Category Archives: History

Bitchin’ Camaro From Cambodia to the Caribbean: American Production of War Criminals

Joe – Uh, how you gonna get down to the shore?
Rod – Funny you should ask, I’ve got a car now.
Joe – Oh wow, how’d you get a car?
Rod – Oh my parents drove it up here from the Bahamas.
Joe – You’re kidding!
Rod – I must be, the Bahamas are islands, okay, the important thing now, is that you ask me what kind of car I have.
Joe – Uh, what kinda car do ya’ got?
Rod – I’ve got a BITCHIN CAMARO!

The most dangerous actors aren’t the incompetent or the overtly malicious, they’re the genuinely skilled professionals who understand that what they’re doing serves no legitimate purpose but continue doing it well.

Admiral Holsey stepping down suggests at least one officer has decided not to be that person.

Alvin Holsey, Admiral Who Oversaw Boat Strikes Off Venezuela’s Coast, Retires: The admiral had abruptly announced that he would step down as the head of the U.S. Southern Command.

Understanding why requires looking back fifty years.

Creighton Abrams was arguably the most capable American tactical commander since Ulysses Grant. Both demonstrated mastery of logistics, both operated under severe political constraints, and both accepted operational risks their predecessors had avoided.

26th December 1944 Commanding 37th Tank Battalion, CCR, 4th Armoured Division, Lt. Colonel Abrams requested he be allowed to dash his Sherman tanks through Assenois to breach German defenses and reach Bastogne to relieve the surrounded 101st Airborne. Abrams was right, and for this Third US Army Commander, General George S. Patton called him the “world champion” tank commander.

A critical difference between these two men lay in civil-military alignment: Grant’s civilian leadership shared his strategic objectives, while Abrams served an administration whose domestic political imperatives systematically undermined coherent strategy.

The constitutional position on Abrams’ tactical work under President Nixon is unambiguous. Congress never authorised military operations in Cambodia; the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution’s writ extended to Vietnam alone. More significantly, the military maintained dual reporting systems that recorded ordnance falling on South Vietnamese coordinates when it actually struck Cambodian territory.

This went far beyond unauthorised action into being a deliberate falsification designed to deceive the branch constitutionally empowered to declare war.

A crime.

It occurred within a broader pattern: Nixon had intervened to obstruct the 1968 Paris peace negotiations to secure electoral advantage, then required the war’s continuation through 1972 for re-election. American casualties served the GOP’s domestic political purposes, literally throwing soldiers’ lives away to win votes.

Abrams’ role was executing Nixon’s strategically incoherent and illegal policies whose consequences extended far beyond military failure. The destabilisation of Cambodia, while not solely attributable to American mistakes, was materially accelerated by it, contributing to state collapse that enabled Khmer Rouge consolidation and genocide.

The Khmer Rouge were teenagers wielding the latest weapons technology to destroy a country from within, a pattern I’ve traced to DOGE staff weaponizing AI to systematically dismantle American state capacity. Two million died from Pol Pot; current projections suggest two million a year dead from DOGE cuts.

Abrams’s culpability should not be reduced to mere order-following. The Abrams Tapes, declassified two decades after his death, demonstrate that he understood the conflict was “basically a political contest.” His failure was therefore not one of comprehension but of institutional role: generals propose military solutions because military solutions are what generals are positioned to propose. His legitimate concern, that American withdrawal was outpacing South Vietnamese military capacity, was correct. His proposed remedy, however, reflected the persistent American misapprehension that a complex insurgency with deep political roots could be addressed through conventional operations against geographic sanctuaries.

The hunt for COSVN epitomised this confusion. American planners conceived of a simplistic targetable headquarters, a “jungle Pentagon”, despite evidence they faced a distributed network of cadres. Nixon’s “Vietnamization” plan compounded this Americanization error by treating military capability as the binding constraint when the fundamental problem was political legitimacy. The Saigon government’s inability to command popular loyalty was never a problem that American firepower could resolve, especially from 90,000 feet.

