Tag Archives: Attorneys

Active Defense/Hack Back/Attribution – The Saga Continues

I have noticed, at least amongst lawyers, there does not seem to be much middle ground when it comes to “Active Defense” or hack back and the right of self-defense.  Those who comment on it either agree self-defense exists in cyberspace, with very few in this camp, or it doesn’t, which is where the majority stand.  All I ask of most is don’t simply jump to the conclusion that self-defense does not exist and “Active Defense” or hack back is illegal, but instead look at the arguments, potential fact scenarios, and definitions.

“Active Defense,” has many definitions and should not be strictly equated to hack back.  Hack back, instead may be considered a subset of “Active Defense,” which does include cyber self-defense or cyber self-help.  Whether or not a company can utilize these theories depends entirely on the given facts of a situation.  For instance, if a company has suffered a cyber attack and cannot show the attack continues or is persistent, they will not likely be able to make a case for the use of self-defense.  My draft definition of “Active Defense” (still a work in progress) is as follows: “a meticulous and escalated approach to a persistent cyber attack wherein the company leadership makes a decision whether or not to progress at pre-determined decision-points, evaluating risk, liability and legal issues.”  Each decision-point will include all of the intelligence gathered, all potential options, tools, techniques, possible scenarios, potential risks, liability, and legal issues.  Depending on the facts and the confidence of the decision-maker there can be few decision points or many.  The number of decision-points is also a factor to consider in the scenario and the actual amount of liability, if any, may depend on how meticulous and cautious the decision-maker acted.  For example, the first decision-point may be whether the attack(s) is or are persistent.  “Active Defense” is very fact dependent.

Unfortunately most jump immediately to the conclusion that Active Defense, or hack back are illegal.  In my opinion this is a very shortsighted view.  If you are a company losing a lot of money, can show you have implemented good or better security, and have taken an escalated approach collecting intel and evaluating risk, liability and legal issues along the way, then I believe you do have a right to defend yourself.  Again, it is very fact specific.  This is where most people then pull out the “attribution” card and claim you will impact an innocent bystander.

If someone drugs and hypnotizes an innocent bystander and convinces him to shoot at you, don’t you have the right to shoot back in self-defense? This is similarly fact dependent.  For instance, if you know the person is an innocent bystander you would likely try and run away and get help, maybe call the police.  You might even attempt an escalated approach causing as little harm as possible to the innocent drugged and hypnotized bystander.  In the end if it is you or him most will likely opt to save their own lives.  Now remember, self-defense applies to person or property.  So, in the end most will opt to save their own property over the property of the innocent bystander.

So, if a server is compromised and being used to attack my company, don’t I have the right to defend against that server? In this scenario I am assuming I cannot identify who owns the server.  If I could I would simply call that person or company and ask that the server be shut down or the malware removed. Also, is the owner of the compromised used to attack me truly an innocent bystander? Is there contributory negligence on the part of that server owner for not having adequate security and allowing his system to be compromised? In a perfect world you could say no, but today many if not most compromises occur because companies have not used due diligence in keeping systems patched and implementing basic security.  Enough for now, comments?

Active Defense: Is it time to test in court? Correcting the Record!

by David Willson

On 16 January I did two webinars with Bright Talk.  One titled, “Active Defense: It is Legal and Will It Actually Improve your Security?,” and the other a panel entitled, “The single greatest security challenges for 2013.” 

Quick side note, due to my zeal for this topic I babbled on too long in the Active Defense webinar and ran out of time before getting to the meat of the issue.  But I am going to do another on 13 March and will manage my time better.  Anyway, Peter Judge moderated the panel for the other webinar and Active Defense was my portion. 

We had a great discussion and I would encourage you to listen if you are interested.  It can be found here: https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/288/64057. 

On 22 January Peter wrote an article for Tech Week Europe entitled, “Its Time to Test Active Defence in Court,” found here: http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/comment/2013-time-to-test-active-defence-in-court-105048. 

Although he got the facts correct and most of what I said in the webinar correct, the tone in which he portrays my comments I feel needs some clarifying.  This is not me trying to pull myself out of the fire, since I have not seen any feedback from his article, but simply my clarification.  So, now that I am done with my overly wordy intro, here we go.

To his first point, I agree that cyber crime victims are within their right to retaliate, but would preface this as any good attorney would with “it depends!”  It depends on the facts and circumstances.  For instance, if the attack is a one-time attack and is over, then you DO NOT have a right to retaliate. 

