Anyone have the exact number of F-16 jets being downed in Iraq? I’m starting to get wind of something I was worried about many moons ago: the shift of increasingly sophisticated arms into the Iraq conflict and the weakening of US air control.

First, I often have to remind myself that the modern US attack helicopter was developed under the pretense of defending American from Russian aircraft of a similar nature. And by that measure the US Army did a marvelous job with their Apache, shredding the gunships it came up against or causing the enemy to do themselves in with tough maneuvering (like that weird incident in East Germany). However, it ironically was not meant to do a better job of handling guerrilla troops trained and armed by organizations like the CIA, perhaps because those making the final purchase decision on contracts did not see this as the role they would face.

Second, I think I have mentioned before that an old-school CIA analyst theory on the Iraq war perhaps will be that China (and perhaps Russia) are happily dragging the US into a quagmire of conflict that not only weakens America’s global position economically but also provides a testing-ground for arms against US armor and aircraft. Where do the new anti-aircraft missiles come from? Maybe I haven’t mentioned it before, but one thing is for sure, arms trade has done anything but decline since Bush and Cheney came into office on a platform that clearly said unilateral arms build-ups and sales are fine.

Ok, so with that in mind, I was reading a story by GovExec on the evolution of Iraq warfare that admits more sophisticated arms from Russia are indeed flowing into the conflict.

More threatening are next-generation anti-aircraft missiles such as the SA-16 and SA-18 now appearing in Iraq.

In 1986, the Afghan mujahedeen used advanced Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to defeat the Soviet Army by forcing pilots to fly at much higher altitudes, thereby robbing troops on the ground of the close air support that had tilted battles in their favor. The same could happen in Iraq, where workhorse helicopters used to move vast quantities of troops and materiel are as vital to American operations as they were in the Vietnam War. Helicopters already operate under strict rules to ensure their safety and prevent downed pilots from being captured by insurgents. In December 2005, a young platoon leader in Iraq told of calling for help from helicopters overhead during a firefight only to be refused because the rules precluded the aircraft from flying above enemy fighters.

Again we see evidence that things are deteriorating, not getting better, for the US. A more subtle point that never seems to make it into the news, however, is that F-16s are being downed.

Consider reports from 1991, for contrast, from the F-16.net mishaps page:

Shot down in Desert Storm from an SA-6. Combat loss number 10 in Desert Storm. The pilot, Captain Harry ‘Mike’ Roberts, ejected safely, but was taken prisoner. Aircraft was on a mission to attack the Air Defense Headquarters Building in Baghdad. Aircraft had flown 4 combat missions before being lost.

Or this one:

Pilot, Major Jeffrey Scott Tice ejected safely after travelling 150 miles inside Iraq, but became a POW as the ejection took place over Iraq. It was the 8th combat loss and the first daylight raid over Baghdad. The aircraft was struck by an SA-3 just south of Baghdad.

Or this one:

Shot down during Desert Storm by SAM. The pilot, Capt. William Andrews, ejected and became a POW, but was released eight days later after the end of the war. Reportedly had been flying too low and hit by a SA-16.

1970s era SA-3 and SA-6? And that was just two months in 1991 when the US was said to have better control of the situation on the ground! Why is it so rare now to hear about the number of pilots being shot-down and their fate, or the source of sophisticated light weapons and their potency? The mishap pages on F-16.net show some reports on crashes but they all hint that the Pentagon doesn’t admit anyone was shot down. What then? Aircraft or pilot fatigue? When I read quotes like the following one in the GovExec story, I wonder about the politics of describing guerrillas trained by a foreign intelligence agency to fire stinger missiles at aircraft.

“Our opponent uses Radio Shack as his procurement system,” said retired Army Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, director of the Pentagon’s Joint Improvised Explosive Defeat Organization, during a September 2006 briefing in Washington.

I can’t tell if he means that as a good or bad thing. Is this an acknowledgment that there is a retail supply and distribution channel for sophisticated arms, or is the director suggesting that pedestrian or Radio Shack materials should be seen as inferior to the products of exclusive American contracts by friends of the Vice-President?

Sadly, the high cost and complexity of a control does not guarantee its superiority, especially when deployed against the wrong attack vector or when a pattern of failures are ignored.

We’ve all known for some time that the French were warning the US about the threat in 2001 of an attack. Now details are emerging that nine months prior to the Trade Center bombing the US intelligence community was told a US airline might be involved. The article in the SFGate tries to emphasize how hard it was for American leaders to make sense of the information:

The warning was another example of how intelligence agents sensed al-Qaida was hard at work in the months leading up to Sept. 11 but were unable to piece together fragmented warnings into a coherent plot.

Le Monde first reported the story Monday as it published excerpts of 328 pages of classified documents from France’s main foreign intelligence agency, the DGSE. One note, dated Jan. 5, 2001, reported that al-Qaida was plotting a hijacking.

Perhaps what is most interesting is that the article leaves out crucial details about other pieces of the puzzle. For example, it does not mention that the French considered Chechen militants terrorists, while the US refused to make the same determination due to political posturing with Russia. It also does not tie in the fact that Greek intelligence (NIS-EYP) uncovered a cartoon depicting planes flying into the twin towers, and finally it does not mention the FBI agents’ attempts to communicate that some suspicious folks (who were considered terrorists by the French, back to my first point) were doing suspicious things and needed to be investigated.

The lesson here should be that the Bush administration failed to heed the information and manage the risk to protect the country with the tools it had available at the time. Anyone can see how bad Bush is at deciding what to do in the face of danger and how he relies on a cabal who refuse to listen to anyone outside their inner circle.

Nowhere does the evidence suggest that wiretap laws needed to be changed or more intelligence would have helped at the time. Wonder why you never hear about that Greek cartoon anymore or why Israeli intelligence was so favored at the time…