Category Archives: Poetry

The Nazis Wore Red: A Curious Case of Color-Correction in Contemporary Fascist Cinema

One does not typically expect to find oneself arguing with a film’s color palette for Nazis. Yet here we are. A new Italian film isn’t making just a palette mistake, however, it’s systematically reconstructing fascism as its exact opposite.

Silvio Soldini’s Le assaggiatrici (2025) is based on Rosella Postorino’s bestselling 2018 Italian novel by the same name about Hitler’s food tasters at the Wolfsschanze. In German it’s titled Die Vorkosterinnen.

The book cover features a seductive red butterfly that obscures an Aryan model, as imposed red lipstick defines her identity. The red of Nazi ideology appears to be consuming her, in a book about forced consumption or death.

It has arrived to generally favourable notices. The performances are creditable. The tension is effectively sustained. The director has stated, in interviews with Deutsche Welle and elsewhere, that he prioritises “emotional truth” over historical precision, which seems like a defensible artistic position, and one that accounts for certain liberties taken with the source material.

What it does not account for is the film’s extraordinary disinformation decision to wash the entire Nazi apparatus in petrol (teal).

Chromatic History of National Socialism

Adolf Hitler was many things. Indifferent to visual propaganda definitely was not among them.

His very particular selection of red, white, and black for the visual identity of a Nazi was not accidental. Hitler addressed the question directly in Mein Kampf, explaining that Imperial German red was deliberately chosen for psychological impact. He wanted its association with revolution, its capacity to command attention, its physiological effect on the blood and nerves. The Nuremberg rallies were intentionally seas of red. The swastika banner was designed, by Hitler’s own account, to be impossible to ignore.

This was, one must acknowledge, a propaganda achievement from the lessons of WWI (e.g. Woodrow Wilson’s belief in spectacle as a weapon, leading to Edward Bernay’s publication of a propaganda bible). The Nazis understood from the last war, if not many before them, that militant power and rapid disruption comes not merely through argument but through aesthetic experience. The red was aggressive, confident, seductive. It promised antithesis, rupture, transformation. It stirred.

Historians have documented this extensively, leaving zero doubt. The visual architecture of fascism was Albert Speer’s Cathedral of Light, Leni Riefenstahl’s geometric masses of uniformed bodies, and most of all the omnipresent crimson banners.

1939 Nazi red banners contrasted sharply and covered everything, like the MAGA hat today. Source: Hugo Jaeger/Life Pictures/Shutterstock

The threat of burgundy covering Europe was not incidental to National Socialism but constitutive of it.

The Fiction of a Teal Reich

In Soldini’s film, none of this exists.

The SS uniforms, which on set were presumably some variant of field grey, have been color-graded into a cold greenish blue. This is what Europeans might call petrol, or an American teal. The train carriages are teal. The Wolfsschanze shadows are teal. The very air of occupied Poland appears to have been filtered through Caribbean seawater.

Americans thinking of azure blue vacations of peace and tranquility will be shocked to find this movie painting SS officers in the wrong palette.

Meanwhile, the women who are the victims, unwilling food tasters conscripted into service under threat of death, are dressed almost uniformly in burgundy and brown.

Warm tones. The color family of the swastika banner is applied to the victims, as if to invoke and rehydrate the Hitler propaganda of young beautiful Aryan women in danger. Even the protagonist’s name is Rose!

The shallow symbolic intention seems transparent: teal is meant to convey cold machinery of death versus flushed cheeks of red as a warm human vulnerability. Petroleum versus blood. It is the sort of color theory one encounters in undergraduate film studies seminars, and it is executed competently enough.

The difficulty is that it ends up ironically being fascist propaganda because it is precisely backwards.

Hitler Was an Inversion Artist

Consider what the audience is being taught.

A viewer encountering this film, especially the younger viewer for whom the Second World War is ancient history, absorbs the following visual grammar: Fascism is cold. Fascism is teal and grey and clinical. Fascism looks like a hospital corridor, or a Baltic winter, or an industrial refrigeration unit.

Die Vorkosterinnen depicts Nazi uniforms and machinery only in hues of teal. The SA literally were called “Brownshirts” when they seized power and destroyed democracy along with black-clad SS. An earth grey (erdgrau) shift was later during war.

False.

This is not what fascism looked like. It rose, in fact, as the exact opposite.

Source: “Hitler and the Germans” exhibit at the German Historical Museum, Berlin.

Fascism in Germany was always meant by Hitler to be red hot. It was his vision of Imperial red, white and black for stirring reactions and emotive attachment. It was torchlight and drums and the intoxication of abrupt mass belonging and sudden purpose. It was institutional drug and drink abuse to dispense rapid highs.

The Nazis did not present themselves as slow and precise, bureaucrats of byzantine rules. That was how they aspired to operate, but not how they recruited or actually functioned. They presented themselves as easy vitality, as rapid revolution, as blood and fire and national resurrection.

They were the cheap promise and marketing of Red Bull, Monster drink, 5 hour energy shot, not bowls of slow cooked hearty soup and vegetables with cream. “Fanta” was the Nazi division of Coca Cola, marketed like a Genozid Fantasie in a bottle.

Fanta was created by Coca-Cola to profit from Nazi Germany, avoiding sanctions. It was industrial food byproducts (apple waste, milk waste), marketed as a health drink using a word short for “fantasy”, because it was all about swallowing lies.

The women, meanwhile, would not have dressed in coordinated burgundy. They were rural conscripts and Berlin refugees. They wore what they had. But even setting aside questions of costume accuracy, there is something perverse about rendering victims in the color palette of the perpetrator’s own propaganda. Notably the women also are portrayed as the smoking, drinking and promiscuous ones, while the Nazis are falsely described as teetotalers.

This reversal is painful to see, as Nazis are played in the film as completely inverted to what makes Nazism so dangerous.

“Emotional Truth” and Its Discontents

Director Soldini has explained that historical precision matters less to him than achieving an emotional resonance. One sympathises with the artistic impulse to generate ticket sales. The film is definitely not a documentary, and accuracy is a burden that can produce its own distortions that don’t translate well to audience growth.

But “emotional truth” is not a free pass to rehydrate Nazism. If your emotional symbolism teaches audiences to look for the wrong visual signatures, if it trains them to associate fascism with cold clinical teal rather than seductive aggressive red, then your emotional truth is propagating a functional falsehood that is dangerous.

This disinformation risk matters far more today than it might have in 1995 or 2005. We are presently surrounded by political movements that borrow freely from the fascist playbook whilst their critics struggle to name what they are seeing. A large part of that struggle is visual.

People have been taught, through decades of erroneously toxic films like this one, that fascism is ugly, grey uniforms and clinical efficiency and cold industrial murder. It was not.

They have not been taught that it looks like rallies of red hats and the intoxication of belonging to something larger than oneself.

Every member of Huntington Beach City Council pose for a photo wearing red “Make Huntington Beach Great Again” hats at a swearing-in ceremony on 3 Dec 2024.

They have not been taught to recognize the aesthetic of hot, rapid seduction and “day one” promises of disruption.

Hollywood Teal

One must also note that Soldini is operating within a system. The teal-and-orange color grade has become so pervasive in contemporary cinema that it functions as a kind of default reference.

He pulled the visual equivalent of scoring every emotional beat with swelling orchestra strings. Teal is what films lean on for tension, ignoring the fact that many people dream of holidays in a typical Caribbean blue scene like a Corona ad.

This creates a particular problem for historical cinema. When every thriller, every dystopia, every prestige drama reaches for the same cool teal palette to signal “this is danger,” the color loses its actual meaning.

It becomes mere convention.

And when that convention is misleadingly applied to the Third Reich, it overwrites the actual chromatic signature of the period with a contemporary aesthetic that signifies nothing more than “this film is a color-by-number for cinematic bad things.”

The Nazis were not teal.

But teal is the reduced palette of what serious films dip into, so the Nazis get rehydrated as such. And viewers start embracing Nazism again while thinking the cool, calm drab good guys are the enemy (as targeted by hot-headed attention seeking rage lords).

White nationalist Nick Fuentes has said repeatedly the racist MAGA is the racist America First and that is exactly what he wants.

We Train Eyes to See the Train

One of the most annoying aspects of the film (SPOILER ALERT) is the director abruptly kills the Jew for trying to board the train of freedom. Of course in history the Nazi trains actually symbolize concentration camps, where anyone boarding faced almost certain death. Yet here’s a film that shows the inversion with trains as the freedom trail for the idealized Aryan woman working for Hitler, while the Jew was denied the ride.

The inspiration for the love story between Rosa and [SS leader] Ziegler stems from Woelk’s statement that an officer put her on a train to Berlin in 1944 to save her from the advancing Red Army, the armed forces of the Soviet Union. She later learned that all the other food tasters had been shot by Soviet soldiers.

That’s Nazi propaganda pulled forward, pure and unadulterated.

The love story in the film frames the SS leader as kind hearted savior, as he is shooting a Jew in the back so she couldn’t be liberated by approaching Allied soldiers, yet “saving” the Aryan girl by gifting her a rare spot on a Nazi train.

The film covers the protagonist’s hands in the blood of the Jewish woman murdered by her SS lover, blood she stares at on the train, perhaps to emphasize how the Swastika was believed to be a symbol of being lucky at birth. She lived to be 91 thanks to the SS, who made sure that a Jewish woman didn’t get a spot on that train, just a bullet in the back.

And just to be clear, Judenhilfe (hiding or even befriending a Jew) was a capital crime for years, eliminating all doubt by killing anyone who doubted. An Aryan woman caught running beside the Jewish woman she was helping and defending would not have been spared when a SS officer opened fire. In the worsening Nazism logic over time, and thus especially by 1945, it would be like a policeman shooting the passenger in a criminal getaway car and then offering the driver a can of gas.

There is a reason disinformation historians care about such visual culture. Political movements are recognised, and hidden, partly through their weaponization of aesthetics. The person who knows that fascism comes wrapped in red flags of instant vitality and promises of national greatness is better equipped to identify it than the person who has been taught to feel disgust for cool grey of law and order, to hate calm bureaucrats in clinical blue corridors.

Soldini’s film, whatever its other merits, trains eyes to see the exact wrong thing. The good guy palette in reality is flipped to evil, audiences are pushed to embrace the palette of Hitler’s violent hate.

  • Chromatic inversion (blueish Nazis, reddish victims)
  • Behavioral inversion (abstemious Nazis, hedonistic women)
  • Logical inversion (Murderous SS as loving saviors)

Soldini color-corrects and codifies fascism into something unrecognisable, antithetical. In doing so, it makes the real thing far harder to recognize correctly today when it flashes itself all around us, signaling as it always has.

The Nazis wore red for a reason.

Red was how they poisoned power.

It would be useful if we remembered this.

The Spanish edition’s cover designer understood something Soldini didn’t. The RED APPLE is the focal point as the danger, the temptation, the poison risk. It sits against cool grey tones. The red is what threatens. The grey is the safety and institutional backdrop.

The Not So Secret Origin of Bowser in Super Mario Brothers

For forty years, gamers have treated Bowser’s name origin as if an unsolved mystery.

The official line from Nintendo is that it’s “unconfirmed.” Wikipedia likes to rest on “multiple competing theories.” The gaming press periodically revisits the question, shrugs, and moves on.

They’ve all been looking in the wrong direction.

Instead, in plain sight, the name has been confirmed not by Nintendo but by the people who actively avoided the name.

Hating on Korea

Mario’s nemesis in Japanese has always been called Kuppa, named by Shigeru Miyamoto after gukbap, a Korean rice soup dish. Miyamoto reportedly also considered naming him after yukhoe (raw beef) and bibimbap. The man liked references to Korean food as villainous.

When Super Mario Bros. was localized for the American market in 1985, someone at Nintendo of America decided that slights directed at Korea like “Kuppa” wouldn’t work for Americans. They needed another name for a villain, the fire-breathing turtle-dragon.

They chose “Bowser.”

Apparently, nobody wrote down why. Nobody filed a memo we can cite. The decision was made by a small team. Nintendo of America had roughly 35 employees at the time, no formal localization department, and was operating out of Redmond, Washington while frantically trying to launch the NES into a market still traumatized by the 1983 video game crash.

The Obvious Pop Villain

In 1985, if you were an American in your twenties working in entertainment-adjacent industries, there was a very specific cultural reference sitting in your mental inventory for “tough guy with a funny name.”

Bowzer.