Similar to when someone robs your house.  If they are gone you have no right to pursue the burglar on your own.  On the other hand, if you have been attacked repeatedly and are sure it continues or will happen again you have a right to defend yourself.

Okay, next comment, “Itching to test this in court.”  Well, personally yes, but I did not say this, and other than my passion for trial work and arguing in court, no one likes to find themselves dragged into court.  But, if the situation dictates that you must do something to protect your company, you have tried all other options and are interested in moving to the next level, then you have options.

Next: “. . . instead of putting in a “huge hodgepodge of security measures” to stop any threat.”  Security is a MUST.  Anti-virus, despite what Josh Corman says, is a MUST.  Anything that can help protect your network and valuable information is a MUST.  If you are going to move into Active Defense you MUST show that you have taken the high ground, done all you can, within reason, and taken an incremental approach slowly escalating as you collect the needed intel.

Next: “Persistent attacks may be bleeding hundreds of thousands of dollars from companies, and in that situation, they should be within their rights to respond, says Willson.”  Yes, they should.  If your company is losing 50 to 100 thousand dollars a week and you have done everything else you believe possible, to include called or considered calling law enforcement, to no avail, self-defense should be an option.

In the interest of time I will make this my last point.  Peter claims that I said those whose networks have been hacked and are being used to attack others are not necessarily innocent victims.  I agree, although this sounds rather ugly. 

Let’s use a physical world example.  Let’s say a bad guy has drugged and brainwashed your neighbor to believe he is a contract killer and his mission is to kill you.  Even if you know this is fact and your neighbor is an innocent unknowing pawn, if he tries to kill you wouldn’t you defend yourself?  You would likely try to diffuse the situation with the least amount of harm to your neighbor, but in the end if it is him or you unless you have a death wish it will be him. 

Active Defense entails escalation, taking the minimal approach at first and slowly escalating with the leadership of the company, not the IT department, making informed decisions based upon risk, liability and legal issues.  The nuclear weapon of cyber is your last resort if that is what the leadership decides to do.

So, there you have it.  Obviously there are many more issues none of them black and white, and this is a very difficult problem.  If it wasn’t there wouldn’t be so much debate about it. 

One last point.  Lately I have been reading a lot of articles, especially by attorneys saying things like, “it’s illegal, don’t do it, but, we are the experts and we can help you.”  Help you do what?  If they are not willing to explore the options then there is nothing for them to do.  Also many articles lately have claimed that “attribution” is impossible.  Stop it.  If it was impossible no one would ever be arrested and prosecuted for hacking.  It is difficult, but not impossible.  So, keep an open mind, think outside the box, and have a nice day ;- ).

‘Active Defense’ will Improve Cyber Security

Lately I’ve seen many articles about “active defense” and “hack back.” This is good because current defenses aren’t working and being in a constant state of defensive mode is not a lot of fun.  Something needs to be done.  The problem is many of these articles take a doomsday approach to the topic. 

Comments like, “it’s illegal, you can’t do it;” “you will disrupt someone’s life support in a hospital;” “we will end up with vigilantes hacking back;”and many more, do not facilitate a discussion but appear to seek to end the debate.  Many of the naysayers claim the only solution is law enforcement and more of it.  How many more police would be enough and is this a realistic response? 

Consider this: one person can command a million bot attack from the comfort of his living room; nation-states are training their people to use cyberspace to attack, steal, disrupt; and working for organized crime and terrorist groups pays much better than working a legitimate job in many countries.  So, what will it take to raise the stakes and make hacking a more risky business?

Active defense will actually improve security for those who consider it.  However, regardless of how the debate proceeds and no matter what the perceived outcome, companies are not likely to suddenly flip a switch and begin hacking back.  There are still too many variables and unknowns involved, e.g. risks, liability and legal issues.  There will continue to be much caution and debate, primarily since the law on this topic is so unsettled and at this point it is difficult to tell from one jurisdiction to the next how this activity will be perceived.

A company with any sense of corporate responsibility will attack this problem with a very cautious approach.  For instance, if your company is persistently attacked the first question is why and how.  Is the company being targeted for a particular reason or is your security so crappy that every hacker and his brother are using you as their playground? 

If your security is good, which is relative because no matter whom you are, your security can always be improved, you will likely take an escalated approach to the problem and not jump right in to hacking back.  During this escalated approach you should be collecting the necessary intelligence to evaluate the problem. 

