on the competitors, not on the customers. L0pht broke the informal norm of silence, as absurd as it was, while many of us stayed away from the shame they attracted. L0pht rose and rose to celebrity. Should they have now the authority to tell others to avoid the kinds of shame that they banked on?

Kannan and Telang modelled vulnerability brokers in 2005 and found the broker’s own incentive is to leak. Then they bray about it like a stuck donkey. Keeping an embargo only bothers people who value being in the club. I guess I can attest to the fact that I was surprised in the 1990s to see someone celebrated for breaking the silence I lived under. Those who value the scoop more than the old club, are going to choose breaking club rules. If I had a dollar for every time I consciously didn’t scoop, I would have retired at least 20 years ago. In actual fact, I know a hacker who built an entire career and cashed out on a scoop I gave him 25 years ago. Good for him, I guess. He loved the profitability of the shame.

In a perfect example, I found a critical 9.8 vulnerability in February this year and spent months following a quiet professional disclosure process, eventually seeing it released in October (with a July notice recorded). And yet, some random shameless “crew” created in August for a bounty claim on the same issue. The vendor notice credits me as equal to a public barker, because quiet work now is so steeply undervalued.

So, shame on someone from the L0pht for claiming shame works.

What their brand represents is the American economics of lookatme lookatme, which has demonstrated the value of a shameless barker.

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