All posts by Davi Ottenheimer

Droning Yandex Hit Russian Bot Armies Hard: 84% Drop

Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation counted 1,526 inauthentic accounts posting into Ukraine’s information space on Facebook and Telegram the day before a drone fire shut Yandex’s data centre at Sasovo. On the day of the fire, 258 posted.

That count is the measurement my 12 October post called for. The viral Cloudflare chart showed YandexBot going quiet. Search crawlers are the largest bot category on Cloudflare’s own dashboard, as I showed in June, and Radar sees only the fifth of the web that Cloudflare fronts. The question of the sock puppets belonged to platform data, and “has not decreased” needed that data exactly as much as “collapsed” did. The platform data now exists. It shows Russian influence networks knocked down twice, once for each Yandex data centre that went fully dark.

The centre published two findings. The first, on 13 October, covered the Kremlin’s automated foreign-facing networks. Posting in certain clusters of the Pravda, InfoDefense and Nod of Time networks fell by about half for around twelve hours, then resumed. The centre framed it narrowly. Russian bot activity across the wider field held steady, and the strikes broke the continuity and coordination of these specific networks. The Pravda sites are served through Cloudflare, as the 12 October post showed. Posting in some of their clusters still halved for half a day when Yandex burned.

The same Pravda network has been working a NATO ally’s vote. Its Canada section ran 67 articles on Alberta, Albertans and the “51st state” between 24 December and 25 April, against 14 mentions of Ontario, according to a DisinfoWatch report. Advance polls for Alberta’s separation referendum opened on 13 October, two days after Vladimir went dark, and the vote is on 19 October.

The second finding is the full report, When bots go silent, published 15 October. Osavul software flagged the accounts. The centre counted 22,664 messages from 5,201 accounts across 26 topics in the Ukrainian information space from 6 to 12 October, removed duplicates, dated everything in Kyiv time and measured each day against the one before.

Day, Kyiv time Messages
7 Oct 4,032
8 Oct, Sasovo shut 660
9 Oct, Kaluga hit 2,231
10 Oct 4,585
11 Oct, Vladimir shut 4,711
12 Oct 2,704

On 8 October messages fell 83.6 percent and active accounts fell 83.1 percent. Telegram messages dropped 90 percent and Facebook messages 79.5 percent. Activity climbed back through the partial hit on Kaluga and passed its pre-strike level by 10 October. On 12 October, the day after Vladimir went dark, messages fell 42.6 percent and active accounts 41 percent.

The first drop lines up with an independent instrument. IODA at Georgia Tech saw Yandex Cloud lose a third of its reachable address blocks starting at 23:30 UTC on 7 October, which is 02:30 on 8 October in Kyiv. IODA’s line then held flat through the Kaluga strike, the same strike the centre’s accounts rode through. It fell again early on 11 October, to about a fifth of its starting level.

Telegram itself kept running throughout. The channels of Germany’s named Kremlin amplifiers posted at their usual pace through both strikes, by my own count. A 90 percent fall on Telegram belongs to these accounts specifically.

A subset of 98 accounts carried what the centre calls destructive content. Their messages fell 77.8 percent on 8 October and 49.2 percent on 12 October. They told Ukrainians the war was staged and their government illegitimate, blamed blackouts on electricity sold abroad, claimed Ukrainian air defence deliberately brings down Russian missiles and drones over homes, and called for violence against officials, soldiers, police and their families. Near-identical texts repeated across accounts.

Cloudflare’s own data shows how the accounts recovered within a day. Its 14 October analysis followed malicious automation off Yandex Cloud. Requests from Yandex Cloud to one gambling customer stopped right after the 8 October disruption, and the identical traffic, with the same TLS fingerprint, request paths, headers and user agents, began arriving from the Russian hosting networks Radist and Selectel. Cloudflare reads this as evidence the strikes had little lasting effect. The same evidence shows operators thrown off their servers overnight and rebuilding on other Russian hosts, inside drone range.

Cloudflare also measured bot traffic to the post, reply and like endpoints of one social platform it fronts and saw Russian-origin requests fall 5.7 percent, within its expectations. Facebook and Telegram run on their own networks. The centre counted there.

