Category Archives: History

Polish Mathematicians Broke Nazi Enigma

Sadly this topic has remained a simmering controversy for far too long, mostly because of lack of effort on all our part. It isn’t hard to get it right, yet for some reason Poland isn’t getting credit due. The BBC in 2014 described a hugely important and historic event as simply a “quiet gathering”.

The debt owed by British wartime codebreakers to their Polish colleagues was acknowledged this week at a quiet gathering of spy chiefs. […] On the outskirts of Warsaw, some of the most senior spy bosses from Poland, France and Britain gathered this week in a nondescript but well-guarded building used by the Polish secret services. Their coming together was a way of marking the anniversary of a moment three-quarters of a century earlier when their predecessors held a meeting in Warsaw that played a crucial role in the victory over Hitler in World War Two.

I feel guilty. What have I done, as a historian of sorts, to help elevate this from quiet obscure ceremony to normalcy?

Mostly, for at least five years, I have bored friends with stories and tweeted about Poland’s contributions, which doesn’t feel like enough. So here’s my blog post to move the ball forward.

This is inspired by a new story in The Telegraph that the Polish government says more needs to be done.

Polish codebreakers ‘cracked Enigma before Alan Turing’ Diplomats say Poland’s key part in the deciphering the German system of codes in WWII has largely been overlooked

Time to stop overlooking. Let’s do this. Say it loud and proud, Poland broke the Nazi Enigma.

The Telegraph in 2012 versus 2016

News from The Telegraph in 2012 was: “Honour for overlooked Poles who were first to crack Enigma code”

…decades after Nazi Germany’s Enigma code was cracked, Poland has gone on the offensive to reclaim the glory of a cryptological success it feels has been unjustly claimed by Britain.

Frustrated at watching the achievements of the British wartime code-breakers at Bletchley Park lauded while those of Poles go overlooked, Poland’s parliament has launched a campaign to “restore justice” to the Polish men and women who first broke the Enigma codes.

[…]

The 2001 film Enigma, in particular, ruffled Polish feathers. The British production starring Kate Winslet and set in Bletchley Park made little mention of the Polish contribution to cracking the codes, and rubbed salt into the wounds by depicting the only Pole in the film as a traitor.

Some really good background in this 2012 article in The Telegraph. It is well written and accurate. Curious then how different it is from the story told to us in 2016.

Instead of pulling forward the earlier work, The Telegraph wrote a whole new version in 2016 filled with poorly researched ideas, pointing more towards the recent Turing movie, “The Imitation Game”.

Here are some questionable statements that jumped out at me.

Telegraph 2016: Poland Passed the Baton

…few people realise that early Enigma codes had already been broken by the Poles who then passed on the knowledge to Britain shortly before the outbreak of war.

It was not so simple. The Poles did not just pass along knowledge “shortly before” war. More to the point, given the escalation path of 1938, why was Britain waiting to the last moment before fall of Poland and declaration of war on Germany to receive crucial intelligence on German Enigma? Why were Brits far more focused on the Soviets as a threat instead of Germany, and why so interested in Spanish and Italian Enigmas instead of German?

Perhaps another way of asking this is what did the 1938 Munich Agreement, British appeasement of Nazi Germany, tell the Poles about trust in potential allies and giving away secrets?

Codebreakers from Britain early in 1939 had a kind of stalemate with Poland via talks setup by France. The three sides weren’t aligned exactly. Simply put it was British arrogance that led them to believe that their ability to break Enigma was best. When they met with the Polish the first time the British left thinking there was nothing they could gain.

Once war with Germany seemed unavoidable by summer of 1939, Poland simply ran out of time waiting for better terms of collaboration or warmer relations with British intelligence. Just before Germany rolled over Poland, codebreaking basically shifted to France, where negotiations continued with real alignment on German Enigma as the most pressing concern.

Months were basically wasted before the British were caught out as laggards and had to realize they had mistaken French and Polish cautions about Germany for incompetence. England realized their error fortunately before it was too late and rushed to learn from Poland, as war with Germany was announced.

Telegraph 2016: Poles Needed Help

By the time war broke out the Germans had increased the sophistication of the machine and the Poles were struggling to make more headway.

I hate the way this sounds. Hope it goes without saying Poles were struggling because…betrayal by Soviet defenses and invasion by Nazis while the world stood by and didn’t help. A highly secretive code-breaking team wasn’t going to just carry on effortlessly while their entire country was carved up and dismantled.

