Category Archives: History

Kurdish group reverts name to PKK

I missed this story in 2005, but thought it was still worth mentioning as I just read some counter-terrorism information from the Turkish police accusing the PKK of changing their name in 2002 to avoid being listed as a terrorist group:

Turkey’s armed rebel Kurdish movement has decided to revert back to its original name of PKK after two name changes in three years, a pro-Kurdish news agency reported on Monday.

Note that the story does not mention “terrorism”, just rebellion, separatism, etc.

The PKK, founded by Ocalan in 1978, waged an armed campaign against the Ankara government from 1984 to 1999, which claimed some 37,000 lives in souutheastern Turkey.

The group, which describes itself as marxist-leninist, proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire in September 1999 after Ocalan was captured in Nairobi, tried and sentenced to death. The sentence was later commuted to life in jail.

It seems unusual to me that the Turkish special forces apparently “captured” Ocalan in the Greek embassy in Kenya. Probably some complex political science to that security affair.

Anyway, the US State Department seems to have felt that the name changes were enough of a threat to the “terrorist list” criteria that they had to issue a statement:

“A recent clash between PKK/KADEK forces and the Iraqi Border Police and U.S. forces, as well as the group’s recent attacks in Turkey, demonstrate its terrorist nature,” said State Department Deputy Spokesman J. Adam Ereli. “The PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and no name change or press release can alter that fact.”

I am not so sure about that definition. A clash with US and Turkish forces may be a symptom of terrorism, but surely it is not sufficient on its own to demonstrate the “terrorist nature” of a group. In fact, if you consider Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d), as cited by the US Navy, you might find that the State Department could have brought forward a much more meaningful definition:

The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant (1) targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

[…]

(1) For purposes of this definition, the term “noncombatant” is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. For example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the following U.S. military personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, U.S. defense attache killed in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle disco bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty U.S. Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against U.S. bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.

Maybe it is just me, but I do not think using a definition like this one hinders the State Department from trying to show solidarity with the Turkish government — using the US military to prevent the PKK from running into/through northern Iraq.

I have not yet found a good reason why people accuse the PKK of trying to evade the terrorist list by changing its name. In other words, if it were not possible, then why announce it is not possible? And what could be their reason for changing it back again?

You are My Drunkenness

by Nazim Hikmet (1901 – 1963)

Translated by Süleyman Fatih Akgül

Sen benim sarhoÅŸluÄŸumsun…
Ne ayıldım, ne ayılabilirim,
Ne ayılmak isterim.
Başım ağır, dizlerim parçalanmış
Üstüm başım çamur içinde
Yanıp-sönen ışığına düşe kalka giderim.
You are my drunkenness…
I did not sober up, as if I can do that;
I don’t want to anyway.
I have a headache, my knees are full of scars
I am in mud all around
I struggle to walk towards your hesitant light.

The Ataman Hotel site provides some context for Hikmet’s arrest and imprisonment by the military:

…in January 1938 he was arrested for inciting the Turkish armed forces to revolt and sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison on the grounds that military cadets were reading his poems, particularly The Epic of Sheik Bedrettin. Published in 1936, this long poem based on a fifteenth-century peasant rebellion against Ottoman rule was his last book to appear in Turkey during his lifetime. His friend Pablo Neruda relates Hikmet’s account of how he was treated after his arrest: “Accused of attempting to incite the Turkish navy into rebellion, Nazım was condemned to the punishments of hell. The trial was held on a warship. He told me he was forced to walk on the ship’s bridge until he was too weak to stay on his feet, then they stuck him into a section of the latrines where the excrement rose half a meter above the floor.”

And The Times explains the significance of his work and the effort to free him:

His release came at the hands of Turkey’s first democratically elected government, after a campaign by an international committee of writers and artists which included Pablo Picasso, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. The remarkable poem that led to Hikmet’s arrest, The Epic of Sheik Bedrettin, is based on a fifteenth-century peasant rebellion against Ottoman rule and remains a major contribution to Turkish poetry in its linguistic experimentation and mixture of narrative voices, Ottoman scholarship and unconcealed political message. Hikmet offered a challenge to Auden’s oft-quoted line, in his elegy of Yeats, that “poetry makes nothing happen”; his work pointed to the possibilities – in literature and in politics – open to those trying to have it otherwise.

Interesting to compare Hikmet with Auden, particularly since they were writing during the same period. Perhaps Auden was just lamenting that in spite of all his own distaste for himself, no one else seemed to find his work inspiring enough to lock him up in the deep end of the latrine? Wonder what Hikmet’s perspective would have been on Auden’s idealist September 1, 1939 poem?