The measurements that showed steady activity came from different populations, and they sort by infrastructure. Antibot4Navalny tracks Kremlin-paid human trolls aimed at Russia’s domestic audience, and saw them carry on. It told AFP the Matryoshka bots stayed active too. LetsData watched networks on X and Facebook keep their weekly rhythm. Antibot4Navalny also told the Kyiv Independent that the engagement network behind Storm-1516 is most likely a commercial engagement-for-hire service, and VIGINUM’s Storm-1516 report places the operation’s websites on American hosting and Cloudflare. Kevin Beaumont monitors thousands of contained accounts on his Mastodon server, and he says they post from a data centre in Manchester.

So the networks that stumbled were the Kremlin’s automated foreign-facing systems and the accounts working Ukraine’s information space. The networks that kept posting run on servers in Manchester, American hosting, Cloudflare, commercial engagement farms and paid human labour. The nearly $10 million that a US indictment alleges RT put into Tenet Media bought American voices beyond the reach of any drone. Drones hit Russian cloud, and the operations built on Russian cloud lost a day each time. That is the result a dependency on Yandex predicts.

Beaumont drew the opposite conclusion from his own server, posting on 13 October:

Russian propaganda operations don’t run from Yandex. They never have… There was no dip.

I answered him eighty minutes later. He accused others of confusing search bots with social bots, then treated bot farms as the whole of a propaganda operation. Yandex is part of the operation in its own right. EU sanctions on Yandex executives in 2022 cited the company for hiding information about the war, promoting state media in search results and deranking Kremlin critics. Two days later the dip he denied appeared in the centre’s data.

Brussels drew the same line over Ceuta. The Commission reported Russian state media and diplomatic channels amplifying the crisis from the day of the crossing and no Russian activity before it, and the Spanish right ran that caveat as an acquittal, as I wrote in September. The EEAS finding of only isolated Israeli accounts was fair as a finding about bots, while Israeli officials joined in under their own names. Beaumont’s count is a fair finding about the bots on his server. The operation is larger than his server.

Strikes on propaganda infrastructure have a legal test, written by a war crimes tribunal reviewing a NATO strike. In June 2000 the ICTY committee examining NATO’s bombing of Radio Television of Serbia held that media whose only effect is to foster support for a war stays a civilian object, and that media used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda can become a legitimate military objective. It found NATO’s propaganda rationale for RTS debatable, because the Serbian broadcasts NATO cited aimed at rallying support for the war.

The centre’s report documents what the RTS case lacked: coordinated accounts calling for violence against Ukrainian officials, soldiers, police and their families. Yandex adds a record of its own. Its Sasovo site sits inside a machine-tool plant the UK has sanctioned since 2024, according to The Record.

The cost of leaving incitement infrastructure alone is on record too. In 1994, with RTLM broadcasting the names and whereabouts of people to be killed, the National Security Council asked the Pentagon about jamming it. Frank Wisner, the Pentagon’s third-ranking official, answered on 5 May that jamming would be ineffective and expensive and that the relief effort was the wiser course. The aircraft that could have done it cost $8,500 an hour. The centre’s numbers answer Wisner’s first objection for the modern equivalent. One strike cut the flagged accounts’ output by 84 percent for a day.

Sergiy Petrenko, who ran Yandex’s Ukrainian business until 2014, told UNITED24 that Russian interference can be influenced, even damaged, by such attacks. He estimates the three strikes cost Yandex more than half its capacity and says the method has plenty of room to scale.

Russia runs its war on European infrastructure through disposable agents and cover names, as I documented in the Kommando Angry Birds rail arson and the Dutch rail outage, and its operations succeed while attribution stays fragmented. Moscow wants the effect felt and the hand unseen. Kyiv announced its strikes on Yandex, framed them as an answer to Russian strikes on Ukrainian data centres, and left the result for anyone to measure.

Washington penalised the open side. Trump announced an energy ceasefire on 11 October, and Russia struck Kharkiv’s CHP-5 plant within hours. Ukraine held off its refinery strikes for two days regardless. On 14 October Ukraine’s military went without its usual early warning of a Russian ballistic missile attack, and hours later lost Starshield for its fast drones. Musk said the US government controls Starshield, and the White House called it a glitch. On 15 October Musk wrote that it was time for Zelensky to go. On 16 October the Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev said Moscow and Washington were discussing joint data-centre projects, including proposals to power them from Russian nuclear plants.

