A new DW article makes the connection explicit: Iran covers 4% of global oil demand versus Venezuela’s 1%. Iran exports 2 million barrels per day; Venezuela manages 350,000. The article notes that if Iranian production stalls, eventually other producers would fill the gaps.

That means Venezuela.

The Calendar

• Dec 10: U.S. forces seize Venezuelan oil tanker Skipper, escalating tensions.
• Dec 19-27: U.S. military buildup in Caribbean reaches 15,000 troops. Energy stocks quietly move to sector-leading positions despite weak crude prices.
• Dec 27: An anonymous Polymarket account is created. It will bet on exactly two things.
• Jan 3: Maduro captured in U.S. military operation. Trump immediately declares U.S. oil companies will “spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure.”
• Jan 3-5: Oil majors “largely silent” as Chevron, Exxon, and ConocoPhillips stock rises—but companies refuse to commit to new investment because “the situation on the ground remains uncertain.”
• Jan 5: Analysts note Venezuela would require $53 billion just to maintain current output. Oil executives say they need “certainty about who is in charge” and “long-term stability” before committing—30-year projects need confidence about the operating environment “decades into the future.”
• Jan 5-14: Iran protests explode. Trump escalates threats of military strikes, creating maximum uncertainty in Iranian supply.

Gaming the Market

Someone wagered $32,000 on Maduro’s ouster hours before the operation, when prediction markets gave it 6% probability. The account was created December 27 to bet on exactly two things: U.S. invasion and Maduro’s removal. It allegedly netted over $400,000, although some say a semantic loophole will prevent payment (e.g. they bet on an invasion, yet Trump rhetoric insists it was an “action”).

The CFTC, which nominally regulates these markets, has one-eighth the SEC’s staff. The Justice Department has dropped investigations into prediction markets. TruthSocial has announced plans to launch its own, while Trump Jr. advises both major prediction market platforms. In other words, no regulation.

A potential Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—through which 25% of global oil passes—could push prices to $120 per barrel. That price spike transforms Venezuela’s $50-180 billion investment requirement from economically marginal to lucrative.

Oil companies won’t commit capital to Venezuela until the deal is sweetened. This means Trump is seeking external pressure. Making Iranian supply genuinely unstable creates the strategic calculus where Western Hemisphere reserves become insurance rather than speculation.

It’s the same coercive arbitrage logic I’ve documented elsewhere: create the crisis that makes one preferred outcome the rational choice. The reluctant oil companies get pushed toward Venezuelan investment not by promises but by making the alternative unacceptably risky.

The Contradiction

Here’s what oil companies actually need. Harvard economist Ricardo Hausmann explained:

If you want to recover oil, you need to go back to rule of law. Let’s be very mechanical: You need to change the hydrocarbons law. And to change the hydrocarbons law, you need a congress that people think is legitimate.

ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods, at Trump’s oil executive meeting, also explained:

If we look at the commercial constructs and frameworks in place today in Venezuela, today it’s un-investable. And so significant changes have to be made to those commercial frameworks, the legal system, there has to be durable investment protections and there has to be change to the hydrocarbon laws in the country.

Oil companies need democratic legitimacy—rule of law, enforceable contracts, a legislature that can change hydrocarbon laws. Military regime change provides none of that. It provides the appearance of stability while destroying the institutional foundations that make long-term investment rational.

Destabilizing Iran creates price pressure. while also it creates urgency that might override oil executives’ assessment that Venezuela remains “un-investable.” The coercion operates on two levels: make the alternative dangerous, and make the timeline for waiting seem unaffordable.

The bet is that $120 oil makes “un-investable” irrelevant. That when the Strait of Hormuz is on fire, Exxon’s lawyers will find a way to make Venezuelan hydrocarbon law work. That crisis overrides judgment.

And once they’ve committed billions to an unstable regime, they become dependent on continued U.S. military presence to protect those assets.

The Trump trap is set.