The sixty-day operational limit also telegraphed the campaign’s own negation plan. Any adversary capable of basic strategic patience would disperse, wait, and return on schedule. That anyone would claim American success was measurable in captured rice and destroyed bunkers merely confirmed total absence of meaningful strategic metrics. The North Vietnamese simply relocated deeper into Cambodia, the Cambodian state authority collapsed further, and so the Khmer Rouge recruitment accelerated.

Most damning is how the promised “breathing room” was a shrewd lie, exposing the American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon as a delusional sycophant. His saccharin cables consistently contradicted accurate CIA assessments and field reporting, to give Nixon what he wanted to hear instead of reality. The Paris agreement that Nixon celebrated as his gift to the world was immediately ignored and within months the North Vietnamese were rolling into Saigon after domestic American backlash had accelerated withdrawal timelines.

None of this absolves Hanoi’s strategic choices, Thieu’s venality, or the Khmer Rouge’s ideological pathology. It shows American ideological intervention created conditions that other actors easily exploited. Whether Abrams’s resignation, like Holsey’s, or public dissent would have altered this trajectory is unknowable. What remains clear is that his silence stands as complicity in an illegal campaign whose strategic bankruptcy he understood.

Nixon knew peace talks were potentially ending the war in 1968 but he convinced America to elect him by scuttling them. He repeatedly lied to the public and to South Vietnam to take power, which meant expansion and prolonging of war while declaring himself the anti-war leader. Tens of thousands more Americans were killed needlessly by him, just to abruptly abandon South Vietnam and let it fall catastrophically in 1975.

Cambodia’s genocide followed.

Abrams had to hide his knowledge that the President’s war plan was strategically bankrupt. Today Hegseth doesn’t have to hide anything because his audience doesn’t care.

The cruelty is the point now; the incompetence is a feature. You don’t need competent complicity when there’s no accountability mechanism left to evade. You just do the crimes, lie about them badly, contradict yourself publicly, and get rewarded because the crimes signal tribal loyalty.

The system that produced Abrams’s silence has decayed into one that produces Hegseth.

Admiral Holsey walked away. Under Trump there will always be someone who won’t.

Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
I ran over my neighbors
Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
Now I’m in all the papers

My folks bought me a bitchin’ Camaro
With no insurance to match
So if I happen to run you down
Please don’t leave a scratch

I ran over some old lady
One night at the county fair
And I didn’t get arrested
Because my dad’s the mayor

Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
Donuts on your lawn
Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
Tony Orlando and Dawn

When I drive past the kids
They all spit and cuss
‘Cause I’ve got a bitchin’ Camaro
And they have to ride the bus

So you’d better get out of my way
When I come through your yard
‘Cause I’ve got a bitchin’ Camaro
And an Exxon credit card

Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
Hey man where ya headed?
Bitchin’ Camaro, bitchin’ Camaro
I don’t want unleaded

“Bitchin’ Camaro” by the Dead Milkmen, released on their debut album “Big Lizard in My Backyard” (1985).

Remembering the Encryption of Painter Rudolph Wacker

The remarkable thing about the paintings of Rudolph Wacker may be how unremarkably good they are (“New Objectivity”).

Sitting with friends the other day, I noticed every single person was saying their favorite painting of a set on the wall was by Wacker.

Winter Landscape, 1934. Rudolf Wacker

I mean, it’s like he had a way of capturing a scene in such an authentic way as to beg the question of why it’s even a scene. It’s a literal depiction of nothing in particular, a pleasing still life “magic of the everyday” that draws you in to wonder why.

During the rise of National Socialism in the 1930s, Rudolf Wacker created encrypted still lifes, which, in a subtle manner, allow us to relate to the abysses and threats of the time.

The Nazis certainly didn’t appreciate his perspective, as they tortured Wacker to death in 1939.

MIT Operationalizes CIA Robotic Insects: Precision Lethality at Paperclip Scale

MIT has materialized what the CIA has wanted since early in the Cold War: deniable, unattributable, precision lethality.

…tiny flying robots could be deployed to aid in the search for survivors trapped beneath the rubble after a devastating earthquake. Like real insects, these robots could flit through tight spaces larger robots can’t reach, while simultaneously dodging stationary obstacles and pieces of falling rubble. So far, aerial microrobots have only been able to fly slowly along smooth trajectories, far from the swift, agile flight of real insects — until now. MIT researchers have demonstrated aerial microrobots that can fly with speed and agility that is comparable to their biological counterparts.