Jon “Bowzer” Bauman was the breakout star of Sha Na Na, the nostalgia doo-wop group that had been inescapable in American pop culture:

  • Woodstock, 1969 (immortalized in the documentary)
  • The movie Grease, 1978 (massive hit)
  • The Sha Na Na TV variety show, 1977-1981 (syndicated for years after)

Bowzer’s whole act was a villain persona with the muscle shirt, the slicked-back hair, the theatrical sneer. The comedy he created was in the contrast: an intimidating figure performing sincere 1950s love ballads. The tough guy who sings love songs. The cruel kindness jokes, like saying he was told by his manager he’s not very nice, so he’s trying to prove him wrong by asking everyone to send get well cards to his hospital room.

Jon “Bowzer” Bauman

The spelling difference is notable. Localization teams routinely adjust spellings to avoid trademark issues or to make names feel more “natural” in the target language. Bowzer becomes Bowser.

The Negative Proof

Here’s where it gets interesting.

In 1993, Hollywood produced the infamous live-action Super Mario Bros. movie. Dennis Hopper played the villain. But in the film, he’s called “President Koopa” and never Bowser.

Why?

In an interview, screenwriter Parker Bennett explained the decision. They didn’t use “Bowser” because, and this is the key clue, it immediately brought to mind “the ’50s Sha Na Na guy.”

Boom.

This wasn’t research. This wasn’t something they had to look up. The association was reflexive. Instant. Obvious.

The filmmakers in 1993 knew exactly where the name came from. It was so obvious to them that they actively avoided it, worried the comedic association would undermine their (inexplicably serious) film.

Bowser no longer was cool, no longer was pop. A generation had passed.

If it was obvious to Hollywood screenwriters in 1993, it was obvious to Nintendo of America in 1985. The difference is that in 1985, someone saw the connection as a feature rather than a bug. A tough villain name with existing cultural resonance? Perfect. Ship it.

The Dismissal

I see some historians dismissed the Sha Na Na theory partly because “the trend of naming Mario characters after musicians hadn’t started yet.” This is terrible reasoning.

Conventions don’t emerge from nowhere. They start with individual decisions that later become patterns.

We know exactly how Nintendo of America’s localization worked in this era because we have documented cases from just a few years later. When Super Mario Bros. 3 was localized in 1990, a product analyst named Dayvv Brooks was tasked with naming Bowser’s seven children, the Koopalings.
Brooks, a former Tower Records employee and DJ, immediately reached for musicians:

  • Ludwig von Koopa (Beethoven)
  • Roy Koopa (Roy Orbison)
  • Wendy O. Koopa (Wendy O. Williams)
  • Iggy Koopa (Iggy Pop)
  • Lemmy Koopa (Lemmy Kilmister)
  • Morton Koopa Jr. (Morton Downey Jr.)

We only know this because someone tracked Brooks down in 2015 and asked him. He didn’t file a memo in 1990. There was no documentation. The knowledge existed only in his memory until a journalist finally thought to ask the right question.

Brooks wasn’t at Nintendo in 1985. But the method he used of reaching for pop culture references that “just fit”, clearly was part of how NoA approached localization. The Koopalings weren’t an innovation. They were a continuation.

Who Are You Going to Call?

The leading candidate is Howard Phillips.

Phillips was NoA’s fifth employee, starting in 1981 as a warehouse manager. By 1985, he had evolved into the company’s key liaison between Japanese developers and the American market. His job was explicitly to advise on what would resonate with US audiences — including, according to documented sources, advising on “the renaming of characters.”

Phillips was born in 1958. In 1985, he was 27 years old — exactly the demographic for whom Sha Na Na’s Bowzer would have been a vivid cultural reference. He was also, by all accounts, deeply immersed in pop culture and an avid consumer of entertainment media.

Has anyone ever directly asked Howard Phillips: “Did you name Bowser? Were you thinking of Sha Na Na?”

Phillips is still active. He does interviews about Nintendo history. He’s been asked about the NES launch, about Nintendo Power, about his role in rejecting the Japanese Super Mario Bros. 2 as too difficult for American audiences. He’s been asked about almost everything.

So? Bowser?

The Bowser is Bowzer

Here’s the most beautiful part.

