Attacks from Russia on Poland has drawn NATO defense forces into direct armed conflict.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Polish parliament that Polish airspace had been breached 19 times. Polish F-16 fighter jets and Dutch F-35s plus other aircraft responded and shot down at least four drones.

NATO tells us “Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked seven times.”

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

The cost imbalance stands out most to me, as it represents the most fundamental challenge for NATO defense. Traditional air defense methods become economically unsustainable against swarm attacks of low-cost drones.

Poland says at least 19 drones were tracked in the attack. Consider that in context of Russia launching nearly 20,000 missiles, meaning nearly 15,000 one-way attack drones, at targets in Ukraine from September 28, 2022, through December 28, 2024.

The Polish are illustrating a dangerous NATO asymmetry perfectly: expensive fighter jets (F-35s operating at $36,000+ per hour) were sent to intercept Russian drones that cost a fraction as much. Even though Shahed drones only hit their target less than 10 percent of the time, such low cost means Russia can fire mass salvos almost daily and NATO will be desperate to force rapid deflation into symmetric or better defense spend.

This is not theoretical. Ukraine developed systems that cost around $5,000 against the Shahed drones that cost over $150,000 each. Meanwhile, an IRIS-T missile costs about $430,000, which is 20 times more than the cost of Russian launching Iranian-made kamikaze drone. NATO appears to be spending nearly half a million dollars to stop a $35,000 drone.

Thus, Poland shows NATO military technological superiority becomes their liability against Russian tactics of sloppy commercial grade drone swarms. The EU, like Ukraine, now urgently needs to innovate and deploy more logical interception methods, whether through directed energy weapons, electronic warfare, or lower-cost interceptor drones, to rapidly invert an economic attrition that Russia is deliberately imposing on the EU.

Poland theoretically could drag NATO into spending over $70 million daily just responding to terrorizing drone attacks, while Russia’s daily production costs would remain ten times less. NATO cannot ignore the airspace violations, so each cheap drone automatically triggers this massive response cost.

Also, here is the history of Article 4 invocations, which mostly have been by Turkey:

1. February 10, 2003 – Turkey: Requested consultations over threats from the Iraq War; NATO launched Operation Display Deterrence (February-May 2003)
2. June 22, 2012 – Turkey: Requested consultations after one of its fighter jets was shot down by Syrian air defense forces
3. October 3, 2012 – Turkey: Requested consultations when five Turkish civilians were killed by Syrian shells
4. November 21, 2012 – Turkey: Requested deployment of Patriot missiles for border defense against Syria
5. March 3, 2014 – Poland: Invoked Article 4 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and increasing tensions in Ukraine
6. 2015 – Turkey: Called for consultations following terrorist attacks
7. February 24, 2022 – Eight Allied Nations (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia): Jointly requested consultations after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine