Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation counted 1,526 inauthentic accounts posting into Ukraine’s information space on Facebook and Telegram the day before a drone fire shut Yandex’s data centre at Sasovo. On the day of the fire, 258 posted.
That count is the measurement my 12 October post called for. The viral Cloudflare chart showed YandexBot going quiet. Search crawlers are the largest bot category on Cloudflare’s own dashboard, as I showed in June, and Radar sees only the fifth of the web that Cloudflare fronts. The question of the sock puppets belonged to platform data, and “has not decreased” needed that data exactly as much as “collapsed” did. The platform data now exists. It shows Russian influence networks knocked down twice, once for each Yandex data centre that went fully dark.
The centre published two findings. The first, on 13 October, covered the Kremlin’s automated foreign-facing networks. Posting in certain clusters of the Pravda, InfoDefense and Nod of Time networks fell by about half for around twelve hours, then resumed. The centre framed it narrowly. Russian bot activity across the wider field held steady, and the strikes broke the continuity and coordination of these specific networks. The Pravda sites are served through Cloudflare, as the 12 October post showed. Posting in some of their clusters still halved for half a day when Yandex burned.
The same Pravda network has been working a NATO ally’s vote. Its Canada section ran 67 articles on Alberta, Albertans and the “51st state” between 24 December and 25 April, against 14 mentions of Ontario, according to a DisinfoWatch report. Advance polls for Alberta’s separation referendum opened on 13 October, two days after Vladimir went dark, and the vote is on 19 October.
The second finding is the full report, When bots go silent, published 15 October. Osavul software flagged the accounts. The centre counted 22,664 messages from 5,201 accounts across 26 topics in the Ukrainian information space from 6 to 12 October, removed duplicates, dated everything in Kyiv time and measured each day against the one before.
| Day, Kyiv time | Messages |
|---|---|
| 7 Oct | 4,032 |
| 8 Oct, Sasovo shut | 660 |
| 9 Oct, Kaluga hit | 2,231 |
| 10 Oct | 4,585 |
| 11 Oct, Vladimir shut | 4,711 |
| 12 Oct | 2,704 |
On 8 October messages fell 83.6 percent and active accounts fell 83.1 percent. Telegram messages dropped 90 percent and Facebook messages 79.5 percent. Activity climbed back through the partial hit on Kaluga and passed its pre-strike level by 10 October. On 12 October, the day after Vladimir went dark, messages fell 42.6 percent and active accounts 41 percent.
The first drop lines up with an independent instrument. IODA at Georgia Tech saw Yandex Cloud lose a third of its reachable address blocks starting at 23:30 UTC on 7 October, which is 02:30 on 8 October in Kyiv. IODA’s line then held flat through the Kaluga strike, the same strike the centre’s accounts rode through. It fell again early on 11 October, to about a fifth of its starting level.
Telegram itself kept running throughout. The channels of Germany’s named Kremlin amplifiers posted at their usual pace through both strikes, by my own count. A 90 percent fall on Telegram belongs to these accounts specifically.
A subset of 98 accounts carried what the centre calls destructive content. Their messages fell 77.8 percent on 8 October and 49.2 percent on 12 October. They told Ukrainians the war was staged and their government illegitimate, blamed blackouts on electricity sold abroad, claimed Ukrainian air defence deliberately brings down Russian missiles and drones over homes, and called for violence against officials, soldiers, police and their families. Near-identical texts repeated across accounts.
Cloudflare’s own data shows how the accounts recovered within a day. Its 14 October analysis followed malicious automation off Yandex Cloud. Requests from Yandex Cloud to one gambling customer stopped right after the 8 October disruption, and the identical traffic, with the same TLS fingerprint, request paths, headers and user agents, began arriving from the Russian hosting networks Radist and Selectel. Cloudflare reads this as evidence the strikes had little lasting effect. The same evidence shows operators thrown off their servers overnight and rebuilding on other Russian hosts, inside drone range.
Cloudflare also measured bot traffic to the post, reply and like endpoints of one social platform it fronts and saw Russian-origin requests fall 5.7 percent, within its expectations. Facebook and Telegram run on their own networks. The centre counted there.