Sure the Germans had made a change, but that wasn’t the first time they altered Enigma (see Rejewski’s leading work on the Enigma Eintrittwalze – “entry wheel” – before the British figured it out, or transfer of Zygalski sheets to Bletchley, where they were known as Netz, short for Netz verfahren – “lattice method”). Difference by the time war broke out? The Polish had to destroy all their secret decoding systems and escape to France. I’ve read at first they tried to go to Britain and were denied due to confusion and secrecy (British embassy could not verify their roles). I’ve also read they went straight to France, where politics prevented them from moving to Bletchley. The bottom line is from the end of 1939 through early 1940 Turing and other Brits visited and studied Polish methods, learning of plans for new machines and preparing to build up operations in Bletchley Park.

“Struggling to make headway” is not a fair characterization relative to the many earlier mathematical struggles, which Poles obviously overcame on their own. The Poles had reconstructed Enigma and solved for daily keys. What made it hard to continue making headway? Staying under difficult conditions in Vichy France.

One of the original three who cracked Enigma, Rozycki, was killed in 1942 (lost at sea). The remaining Poles tried to escape to Spain that year. Langer, Ciezki and Palluth were captured by Germans. Rejewski and Zygalski escaped and landed in a Spanish prison. Only in 1943 these two finally enter England, where they were pushed aside into the Polish army in exile.

Struggling to make headway shouldn’t be blithely blamed on sophistication of the Enigma. Poles already had made plans to step up their game, which were handed over to England, as they tried to fight in Vichy France and stay alive.

Telegraph 2016: Blame Hollywood

…despite their help, history and Hollywood has largely ignored their role. The most recent film The Imitation Game, starring Benedict Cumberbatch, barely mentioned the Poles.

That’s right. And it’s a damn shame. Given that The Telegraph wrote in 2012 that a 2001 movie gave an unfair portrayal of the Poles, how did Imitation Game repeat the error? I found the movie highly disappointing.

Even more to the point there was in 2001 a book called “Stealing Secrets” that should have given Imitation Game producers all the background they needed on the true Turing story. Stealing Secrets doesn’t mince words here:

With the tide of the war having changed for the better, Bletchley’s leaders must have concluded in the cold calculus of realpolitik that is no longer had anything to gain from the Poles. […] Even now that the facts of the Poles’ Enigma breakthrough are out in the open, they must still compete in the marketplace of knowledge with earlier fictions. […] For a decade before the truth emerged about the Polish achievement, however, most of the English-speaking public was fed a steady diet of fiction masquerading as fact. […] Therefore, anyone who believes that Bletchley Park paved the road to victory in World War II must give credit to Poland for designing the road and mixing the pavement.

“Must give credit to Poland” as sage advice in 2001 and yet Imitation Game does none of that.

While visiting Bletchley Park I talked with the keepers about how Turing was portrayed relative to the Poles. They told me the film was rubbish and unfair. Their frankness surprised me and I found it refreshing. They basically had nothing good to say about the movie’s portrayal of events.

Telegraph 2016: Blame the Soviets

“We were trapped on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War which meant we did not get the credit that we should have received and nobody wanted to admit that anyone in Eastern Europe had anything to do with Enigma.

The Americans and English weren’t trapped by Soviets yet they too chose not to give credit. Does the world really need the Poles to repeatedly convince us of these facts as if the West doesn’t get it? And were the Poles blocked by Soviets? Sort of.

First, put this in terms of the 1940 Katyn massacre.

The Soviets in 1940 rounded up and assassinated 22,000 Polish military and intellectual elites (doctors, lawyers, professors), taking them into the woods and shooting them all in the back of the head. This massacre aimed to destroy any Polish resistance to Soviet control. America learned these details in 1943 from American POW forced by Germans to look at mass graves left behind by Soviets. Instead of bringing the news to light, the US kept it all a secret under the pretense of avoiding friction with Stalin.

That context makes it highly plausible the West was not about to credit Polish intellectuals for breaking Enigma when Stalin was around. But here’s the problem, nobody before the 1970s (20 years after Stalin) got public credit for cracking Enigma. There was literally no risk.

Second, put this in terms of the 1980 Solidarność.

Being on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain at that time is more relevant to our topic because that’s when Bletchley Park started leaking the stories. Now we’re talking about a prime time for strong characters and thaw stories, a time of Polish greatness and the Solidarity movement.

Remember the hardships the Polish cryptographers faced in 1940s France? None of them, even during German capture, leaked details of their work to anyone. Secrecy was crucial to success even after the end of the war. It was a top secret operation that only started to be verified more than 20 years after Stalin was out of the picture.