All I have is a voice
To undo the folded lie,
The romantic lie in the brain
Of the sensual man-in-the-street
And the lie of Authority
Whose buildings grope the sky:
There is no such thing as the State
And no one exists alone;
Hunger allows no choice
To the citizen or the police;
We must love one another or die.

Great, so during a time that Britain and France turned a blind eye to Hitler’s rearmament and breaches of the Treaty of Versailles, and after Kristallnacht, Auden’s poem told people to ignore the authority and love one another. Perhaps that is the drunkenness that Hikmet understood and that made his writing so relevant — able to make things happen. Chamberlain probably hated reading Hikmet.

The Future of Poetry

I always seem to find poets bemoaning the unrealistic and detatched nature of poetry today. Take Harold Monro’s article from 1912, for example, published online by poetrymagazines.org.uk:

Poetry is uninteresting to-day in that degree only that it is remote from life. It need not treat necessarily of events, deeds or episodes, but it must be fundamental, vital, innate, or nothing at all. It must be packed and tense with meaning; no line may be thin, no link may rattle. And in the future, when it has become natural and keen, there will be improvisatori again, who will lavish us their poems carelessly, like a plant its flowers.

So, has anything changed or are does the latest generation of Monro-like critics still complain that poems are too remote from life? After all, who really gets to inventory and count the poems of the world in order to determine their remoteness from life? Do we count lyrics of songs, or is that somehow a lesser form as Monro suggests in his timeline:

the minstrel became poet, and the poet became man of letters

Perhaps a new API for web search engines is in order. Or maybe poetry sites should have a “remoteness” warning on their poetry pages? Here’s Monro’s suggestion:

The poets of the present and the future must re-define, through their work, the true function of poetry. For, though it has become partly, and will become wholly, intellectualized; in spite of innumerable experiments in subject, rhythm and form, straining of metre, novelties in cadence, in spite of fluency, technique, originality, it still must be said that modern poetry is devoid of any real function or aim.

Have you noticed that people always seem to say something like “devoid of purpose” when they dislike expressive works? I think it particularly interesting that Monro calls out Whitman, of all poets, as someone guilty of losing touch with reality:

The reason must be sought deeper; in the fad, namely, that modern poetry fails to express the real aspirations of life. Just as the jargon is distinct from normal language, so the substance is alien to life. Moreover, these two characteristics are interdependent, and the use of a normal vocabulary will not be possible with dignity until poets learn again to represent with dignity and naturalness every aspect and manifestation of life. The experiments of Whitman and Carpenter solve nothing. These authors, and their imitators, have shirked the problem by simply dispensing with metre, and their work, however fluent and rhythmical, nevertheless cannot be called poetry.

Naturalness as dignity? Who really gets to define where nature starts? To me this sounds like a classical composer criticizing hip-hop for being a crude form of structured sounds, when in fact hip-hop has more fundamental and grounded roots than classical…

The Boston Research Center poses an alternative (modern) view of Whitman:

Modern literary scholars now agree that Whitman’s poetry was “a watershed in American literary history,� Myerson explained, noting that by rejecting the formal structures of traditional poetry in favor of free verse and replacing commas and periods with ellipses, Whitman opened the way for later poets to experiment stylistically.

Myerson elaborated by suggesting that Whitman’s verse was a far cry from the poetry of the day that ignored sex, rarely dealt with contemporary life, and was written in highly formal and prescribed poetic language. He pointed out that Whitman was a man of enormous physicality who introduced eroticism into mainstream American poetry, thus making his verse sensuous in an age of decorum. Referring to Whitman as “the great poet of democracy,� Myerson noted that his writing contains elaborate catalogues of Americans, their occupations, and their lives, all presented with a spirit of egalitarianism. This interconnectedness of citizens was intended to evoke the equality of all.

Great poet of democracy? Ironic then that he cheated at the polls to overcome resistance to his work and lubricate (pun not intended) public acceptance:

Leaves of Grass received lukewarm acclaim. The book was assailed as immodest and “quite out of place amid the decorum of modern society,� according to Myerson. In fact, the only positive reviews were written anonymously by Whitman himself.

NeoCons back to the future

I have to admit I am really confused by the new US neocon strategy to say that they had nothing to do with the failure of the neocon strategy.

Another top neocon, Ken Adelman, had assured the administration in February 2002 that “liberating” Iraq would be a “cakewalk,” but today disavows all responsibility with how the venture has turned out.

There is nothing more annoying than having someone say that a plan is low or even no-risk, and then blame the operator(s) if the plan fails. Reminds me of some big software deals where the salesmen constantly say that everything will just “plug-and-play”, when those who know better understand that they really mean “plug-and-pray”.

Speaking of prayer…

Joshua Muravchik, a leading conservative scholar with the American Enterprise Institute, agreed that the neocon role has been overstated.