To use an analogy, let’s say you are in a combat zone and encounter a sniper.  In most circumstances you will not call in an airstrike on the sniper.  There are many factors to consider, like where is he, what type of collateral damage may occur, what is the least amount of effort and resources necessary to take him out, etc.?  So, when facing a cyber-attack the same considerations apply:

  • Where is the hacker coming from;
  • What is his motive and end-state;
  • Based on the Intel you have collected, what tools and techniques can you use;
  • What collateral damage may occur; and,
  • Since time and resources are money, what is the least time and resource intensive course of action you can take to resolve this issue?

Companies have too much to lose to take this lightly and jump forward without a very careful analysis.  It is this analysis that will inevitably lead to much better security and more focus on the problem.

Other questions for a company to ask are, is the attack persistent or a one-time hit and how much Intel can be collected regarding the attack: can a motive be determined, what is the source and means of the attack, potential location and/or identity of the attacker, how many hops in-between your network and the attacker, what type of servers and who owns those servers; then, what is your end-state (block attack, find hacker, prevent further disruption, retrieve intellectual property/trade secrets, etc.), and finally, what are the risks, liability, and legal issues involved? 

Any company that would attempt to hack back without ensuring that their security is good or better than average is just asking for trouble.  A lot of avenues of approach beyond the standard defenses currently employed exist for companies persistently attacked.  The fear mongering spewed in many articles over active defense and hack back will simply drive companies, which are persistently attacked and frustrated with the state of security, to go underground with their response, act in a haphazard manner, and hope they don’t get caught.

Attorneys and Law Firms Beware and Implement Good Cyber Security Practices

If you are an attorney you need to heed the warnings: lock down and protect client data.  This is not a scare tactic, but good advice in light of recent events.  In 2010 at least seven law firms in Canada were hacked, allegedly by Chinese hackers seeking to derail a $40 billion deal with an Australian mining company and to steal valuable client data resident at the law firms; and just this year the Puckett law firm was hacked by the Anonymous hacker group because the firm represents one of the Marine sergeants accused in the Hidatha, Iraq killings.  Some members of Anonymous were upset that the sergeant was getting a pretty good deal and Bradley Manning, the private who leaked      secrets to WikiLeaks was facing life in prison.  Imagine realizing that your law firm has been hacked and wondering what this is going to do to your reputation, and what, if any, ethics or disciplinary action may result. These are the type of stories that make the headlines.

Let’s face it, if your client’s network and/or data is secure, smart hackers will look for the soft target and see if they can get what they are looking for by going through you.  “As financial institutions in New York City and the world become stronger, a hacker can hit a law firm and it’s a much, much easier quarry.” (Mary Galligan, head of cyber in the New York City office of the FBI).  As a profession, we have moved far beyond being able to claim ignorance when it comes to cyber security.

An Aug. 2011 ABA formal opinion suggested that attorneys discuss with clients the fact that email may not be very secure.  Ensure clients are comfortable sending sensitive client info via email.  Some local bar associations have taken it a step further and stated that ethics require attorneys to use a secure email service.  I agree.  In fact, I would do two things:

1) include in your engagement letter a statement that email is not secure and that clients should either agree to use a secure service or sign a statement indicating their desire to continue to use email despite the security concerns; and,

2) Incorporate into a security policy for the firm a plan that outlines how client data will be protected and ensure all in the firm have read and are following it.

Cyber security does not need to be a mystery.  Many free and easy to use tools exist that will help you keep your practice more secure.  For instance, your email service may support secure or encrypted email.  If it doesn’t, there are many good options, such as Hushmail.  It is free, like Hotmail, and allows you to password protect emails using a question and answer format.  Just send your client a text or call them on the phone and tell them the password/answer.  This will significantly lower the risk of loss or theft of data and potentially reduce or eliminate your liability if an incident does occur.  It will also be a deterrent to your client if he/she decides to share your confidential communications with a third party, thus destroying attorney-client confidentiality. He/she will have to provide the password to that person or at least take extra steps to forward the message.  This is just one of many free tools that you can use to significantly lower the risk of a cyber-incident and reduce your liability if data is lost or stolen.  Will these tools make you 100% secure?  Not even close, but if the big guys like Citibank, JP Morgan, Google, the Pentagon, RSA, Visa, and a slew of others cannot prevent getting hacked neither can you.  What you can do is pull yourself out of the low hanging fruit category and minimize the risk of an incident. It’s time to do some research into this topic or hire someone you can trust.  Do Not trust the firm that tells you they have made your network secure, its not going to happen, and if you believe it there is a little bridge I would love to sell you ; – ).  Feel free to contact me with questions or leave a comment.