Insect sized robots at MIT, offering autonomous targeted micro lethality. Reminiscent of 2018 Micro Air Vehicle Lab (MAVLab) bird-sized versions. Source: MIT

The “humanitarian” framing is the… beard. All the “cameras and sensors” they mention as “future work” is sheer euphemism. A payload at this scale doesn’t need to be explosive; a guided needle, a directed toxin, a micro-charge at close range even inside of critical infrastructure.

The evolution from surveillance drone to armed drone to precision kinetic strike happened over roughly two decades. In terms of recent Lebanon and Caribbean strikes, we’re talking about people who market the R9X Hellfire (“Ninja”) blades as precision reducing collateral damage — amputation and destruction as humanitarian language.

Same rhetorical pattern here.

The argument that smaller and more precise is more ethical has been the justification for every escalation in targeted killing capability starting even before “Tarzon” (TAllboy, Range and aZimuth ONly) bombs or shoulder-fired mini-nuclear “Davy Crockett” rockets were claimed to be how America should win the Korean War cleanly.

The American racial encoding of this “frontier” weapon named after a genocidal folk hero (M28/M29 Davy Crockett) entered service in May 1961. It was promoted as a “surgical” strike, in photos like this one, where a white soldier poses as a “big dick” who needs soldiers of color to load and unload him. The Crockett rocket fired an “atomic watermelon” with 20 tons radioactive TNT equivalent up to 3 miles away.

This new technology announcement compresses the “precision” death timeline even more significantly because:

  • Scale advantage: A paperclip-weight robot is essentially undetectable. No radar signature. Visual acquisition nearly impossible.
  • Penetration capability: Explicitly designed to go where “traditional quadcopters can’t” — through rubble, gaps, screens, gates, grills, broken windows
  • Autonomous targeting: The saccade movement they’re celebrating mimics how insects localize and identify — that’s targeting behavior, not just navigation

And look at the funding: Office of Naval Research, Air Force Office of Scientific Research. The search-and-rescue framing is a dual-use press release. The money trail tells you the most likely uses and customers.

The CIA failed in the 1970s to get their Insectothopter (let alone robotic birds of Project Aquiline) operational, for precisely the reason this MIT team solved: crosswind instability.

The Insectothopter. Source: CIA Archives

The 1970s robotic dragonfly design couldn’t handle more than a light breeze, an important context for everything MIT just demonstrated:

  • Wind disturbances of >1 m/s handled
  • Aggressive maneuvers with <5cm trajectory deviation
  • Autonomous control (AI) architecture that compresses decision-making to distributed and real-time

Sarah Bergbreiter explicitly notes in the news release by MIT that while the controller still runs externally, they’ve demonstrated onboard execution.

“This work is especially impressive because these robots still perform precise flips and fast turns despite the large uncertainties that come from relatively large fabrication tolerances in small-scale manufacturing, wind gusts of more than 1 meter per second, and even its power tether wrapping around the robot as it performs repeated flips,” says Sarah Bergbreiter, a professor of mechanical engineering at Carnegie Mellon University, who was not involved with this work. “Although the controller currently runs on an external computer rather than onboard the robot, the authors demonstrate that similar, but less precise, control policies may be feasible even with the more limited computation available on an insect-scale robot. This is exciting because it points toward future insect-scale robots with agility approaching that of their biological counterparts,” she adds.

That’s the tell.

External computation means tethered, lab-bound demonstrations with oversight. Onboard computation means operational without oversight. She’s essentially confirming a roadmap to fly around and find out.

Search-and-rescue framing isn’t just cover for academic institutions appropriating funds, it’s how the Lincoln Laboratory gets graduate students to create weapons without moral injury or considering what happened when MIT’s death machines, known as Operation Igloo White, illegally destroyed Cambodia (Operation Menu).