“In reality, of course, we don’t wield any of the power that contemporary legend attributes to us. Most of us don’t rise at the crack of dawn to report to powerful jobs in government,” he said in an article in Foreign Policy magazine.

“But it is true that our ideas have influenced the policies of President George W. Bush, as they did those of President Ronald Reagan. That does feel good. Our intellectual contributions helped to defeat Communism in the last century and, God willing, they will help to defeat jihadism in this one.”

In other words, don’t blame us when things fall apart, but we’d sure like to take credit for anything good that happens. Sounds like the sort of consultants you are better off never hiring.

The sad irony to Muravchik’s point is that the Soviet Union unilaterally stood down from the arms race because Gorbachev brought a reasoned and rational focus to his role and called upon Reagan to follow his lead. He started a process whereby the USSR could finally recognize that it had been run so poorly that it was over-committed to the war in Afghanistan, overspending on defense initiatives, and unable to keep up with the economic growth and expansion of the US. He argued for a more diplomatic, less militant, foreign policy, just like he did when he warned that Bush and Blair would regret their decision to invade Iraq.

Frankly, I guess I am truly disappointed by the neocons for mistaking the diplomatic compliance of Reagan and his cooperation with Gorbachev as some kind of clarion call for future half-baked unilateral military intervention into the Middle East. Instead, I thought they would recognize that China’s economic strength and influence in developing markets poses the same challenge to the US that the US once posed to the USSR. I thought they would try to avoid past mistakes (as Gorbachev suggested) rather than become the image of the enemy they thought they destroyed. Perhaps most notably, I do not see how they could have thought that pride and greed are a sound foundation for foreign policy. Harpers provides some insight into how the neocon strategy was a disaster waiting to happen:

The problem is that governments, even neoconservative governments, rarely get the chance to prove their sacred theory right: despite their enormous ideological advances, even George Bush’s Republicans are, in their own minds, perennially sabotaged by meddling Democrats, intractable unions, and alarmist environmentalists.

Iraq was going to change all that. In one place on Earth, the theory would finally be put into practice in its most perfect and uncompromising form. A country of 25 million would not be rebuilt as it was before the war; it would be erased, disappeared. In its place would spring forth a gleaming showroom for laissez-faire economics, a utopia such as the world had never seen. Every policy that liberates multinational corporations to pursue their quest for profit would be put into place: a shrunken state, a flexible workforce, open borders, minimal taxes, no tariffs, no ownership restrictions.

Of course, if you flatten the playing field and erase the rules, you might not like it when someone shows up that you simply can’t beat, or the tide turns from cooperative to contentious hard work and your hope for return on investment was based entirely on implied rules of engagement. This of course raises the question of whether the neocons were just sitting in the back row making suggestions to the Bush administration, or whether they were actively driving the Iraq bus while Bush gamely rode along?

Slate had an interesting opinion piece in 2004 describing the neocon foreign policy role in the Bush administration:

In December 2002, Wolfowitz, Feith, Wurmser and Vice President Cheney’s national security advisor, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, acting together, maneuvered Condoleezza Rice into appointing Elliott Abrams to the position of special assistant to the president and senior director for the Middle East at the National Security Council. This appointment gave the neocons everything they wanted — the NSC, Executive Office of the President, Office of the Vice President, the Pentagon, a cornered director in George Tenet at CIA, and Wurmser at State.

The neocons had control of the information reaching the president and a channel for their pseudo-intelligence product from Wolfowitz and Feith’s secret Pentagon Office of Special Plans. The only wild card was Colin Powell and State’s elite and independent Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

[…]

INR kept telling Powell the truth about Saddam’s nonexistent WMD. State’s Future of Iraq project, led by a career Foreign Service officer, who was cold-shouldered by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, laid out what might happen if we took over control of Iraq. Unfortunately, even the sober minds of INR could not stop Powell from lending his credibility to the “unfortunate error” show at the U.N. Security Council.

That pretty-much says to me that the whole debacle is, in fact, more proof of the disaster of neocon strategy. If nothing else, the neocons had successfully gained so much control of the administration that there was virtually only one source of information allowed — that which suited the neocon strategy. Such amazing power coupled with blinkered pride, arguably fueled by Halliburtonesque greed, is hardly the sort of thing you can overlook when wondering where things went wrong. I mean they might have been able to make their plan workable in a utopian country endowed with a strong, secure infrastructure and a friendly yet competitive population (in the real world, the only thing close to that is usually a result of years of friendly and progressive economic/public policy balance — not exactly Iraq under Saddam), but to completely tear down all the rules and regulations of a country, fail to establish a secure foundation, and then just expect a “honeypot” approach to attract more good flies than bad…that totally defies the fundamentals of security, as well as common sense.