Over forty years, Bowser evolved from a one-dimensional fire-breathing villain into the comedy shtick of a 1970s Bowzer:

  • The bumbling dad who genuinely loves kids
  • The hopeless romantic pining for his girl
  • The adversary who holds grudging respect
  • The antagonist whose menace is increasingly played for comedy

And in 2023, the apotheosis: Jack Black voicing Bowser in the Super Mario Bros. movie, sitting at a piano, singing a power ballad called “Peaches” about his unrequited love.

Jack Black as Bowser

It’s as Bowzer as Bowser can get.

The tough guy who sings love songs.

Whether or not anyone at Nintendo in 1985 consciously intended the reference, the character arc rhymes perfectly with its namesake. Bowser became Bowzer. The archetype was encoded in the name from the beginning.

If anyone reading this has contact with Howard Phillips, please ask:

“Did you name Bowser after Sha Na Na?”

The answer might finally close a forty-year-old case that was never actually mysterious. We just forgot to ask the right people the right question, to stop believing it is unknowable.

Bitchin’ Camaro From Cambodia to the Caribbean: American Production of War Criminals

Joe – Uh, how you gonna get down to the shore?
Rod – Funny you should ask, I’ve got a car now.
Joe – Oh wow, how’d you get a car?
Rod – Oh my parents drove it up here from the Bahamas.
Joe – You’re kidding!
Rod – I must be, the Bahamas are islands, okay, the important thing now, is that you ask me what kind of car I have.
Joe – Uh, what kinda car do ya’ got?
Rod – I’ve got a BITCHIN CAMARO!

The most dangerous actors aren’t the incompetent or the overtly malicious, they’re the genuinely skilled professionals who understand that what they’re doing serves no legitimate purpose but continue doing it well.

Admiral Holsey stepping down suggests at least one officer has decided not to be that person.

Alvin Holsey, Admiral Who Oversaw Boat Strikes Off Venezuela’s Coast, Retires: The admiral had abruptly announced that he would step down as the head of the U.S. Southern Command.

Understanding why requires looking back fifty years.

Creighton Abrams was arguably the most capable American tactical commander since Ulysses Grant. Both demonstrated mastery of logistics, both operated under severe political constraints, and both accepted operational risks their predecessors had avoided.

26th December 1944 Commanding 37th Tank Battalion, CCR, 4th Armoured Division, Lt. Colonel Abrams requested he be allowed to dash his Sherman tanks through Assenois to breach German defenses and reach Bastogne to relieve the surrounded 101st Airborne. Abrams was right, and for this Third US Army Commander, General George S. Patton called him the “world champion” tank commander.

A critical difference between these two men lay in civil-military alignment: Grant’s civilian leadership shared his strategic objectives, while Abrams served an administration whose domestic political imperatives systematically undermined coherent strategy.

The constitutional position on Abrams’ tactical work under President Nixon is unambiguous. Congress never authorised military operations in Cambodia; the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution’s writ extended to Vietnam alone. More significantly, the military maintained dual reporting systems that recorded ordnance falling on South Vietnamese coordinates when it actually struck Cambodian territory.

This went far beyond unauthorised action into being a deliberate falsification designed to deceive the branch constitutionally empowered to declare war.

A crime.

It occurred within a broader pattern: Nixon had intervened to obstruct the 1968 Paris peace negotiations to secure electoral advantage, then required the war’s continuation through 1972 for re-election. American casualties served the GOP’s domestic political purposes, literally throwing soldiers’ lives away to win votes.

Abrams’ role was executing Nixon’s strategically incoherent and illegal policies whose consequences extended far beyond military failure. The destabilisation of Cambodia, while not solely attributable to American mistakes, was materially accelerated by it, contributing to state collapse that enabled Khmer Rouge consolidation and genocide.

The Khmer Rouge were teenagers wielding the latest weapons technology to destroy a country from within, a pattern I’ve traced to DOGE staff weaponizing AI to systematically dismantle American state capacity. Two million died from Pol Pot; current projections suggest two million a year dead from DOGE cuts.

Abrams’s culpability should not be reduced to mere order-following. The Abrams Tapes, declassified two decades after his death, demonstrate that he understood the conflict was “basically a political contest.” His failure was therefore not one of comprehension but of institutional role: generals propose military solutions because military solutions are what generals are positioned to propose. His legitimate concern, that American withdrawal was outpacing South Vietnamese military capacity, was correct. His proposed remedy, however, reflected the persistent American misapprehension that a complex insurgency with deep political roots could be addressed through conventional operations against geographic sanctuaries.