Ukraine has shown that Russian data centres can be hit and that hitting them knocks the Kremlin’s networks down. The networks recover in a day because their operators can still move to another data centre. Russia is now studying coal mines 300 metres underground for the next ones.

Poisoned Tea: Arrest of Chinese Researcher Mirrors the AI Integrity Breach Story

Headlines about the University of Wyoming poisoning case tell a confidentiality breach story, built around a Chinese national and a cache of hard drives seized at Los Angeles airport.

The far more important story is trusted input tampering. Prosecutors allege graduate student Aili Wang put a neurotoxin, acrylamide, in the water a fellow researcher used every day to make tea at his desk. His wife and colleagues boiled his kettle’s water down to 63 milligrams of white powder, and a chemistry professor identified it. The affidavit says a hidden camera then recorded Wang rinsing his mug with liquid from her own, and university records tied her uwyo.edu account to acrylamide bought on eBay.

Their professor, Mark Gomelsky, told the AP that Wang failed her first dissertation defense and grew envious of her colleague’s success using bacteria to deliver RNA into human cells. The alleged goal was to stop a competitor from producing results. Tampering with his trusted input to get there is an integrity breach.

It reminds me of Fei-Fei Li.

By her own account, a Princeton professor told her the ImageNet work was unethical. She moved to Stanford in 2009 and kept building it there. The ImageNet leaderboard became the field’s definition of success, and her Stanford profile calls ImageNet one of the three driving forces of the deep learning revolution.

The leaderboard rewarded gaming.

In 2015 the challenge banned Baidu for 12 months after organizers found its team had used multiple accounts to run far more test evaluations than the rules allowed. Baidu fired the team’s leader, who denied cheating.

The leaderboard scored outputs.

The input got its check in 2019, when an art project exposed bias in the person labels. Princeton and Stanford researchers then traced the bias to how ImageNet was built. By then Li co-directed Stanford’s new Institute for Human-Centered AI, promoting ethics for a field that trained on her dataset.

Nationality matters here as competition culture.

China has a name for its grind, neijuan, which young Chinese began using in 2020 for the hypercompetitive and often self-defeating chase after markers of success. American AI runs on its own win-at-all-cost version, and Li’s career runs through both. The headlines tie nationality to espionage. The motive, for what it is worth on explaining behavior, is competition.

Fei-Fei built massive influence and power on a faulty notion of success. Her dataset served biased person labels to the public for a decade before her own field checked them. Same poisoned ramp as Wyoming: win at all cost.

The Only Breached Company to Call Its Attacker Unsophisticated Was Suing Someone Else

Just once, I’d like to see a company come forward and say “we got badly breached, and we analyzed the evidence, and you know what, we don’t think the adversary was extremely sophisticated at all”

Michal Zalewski (lcamtuf) asked for that sentence in Fediverse. I replied “challenge accepted”, as a matter of historical record.

In twenty years of breach disclosures I have found it exactly once, in 2025, in a lawsuit that put the blame on a vendor anyway. Regulators are the ones who write it often, usually a year or two after a chief executive put the word “sophisticated” into a press release. The herd of chief executives (ironic, no?) reaches for “sophisticated” by reflex. Only a thin file of them said something closer to “oops, duh” than “wow, who could have known.”

This post is a trip down memory lane, and it collects exact quotes, with links to the filing, transcript, penalty notice or original report where it appears. It’s similar to posts I’ve done in the past, but more targeted to the question of accepting fault.

1755

Let’s talk about “sophisticated” as a particular term in breach disclosure defense filings. I have called it out since at least 2011 when I gave a series of talks about state-level breaches, attempting to convince our industry to stop using the word.

Samuel Johnson defined it in his 1755 Dictionary as “To adulterate; to corrupt with something spurious.” For the noun, he quoted medical writer John Quincy: “the act of counterfeiting or adulterating any thing with what is not so good, for the sake of unlawful gain.” Merriam-Webster still gives “to alter deceptively; especially : adulterate” as the first sense of the verb, in use since the fifteenth century.

