Explained by the Guardian

“Prison bosses made more money forcing inmates to play games than they do forcing people to do manual labour,” Liu told the Guardian. “There were 300 prisoners forced to play games. We worked 12-hour shifts in the camp. I heard them say they could earn 5,000-6,000rmb [£470-570] a day. We didn’t see any of the money. The computers were never turned off.”

The prisoner story is just one part to a much larger story about trading online goods, which the government is trying to regulate

It is estimated that 80% of all gold farmers are in China and with the largest internet population in the world there are thought to be 100,000 full-time gold farmers in the country.

In 2009 the central government issued a directive defining how fictional currencies could be traded, making it illegal for businesses without licences to trade.

Fictional currencies? That’s an interesting way to look at the problem. What would they suggest as less fictional currencies? Pieces of paper? Cattle?

A free script is available from Alan Renouf to check vCenter clusters for compliance with the Epping/Denneman book on HA and DRS.

This is not to be used as a replacement for the HA and DRS book, quite the opposite, it is used to compliment the book and tells you which pages to look at for information within the book.

So far I have only read the first 50 pages so all the information in V1.0 of the script is related to the first 50 pages but as I read more I will add more checks and update the script.

BIND is being updated under CVE-2011-1910 (CVSS Score: 7.8) due to a buffer size check error revealed over the past weekend.

A negative cache is setup by BIND to improve performance. In other words a negative response like “NXDOMAIN” or “NODATA/NOERROR” can be saved for reference and better response time. Sending a very large set of resource records associated with a name (RRSet) in a negative response can cause an off-by-one error (OBOE) and crash named, resulting in a denial of service condition.

The nature of this vulnerability would allow remote exploit. An attacker can set up a DNSSEC signed authoritative DNS server with large RRSIG RRsets to act as the trigger. The attacker would then find ways to query an organization’s caching resolvers for non-existent names in the domain served by the bad server, getting a response that would “trigger” the vulnerability. The attacker would require access to an organization’s caching resolvers; access to the resolvers can be direct (open resolvers), through malware (using a BOTNET to query negative caches), or through driving DNS resolution (a SPAM run that has a domain in the E-mail that will cause the client to perform a lookup).