The measurements that showed steady activity came from different populations, and they sort by infrastructure. Antibot4Navalny tracks Kremlin-paid human trolls aimed at Russia’s domestic audience, and saw them carry on. It told AFP the Matryoshka bots stayed active too. LetsData watched networks on X and Facebook keep their weekly rhythm. Antibot4Navalny also told the Kyiv Independent that the engagement network behind Storm-1516 is most likely a commercial engagement-for-hire service, and VIGINUM’s Storm-1516 report places the operation’s websites on American hosting and Cloudflare. Kevin Beaumont monitors thousands of contained accounts on his Mastodon server, and he says they post from a data centre in Manchester.
So the networks that stumbled were the Kremlin’s automated foreign-facing systems and the accounts working Ukraine’s information space. The networks that kept posting run on servers in Manchester, American hosting, Cloudflare, commercial engagement farms and paid human labour. The nearly $10 million that a US indictment alleges RT put into Tenet Media bought American voices beyond the reach of any drone. Drones hit Russian cloud, and the operations built on Russian cloud lost a day each time. That is the result a dependency on Yandex predicts.
Beaumont drew the opposite conclusion from his own server, posting on 13 October:
Russian propaganda operations don’t run from Yandex. They never have… There was no dip.
I answered him eighty minutes later. He accused others of confusing search bots with social bots, then treated bot farms as the whole of a propaganda operation. Yandex is part of the operation in its own right. EU sanctions on Yandex executives in 2022 cited the company for hiding information about the war, promoting state media in search results and deranking Kremlin critics. Two days later the dip he denied appeared in the centre’s data.
Brussels drew the same line over Ceuta. The Commission reported Russian state media and diplomatic channels amplifying the crisis from the day of the crossing and no Russian activity before it, and the Spanish right ran that caveat as an acquittal, as I wrote in September. The EEAS finding of only isolated Israeli accounts was fair as a finding about bots, while Israeli officials joined in under their own names. Beaumont’s count is a fair finding about the bots on his server. The operation is larger than his server.
Strikes on propaganda infrastructure have a legal test, written by a war crimes tribunal reviewing a NATO strike. In June 2000 the ICTY committee examining NATO’s bombing of Radio Television of Serbia held that media whose only effect is to foster support for a war stays a civilian object, and that media used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda can become a legitimate military objective. It found NATO’s propaganda rationale for RTS debatable, because the Serbian broadcasts NATO cited aimed at rallying support for the war.
The centre’s report documents what the RTS case lacked: coordinated accounts calling for violence against Ukrainian officials, soldiers, police and their families. Yandex adds a record of its own. Its Sasovo site sits inside a machine-tool plant the UK has sanctioned since 2024, according to The Record.
The cost of leaving incitement infrastructure alone is on record too. In 1994, with RTLM broadcasting the names and whereabouts of people to be killed, the National Security Council asked the Pentagon about jamming it. Frank Wisner, the Pentagon’s third-ranking official, answered on 5 May that jamming would be ineffective and expensive and that the relief effort was the wiser course. The aircraft that could have done it cost $8,500 an hour. The centre’s numbers answer Wisner’s first objection for the modern equivalent. One strike cut the flagged accounts’ output by 84 percent for a day.
Sergiy Petrenko, who ran Yandex’s Ukrainian business until 2014, told UNITED24 that Russian interference can be influenced, even damaged, by such attacks. He estimates the three strikes cost Yandex more than half its capacity and says the method has plenty of room to scale.
Russia runs its war on European infrastructure through disposable agents and cover names, as I documented in the Kommando Angry Birds rail arson and the Dutch rail outage, and its operations succeed while attribution stays fragmented. Moscow wants the effect felt and the hand unseen. Kyiv announced its strikes on Yandex, framed them as an answer to Russian strikes on Ukrainian data centres, and left the result for anyone to measure.
Washington penalised the open side. Trump announced an energy ceasefire on 11 October, and Russia struck Kharkiv’s CHP-5 plant within hours. Ukraine held off its refinery strikes for two days regardless. On 14 October Ukraine’s military went without its usual early warning of a Russian ballistic missile attack, and hours later lost Starshield for its fast drones. Musk said the US government controls Starshield, and the White House called it a glitch. On 15 October Musk wrote that it was time for Zelensky to go. On 16 October the Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev said Moscow and Washington were discussing joint data-centre projects, including proposals to power them from Russian nuclear plants.
Ukraine has shown that Russian data centres can be hit and that hitting them knocks the Kremlin’s networks down. The networks recover in a day because their operators can still move to another data centre. Russia is now studying coal mines 300 metres underground for the next ones.