A sophisticated act is, in the literal sense, a breach of integrity. Like someone serving colored water and calling it wine, or someone who fails the bar yet says they are a lawyer. Sophisticated attacker means a defender has been duped, in even the most basic way.

The self-flattering pivot of the word came very late. Etymonline dates “worldly-wise” to 1895, and the OED’s first citation for “complex or advanced” is C. S. Lewis in 1945, as Wordorigins reports. A breach statement that calls an attack sophisticated uses the youngest, and usually least applicable, sense of a word that meant a counterfeit for the prior five hundred years.

The modern sense therefore becomes a measure of the speaker, not the breach. In Was Stuxnet the “First”? I argued that calling an attack sophisticated mostly tells you the observer does not yet understand it. Verizon’s investigators had already said as much in their 2013 report, writing that attack difficulty “almost certainly reveals much more about the skill and readiness of the defender.” Lawyers then read the absence of the word as a confession of negligence, putting pressure on constant use as a get-out-of-jail card. Instead of claiming drunkenness and promising rehab, the executive claims the drink was complex and advanced. Thus the “sophisticated attack” became a confession of ignorance dressed up as a legal defense, one the courts have yet to accept.

2005 to 2010

An early clean admission came from Derek Smith of ChoicePoint, testifying to a House subcommittee on 15 March 2005. Criminals posing as small businesses had bought consumer files from his company. Smith apologized to consumers harmed by “criminals whose fraudulent activity ChoicePoint failed to prevent,” and when asked about warning signs he said “we should have recognized sooner the magnitude of that particular crime.” He described the criminals only by what they did.

The FTC fined ChoicePoint $10 million the following January because it “did not have reasonable procedures to screen prospective subscribers.”

Four months after Smith, John Perry of CardSystems Solutions showed the House how to talk out of two sides in one hearing. On 21 July 2005 he testified that “the attack on our system was very sophisticated.” Pressed later in the same session about the card data his company had kept, he said “we have stated that we were in error by keeping that data.” Visa’s witness at the same table said CardSystems had “knowingly and improperly retained magnetic stripe information.” I remember this case well, and CardSystems didn’t even use firewalls. Literally named “card systems” for payment cards, zero security.

The FTC’s complaint the next year described a SQL injection against a web application and found the company “did not implement simple, low-cost, and readily available defenses.” The words “readily available” run through the FTC’s orders of that period, against DSW, Guidance Software and TJX.

TJX took a third path. Its 2007 10-K described “the technology used by the Intruder” and an intruder who “had access to the decryption tool,” and left the adjective to the reader. My post on the TJX theft read that decryption tool as a key management failure. Canada’s privacy commissioners found TJX had protected its store wireless networks with WEP, which “can be defeated relatively easily.”

Ah, WEP. At a tech conference when WEP was first introduced I met with the 3Com engineers demonstrating the first WiFi routers with encryption. They had plastic cases with the SSID and password raised in the actual hard plastic.

What about rotation, I asked, since my secret should be a secret. They replied adoption needed ease of use, or there would be no encryption at all, secrets slow down use. Jesus WEP’d.

Hannaford Bros. disclosed in March 2008 and passed along a law enforcement assessment of a “new and sophisticated method.” In August 2009 the Justice Department indicted Albert Gonzalez for the Hannaford, Heartland and 7-Eleven intrusions, and its press release called SQL injection “a sophisticated hacking technique.” The adjective showed up as prosecution.

Robert Carr of Heartland Payment Systems then stood on a soap-box and said all of this out loud for the herd to hear. In August 2009 he told CSO that his assessors’ audits “were of no value whatsoever,” and in the same interview said “We need more humility” and “you can easily buy sniffer software off the shelf.”

This is my shocked face.

On 9 September he told SC Magazine “We thought we had protected ourselves, but we didn’t do enough,” and conceded “This was a website that they could get into.”

It was like “sophisticated” was finally going to be washed away.

Five days later he testified to the Senate about “the ever more sophisticated methods used by these cyber criminals.”

Damn it.