The hunt for COSVN epitomised this confusion. American planners conceived of a simplistic targetable headquarters, a “jungle Pentagon”, despite evidence they faced a distributed network of cadres. Nixon’s “Vietnamization” plan compounded this Americanization error by treating military capability as the binding constraint when the fundamental problem was political legitimacy. The Saigon government’s inability to command popular loyalty was never a problem that American firepower could resolve, especially from 90,000 feet.

The sixty-day operational limit also telegraphed the campaign’s own negation plan. Any adversary capable of basic strategic patience would disperse, wait, and return on schedule. That anyone would claim American success was measurable in captured rice and destroyed bunkers merely confirmed total absence of meaningful strategic metrics. The North Vietnamese simply relocated deeper into Cambodia, the Cambodian state authority collapsed further, and so the Khmer Rouge recruitment accelerated.

Most damning is how the promised “breathing room” was a shrewd lie, exposing the American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon as a delusional sycophant. His saccharin cables consistently contradicted accurate CIA assessments and field reporting, to give Nixon what he wanted to hear instead of reality. The Paris agreement that Nixon celebrated as his gift to the world was immediately ignored and within months the North Vietnamese were rolling into Saigon after domestic American backlash had accelerated withdrawal timelines.

None of this absolves Hanoi’s strategic choices, Thieu’s venality, or the Khmer Rouge’s ideological pathology. It shows American ideological intervention created conditions that other actors easily exploited. Whether Abrams’s resignation, like Holsey’s, or public dissent would have altered this trajectory is unknowable. What remains clear is that his silence stands as complicity in an illegal campaign whose strategic bankruptcy he understood.

Nixon knew peace talks were potentially ending the war in 1968 but he convinced America to elect him by scuttling them. He repeatedly lied to the public and to South Vietnam to take power, which meant expansion and prolonging of war while declaring himself the anti-war leader. Tens of thousands more Americans were killed needlessly by him, just to abruptly abandon South Vietnam and let it fall catastrophically in 1975.

Cambodia’s genocide followed.

Abrams had to hide his knowledge that the President’s war plan was strategically bankrupt. Today Hegseth doesn’t have to hide anything because his audience doesn’t care.

The cruelty is the point now; the incompetence is a feature. You don’t need competent complicity when there’s no accountability mechanism left to evade. You just do the crimes, lie about them badly, contradict yourself publicly, and get rewarded because the crimes signal tribal loyalty.

The system that produced Abrams’s silence has decayed into one that produces Hegseth.

Admiral Holsey walked away. Under Trump there will always be someone who won’t.

Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
I ran over my neighbors
Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
Now I’m in all the papers

My folks bought me a bitchin’ Camaro
With no insurance to match
So if I happen to run you down
Please don’t leave a scratch

I ran over some old lady
One night at the county fair
And I didn’t get arrested
Because my dad’s the mayor

Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
Donuts on your lawn
Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
Tony Orlando and Dawn

When I drive past the kids
They all spit and cuss
‘Cause I’ve got a bitchin’ Camaro
And they have to ride the bus

So you’d better get out of my way
When I come through your yard
‘Cause I’ve got a bitchin’ Camaro
And an Exxon credit card

Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
Hey man where ya headed?
Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
I don’t want unleaded

“Bitchin’ Camaro” by the Dead Milkmen, released on their debut album “Big Lizard in My Backyard” (1985).

Remembering the Encryption of Painter Rudolph Wacker

The remarkable thing about the paintings of Rudolph Wacker may be how unremarkably good they are (“New Objectivity”).

Sitting with friends the other day, I noticed every single person was saying their favorite painting of a set on the wall was by Wacker.

Winter Landscape, 1934. Rudolf Wacker

I mean, it’s like he had a way of capturing a scene in such an authentic way as to beg the question of why it’s even a scene. It’s a literal depiction of nothing in particular, a pleasing still life “magic of the everyday” that draws you in to wonder why.

During the rise of National Socialism in the 1930s, Rudolf Wacker created encrypted still lifes, which, in a subtle manner, allow us to relate to the abysses and threats of the time.

The Nazis certainly didn’t appreciate his perspective, as they tortured Wacker to death in 1939.