Scene from “Bugging the Battlefield” by National Archives and Records Administration, 1969
Cambodia Genocide Map: US Bombing Points 1965-73, Source: Yale

Pete Hegseth Makes the Case Against Pete Hegseth

The Man Unfit to Command

Hegseth has tried to claim his only job is to be offensive, dismissing “defense” of America as someone else’s job. So be it. Let’s review what his loud rejections of duty have meant so far in terms of military preparedness and execution.

I. Pattern

June 14, 2015. Pete Hegseth throws a double-sided axe on live television.

Behind the target: Master Sergeant Jeff Prosperie, West Point Band, five children.

Hegseth wasn’t authorized to throw. He’d practiced once. He threw anyway.

The axe struck Prosperie’s elbow, cut his wrist. Prosperie’s statement:

Poor decision, obvious negligence, should not have happened, could have been avoided. When shooting or throwing, always know what is behind your target.

He sued. The incident is documented.

The military now appears to be preparing for Hegseth’s removal through coordinated disclosures like these.

The question is whether Trump tries to cut ties or double down on those exhibiting a pattern of being unfit for duty.

II. Preparation

January–August 2025: Hegseth fires the Army and Air Force Judge Advocates General to remove prevention of war crimes.

March 2025: Hegseth shares classified Yemen strike details via Signal with his wife, brother, Fox News producer, and journalist Jeffrey Goldberg. IG report confirms Hegseth pushed classified information to insecure networks, endangering soldiers.

Before September 2: Hegseth approves written contingency protocols. If survivors take “hostile action,” Hegseth says kill them, where hostile action is redefined to include the wounded and defenseless who ask for help.

III. Execution

September 2, 2025. First strike.

Two survivors on burning wreckage. One radios for rescue.

Admiral Bradley, executing Hegseth’s pre-approved criteria, orders a second strike.

Both shipwreck survivors are murdered.

IV. Crimes

Joint Publication 3-0 defines hostile act:

An attack or other use of force.

Pentagon Law of War Manual, Section 7.3: hostile acts are “acts of violence.”

A shipwreck survivor radioing for rescue is neither.

Major General Steven Lepper, 35 years as military lawyer, former Deputy JAG of the Air Force, on record:

Once we have rendered a vessel capable of survival only if it’s rescued, our obligation then shifts as well from attack to rescue. And so under those circumstances, even in the best light possible, I don’t think that anyone can say that this was a lawful order.

This is common sense as much as exact law.

Hegseth authored kill criteria in advance that lacked any moral justification. The Trump administration has floated a theory that is attenuated by the most basic logic:

  • Any restaurant is now a military target (profit from selling food pays for something that could harm Americans, such as cigarettes or alcohol).
  • A man’s eyeglasses are military targets (he can see America).
  • A shipwreck survivor’s pen makes him a military target (he could write a message in a bottle for rescue).

The point: the Trump administration launders summary execution through four degrees of separation (goods → sale → profits → weapons) that are so patently absurd they make evidence of community or prosperity the target for military strike. That’s a significant tell for historians.

This is 1919 Elaine, Arkansas mass murder logic when Black farmers gathered in a Church to complain of being underpaid. Hundreds were shot dead by federal troops. This is 1921 Tulsa, Oklahoma mass murder logic when “Black Wall Street” openly displayed prosperity. Mass unmarked graves to this day still hide the dead from napalm bombs dropped by white supremacist militias (oil company men) on Black neighborhoods.

This is… American racist rhetoric of assigning non-whites the label of “drugs” to dehumanize and murder them.

Now Trump says anyone on a boat anywhere can be killed by Hegseth’s orders because someone has something that could be sold. The through-line should be clear: assign non-whites a dehumanizing label (“drugs,” “uppity,” “threat”) for soldiers to murder them with legal cover.

Tribunals have seen this argument before. They rejected it and shot the officers who made it.

The distinction matters. No soldier can be a professional when there is no defense of the profession left.

V. Documentation

The following exist:

  • Strike Bridge logs: automatic record of all communications during the September 2 operation
  • Hegseth’s execute order
  • Pre-approved contingency protocols
  • Unedited video of both strikes
  • Hegseth’s public statements contradicting each other across five days
  • Hegseth’s social media posts celebrating military murder of civilians posing no immediate threat

Congress has requested these documents.