By July 2010 his first lesson for other executives was “Don’t blame other people.” Visa had answered the auditor complaint back in March 2009: “No compromised entity has yet been found to be in compliance with PCI DSS at the time of a breach.”

Word games. Compromise means non-compliant.

Verizon’s 2010 report, covering 2009 cases, found 96 percent of breaches “avoidable through simple or intermediate controls.” Sophisticated meant low bar, as in you aren’t doing the basics. Yet it clearly was being deployed for legal smoke to avoid charges of negligence.

2011

The argument for owning the basics really took off in 2011. Verizon’s April report repeated the news and said “90% of attacks are not highly sophisticated, and the method of intrusion is relatively straightforward in most cases.”

I spent that year giving talks on why Stuxnet was less sophisticated than its coverage claimed. By the time the antivirus vendors were hot-selling Flame in 2012, I could write “Apparently Stuxnet is no longer considered sophisticated.”

RSA’s disclosures that year carried both registers at once. On 18 March the illustrious Art Coviello described an “Advanced Persistent Threat” attack. Two weeks later RSA’s Uri Rivner explained that a phishing email had been “crafted well enough to trick one of the employees to retrieve it from their Junk mail folder,” and called the whole thing an “extremely sophisticated cyber attack.”

F-Secure later recovered the message. Its body read:

I forward this file to you for review. Please open and view it.

The attachment carried a Flash zero-day. The delivery was two sentences. Sophisticated.

Sony told Congress in May 2011 that the PlayStation Network intrusion was a “very carefully planned, very professional, highly sophisticated criminal cyber attack.” The UK Information Commissioner fined Sony in January 2013 and found “the attack could have been prevented if the software had been up-to-date.” Sony dropped its appeal that July with the line “We continue to disagree with the decision on the merits.” Citigroup said almost nothing about its own 2011 breach, in which account holders changed digits in the browser address bar and reached other people’s accounts. My old colleague Bruce Schneier called the missing control “kindergarten security.”

Honestly, I would expect better even from a kindergartener.

On 13 October 2011 the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance issued its first guidance on cyber disclosure. It told issuers that detail amounting to a “roadmap” for attackers was “not required under the federal securities laws.” The Verizon statistic and the SEC guidance were just six months apart. From then on public companies drafted breach statements with permission to leave out the details, which is an invitation to turn adjective abuse up to 11.

2012 to 2016

Dropbox wrote a plain admission in July 2012, after passwords stolen from other websites were used against its users: “A stolen password was also used to access an employee Dropbox account.”

Target spoke out of both sides of its mouth. A spokeswoman said on 19 December 2013 “It is very clear it is a sophisticated crime.” Chief executive Gregg Steinhafel told CNBC “Clearly we are accountable and we are responsible.” Can it be both? The Senate Commerce Committee’s majority staff then documented stolen vendor credentials and security alerts that went unanswered, and quoted McAfee calling the point-of-sale malware “absolutely unsophisticated and uninteresting.”

A federal judge let the banks’ negligence claims proceed in December 2014 and wrote “Although the third-party hackers’ activities caused harm, Target played a key role in allowing the harm to occur.” The ruling was about what Target allowed to happen.

Dido Harding of TalkTalk delivered a plain answer in October 2015 on the BBC. Asked whether customer data had been encrypted, she said “The awful truth is, I don’t know.” Her company’s statements that month described criminals “becoming increasingly sophisticated.” Police arrested a 15-year-old.

I mean, it wasn’t a kindergartener, but still.

In December Harding told a Commons committee “Cyber security is a board level issue, and I am responsible for it.” The Information Commissioner’s penalty in October 2016 found “TalkTalk’s failure to implement the most basic cyber security measures allowed hackers to penetrate” its systems by SQL injection, through a database bug whose fix had been available “for over three and a half years.”

A very sophisticated amount of time.

In June 2015, four months before Harding’s BBC interview, the director of the US Office of Personnel Management told senators “I don’t believe anyone is personally responsible.”

2017 to 2022

Dara Khosrowshahi disclosed Uber’s concealed 2016 breach in November 2017 with a sentence that puts the whole failure on Uber: “None of this should have happened, and I will not make excuses for it.”

Richard Smith of Equifax wrote an ugly testimony the month before. The breach “occurred because of both human error and technology failures,” and the data was lost “at the hands of sophisticated cybercriminals.” The House Oversight majority found in December 2018 that “Such a breach was entirely preventable.” Capital One’s July 2019 filing blamed “a highly sophisticated individual” exploiting “a specific configuration vulnerability.” The OCC’s $80 million order the next year cited the bank’s “failure to establish effective risk assessment processes” before it moved significant operations to the public cloud. British Airways argued to the ICO that its attacker made conscious efforts to avoid detection. The penalty notice recorded that argument and then found a compromised supplier account without multi-factor authentication and administrator login details “stored in plain text.”

Perhaps most notably, the New York’s Department of Financial Services wrote lcamtuf’s sentence in October 2020 about the Twitter hijacking. Twitter had described “a phone spear phishing attack.” The regulator’s report called the attackers “a group of unsophisticated cyber crooks” using “basic techniques more akin to those of a traditional scam artist.”

Boom. There it is, although from a regulator.

Joseph Blount of Colonial Pipeline told the Senate in June 2021 that the ransomware crew entered through a legacy VPN profile that “did only have single-factor authentication.” In the same answer he said “It was a complicated password, so I want to be clear on that.” Blount defended his own concept of a “complex” password, and when Senator Portman asked whether multi-factor authentication should be used, he said “that is absolutely the correct advice.” He also said “We are accountable for our defenses.” Colonial then hired its first ever CISO, nearly a year after it had tripped over its clown shoes into a basic ransomware attack.

Optus produced a three-part record. Chief executive Kelly Bayer Rosmarin said of the September 2022 breach “it’s a sophisticated attack.” Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil said Optus had “effectively left the window open.” The communications regulator told the Federal Court in 2024 that the attack was “not highly sophisticated or one that required advanced skills” and was “carried out through a simple process of trial and error.”

The SMS phishing wave of summer 2022 shows an evolution. Twilio called its attackers “well-organized, sophisticated and methodical.” That’s like saying unknown kmown. Cloudflare titled its write-up “The mechanics of a sophisticated phishing scam and how we stopped it,” and the body reports that three employees entered their credentials and hardware security keys stopped the rest. In September Uber’s 8-K exhibit gave a literal account: “It is likely that the attacker purchased the contractor’s Uber corporate password on the dark web.” The contractor rejected repeated login approval requests. “Eventually, however, the contractor accepted one, and the attacker successfully logged in.”

2023 to 2026

CircleCI wrote a single sentence in January 2023: “While one employee’s laptop was exploited through this sophisticated attack, a security incident is a systems failure.”

Microsoft described its Midnight Blizzard intrusion in January 2024 as a password spray against “a legacy, non-production test tenant account” that “did not have multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled.” The Cyber Safety Review Board found the earlier Storm-0558 intrusion “was preventable and should never have occurred.”

Brad Smith answered in June that “Microsoft accepts responsibility for each and every one of the issues cited in the CSRB’s report.” The same testimony calls Russia’s SVR one of the “most sophisticated cyber agencies in the world.” By 2024 this annoying adjective had moved from the attack itself to the attacker’s employer.

Andrew Witty of UnitedHealth gave a one-sentence admission in written testimony on 1 May 2024: “The portal did not have multi-factor authentication.” He added “I am deeply sorry.” He delayed using the adjective for what happened until after entry, when the attackers “moved laterally within the systems in more sophisticated ways.” Senator Wyden called the missing control “cybersecurity 101.”

23andMe went the other direction and blamed its customers. Its January 2024 letter to plaintiffs said “users negligently recycled and failed to update their passwords.” It’s a good thing biometric login wasn’t blamed or the customers might have been accused of having poor DNA. The UK Information Commissioner fined the company £2.31 million in June 2025 and said “23andMe failed to take basic steps to protect this information.” At Marks and Spencer the chief executive and the chairman gave different accounts seven weeks apart. Chief executive Stuart Machin said in May 2025 “we were unlucky on this particular day through some human error.” Chairman Archie Norman told Parliament in July that social engineering is “a euphamism for impersonation” and that “it was a sophisticated impersonation.”

The SEC’s October 2024 order against Mimecast shows where the regulator takes its stand4. Mimecast’s January 2021 8-K said the company “has been compromised by a sophisticated threat actor” and said a “low single digit number” of customers had been targeted. The SEC found the actor had reached encrypted credentials for roughly 31,000 customers and fined Mimecast $990,000. The penalty attached to the understated scope. The adjective landed yet again.

Table time

Org Statement
2005 ChoicePoint “criminals whose fraudulent activity ChoicePoint failed to prevent”
2005 CardSystems “we have stated that we were in error by keeping that data”
2009 Heartland “We thought we had protected ourselves, but we didn’t do enough.”
2011 RSA “crafted well enough to trick one of the employees to retrieve it from their Junk mail folder”
2012 Dropbox “A stolen password was also used to access an employee Dropbox account.”
2014 Target “Clearly we are accountable and we are responsible”
2014 eBay “Cyberattackers compromised a small number of employee log-in credentials”
2014 Bitly “discovered an unauthorized access on an employee’s account”
2015 TalkTalk “The awful truth is, I don’t know.”
2017 Uber “None of this should have happened, and I will not make excuses for it.”
2017 Equifax “both human error and technology failures”
2018 Reddit “SMS-based authentication is not nearly as secure as we would hope”
2018 Marriott “We fell short of what our guests deserve and what we expect of ourselves.”
2019 Norsk Hydro “This Trojan software was discovered by our antivirus a few days later. But that was already too late.”
2019 Capital One “I am deeply sorry for what has happened”
2021 Colonial Pipeline “it did only have single-factor authentication”
2021 Kaseya “I feel like I let this community down”
2022 Okta “We want to acknowledge that we made a mistake.”
2022 Uber “Eventually, however, the contractor accepted one”
2022 Cloudflare “three Cloudflare employees fell for the phishing message and entered their credentials”
2022 Dropbox “We’re sorry we fell short”
2023 CircleCI “a security incident is a systems failure”
2023 Okta “an employee had signed-in to their personal Google profile on the Chrome browser of their Okta-managed laptop”
2024 Microsoft “did not have multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled”
2024 UnitedHealth “The portal did not have multi-factor authentication.”
2024 Ascension an employee download, likely an “honest mistake”
2025 Troy Hunt “I’m enormously frustrated with myself for having fallen for this”
2025 Coinbase “paying multiple contractors or employees working in support roles outside the United States”
2025 Marks and Spencer “some human error”
2025 Co-op “I’m devastated that information was taken”
2026 Carnival “gained access to an employee’s account via social engineering”
2026 Instructure “We focused on fact-finding and went quiet when you needed consistent updates.”

The answer

That leaves us back at lcamtuf’s sentence.

In July 2025 Clorox sued Cognizant, the contractor that ran its help desk, for $380 million over the 2023 breach. The complaint quotes the call in which a Cognizant agent answered an outside caller with:

Oh, ok. Ok. So let me provide the password to you ok?

Clorox’s lawyers wrote:

Cognizant “was not duped by any elaborate ploy or sophisticated hacking techniques.”

There it is. That is the sentence, filed in court by a breached company about its own attacker. Cognizant replied:

Clorox had “such an inept internal cybersecurity system.”

Children, settle down.

A breached company seems to have stepped up to call its adversary unsophisticated, the day that negligence sticks to someone else.

Katie “I am a lawyer” Zacharia

Lies, lies and more lies. She says she “practiced corporate law”, while her public bio lists “General Counsel” and “Associate” as titles. Although I’m not a lawyer… lawyers tell me these are criminal offenses.

“Lawyer” historically refers to anyone trained in the law, while “attorney” means someone authorized to act on another person’s behalf in legal matters. In practice, the public uses them interchangeably, and so do regulators. Using either title without a license lands you in the same trouble.

[…]

If you suspect someone is holding themselves out as a licensed attorney when they aren’t, you have two main options. File a complaint with your state’s bar association or disciplinary authority; every state investigates UPL claims, and most take complaints online. You can also file a report with local law enforcement, since UPL is a criminal offense in most states.

  1. 2011 graduated Caruso School of Law, Pepperdine
  2. Failed bar exam
  3. Repeatedly called herself a lawyer