VI. Allies’ Unfavorable Assessment

Britain suspended intelligence-sharing with the Pentagon. Canada distanced itself. Allied nations have made complicity calculations.

VII. War Crime Precedents

At Fort Pillow in 1864, Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s forces murdered Black Union soldiers attempting to surrender. General Forrest wrote that the massacre was intentional:

It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that the Negro soldier cannot cope with Southerners.

Source: “Hymns of the Republic: The Story of the Final Year of the American Civil War”, S. C. Gwynne, p 19

Three months later, forces under General Lee did the same at the Battle of the Crater, butchering Black soldiers who surrendered, then murdering prisoners of war afterward.

The Union’s response established that killing the defenseless is murder, not war.

Think about that precedent and what it means when someone attempts to reverse it. This American history matters, not least of all because “Make America Great Again” and America First are both racist platforms that reject defeat of the Confederacy.

General Grant stopped these butchers on the battle fields and again in the ballot boxes. And yet, here we are again.

Foreshadowing horrors in WWI trench warfare, General Lee at Cold Harbor entrenched to massacre soldiers and then deny the wounded care as his explicit terror tactic. Source: “This was not war” Welt.de

Hegseth’s tattoos tell you the hateful traditions he follows, rejecting post-Civil War values and clear military doctrines. His overt Confederate loyalties (e.g. forcing enemy Confederate names onto U.S. military bases) and protocols—kill any survivors who cry for help—show you he means it.

When General Anton Dostler transmitted Hitler’s order to execute captured commandos, his defense was he only passed along the order, didn’t originate it.

The post-war tribunal ruled against him:

No soldier, and still less a Commanding General, can be heard to say that he considered the summary shooting of prisoners of war legitimate.

Dostler was shot by firing squad, December 1, 1945.

The Peleus case is even more directly parallel. In 1944, German U-boat commander Heinz-Wilhelm Eck torpedoed a Greek steamship, then spent five hours machine-gunning the wreckage and rafts. His defense: he wasn’t targeting survivors, he was eliminating debris for “operational necessity.”

The British Military Court rejected it:

You cannot shoot up rafts full of shipwreck survivors and then hide behind semantics about what, exactly, you were “really” aiming at.

Eck and two officers were shot by firing squad, November 30, 1945.

Hegseth’s defense argument that survivors became valid targets by radioing for help is the same Nazi argument in different words.

The precedent is very clear.

Three days after the strike on shipwreck survivors, to the press and then again in Quantico, Hegseth gloated:

Maximum lethality, not tepid legality.

Hegseth now has done worse than Nazi General Dostler, as he didn’t claim to transmit an order from above. He originated the criteria. He approved the protocols before the operation. Bradley executed what Hegseth authorized, keeping detailed paper trails capturing the criteria.

Firing squad is on the table.

18 U.S.C. § 2441, the War Crimes Act: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions by U.S. nationals are federal crimes. If death results, the penalty includes death.

VIII. Documented

Hegseth threw an axe without authorization and hit a soldier. Documented.

Hegseth fired the lawyers who would have stopped him. Documented.

Hegseth approved kill criteria for survivors in advance. Documented.

Hegseth’s criteria were executed. Two men dead. Documented.

Hegseth celebrated on social media. Documented.

Hegseth contradicted himself on camera for five days. Documented.

The man who couldn’t be trusted with an axe now commands the American military. The file he’s building is his own prosecution.

The SS nameplate, the mocking memes, the “maximum lethality not tepid legality”—those aren’t bugs, they’re features for the white nationalists saying they own the White House. But constitutional loyalists appear to be gathering Hegseth’s prosecution file in real time; the documentation systems are running, and Hegseth keeps feeding them like the infamous Nixon tape recorders.

Bottom line: This is far more than political theater because an actual safety mechanism inside the Pentagon is rolling out to stop war criminals.

Hegseth is losing the information war every time he opens his mouth to order “maximum lethality” against unarmed civilians, or brags about another Confederate base naming, or thumps his anti-American tattoos.

Source: Twitter

The file he’s building isn’t a highlight reel. It’s an air-tight prosecution of himself as a war criminal, reminiscent of racist Confederate and Nazi leaders who were tried, convicted and… executed by America.