So really it isn’t about the Iron Curtain. It is about lazy historians in the West not doing a proper job with the facts. Blame is global and can’t be put on the Soviets repressing Poland’s voice, especially since we’re actually talking about the 1990s when these secret stories reached public sources; started to appeal to wider audiences. Still, Poland has to tell the world again and again until we accept it.

Telegraph 2016: Enigma is From End of WWI

The Enigma machine was invented by German engineer Arthur Sherbius at the end of the First World Wat [sic] and were used by the military and government of several countries.

Sherbius was applying for a patent for the Enigma in February 1918. WWI ended in November. Given events between those months I wouldn’t say Enigma came at the end. To me that would imply December or the start of 1919. There may even be some significance in timing relative to 1917; that was the year American scientist Vernam was given a task to invent a communication channel the Germans could not break, as patented in 1918. So “developed during the war” would be most appropriate in my mind.

In terms of several countries use…in 1927 the British government gave Enigma plans to Foss and Knox, code breakers, for review. A book about Knox’s role in breaking Enigma explains how Foss reported in theory it “could be broken given certain conditions” knowing as little as fifteen letters to figure out the machine settings. This effort led to the British and French working together on deciphering Spanish (Civil War) and Italian (invasion of Ethiopia) military communications in 1936.

Dillwyn (Dilly) Knox was one of the [British] Room 40 codebreakers during World War I. Since 1925 he had been trying to break the Enigma machine and had his first success on 4 April 1937 when he broke Franco’s Enigma K during the Spanish Civil War. When Germany starts using the Steckered Enigma for communication between Germany and Spain in 1938, he mounts an attack on the military Enigma, but is not successful as he unable to work out the wiring of the entry disc (ETW).

Here’s the key issue (pun not intended). Britain was not as keen to monitor German Enigma traffic until long after the French and Polish had warned of its importance. France was able to extract German documentation and gave it to Poland, who then cracked even the most advanced Enigma by 1933. That should put in perspective Britain listening to “several countries” signals in 1936. That was the year Germany was pushing into Rhineland and getting no push-back from Britain.

Telegraph 2016: Poland Involvement Well Known in WWII

…Polish involvement was well known during World War Two but during the communist time it was not so convenient to admit that there had been so much cooperation between Britain and Poland. It was a very special and very secret alliance.

This just makes no sense to me. It was top secret work, as mentioned above. No one knew about involvement, except those working in secrecy who couldn’t tell anyone outside. The secrecy extended well into the 1970s. During the communist time is when the story was not actually known, rather than being a convenience issue.

Also, rather than “admit…so much cooperation” I’d call it acknowledge the lack of working relationship once the British realized the Polish were ahead and captured all their secrets, as forced by German invasion of France.

Revisting Bletchley Park

What really would be nice to see is Bletchley Park incorporate French and Polish exhibits, perhaps even curated by representatives from those countries, to give factual explanations of their roles. After all it is meant to be a place to read about the “allied” effort. The Park could benefit from the help for upkeep and maintaining records. Meanwhile, visitors would get a more robust and fair portrayal of a “world” war.

At some point maybe I’ll post my photos here from my trip there, which show some of the odd statements made by British historians, minimizing the efforts of the Polish.

Reasons Against Remembering

Some want to erase history to make others look good; ignoring the Polish role as Allies lets the British or Americans stand out more.

Some want to erase history to make themselves look less bad; ignoring Polish role as Axis lets the Germans stand out more.

Either way overlooking real Polish history is bad for WWII history as well as our understanding of security. Bringing facts forward today should have no risk.

If we give credit to Polish code-breakers we are not diminishing the still monumental contributions of Alan Turing during WWII. We can be more correct in the presentation of historic facts without much impact or edits to Bletchley Park.

When we give credit to those in Poland who fought against Nazis and did so much right, it does not mean we can forget wrongs done by others, such as Erich von Zelewski the Polish Nazi who proposed creation of Auschwitz (just one out more than 10,000 prisoner camps under Nazi control, let alone nearly 1,000 forced labor camps for Jews inside Poland). By 1946 Nuremburg trials this Polish Nazi testified while he had no issue with Jews sent to die in camps he had “tried to prevent the destruction of Warsaw” and his work “saved hundreds of thousands of civilians and tens of thousands of soldiers of Polish nationality”.

As more sunlight comes for the Poles who fought against Nazis, it may clear the air for us to also discuss and better understand their opposite, the Poles who collaborated. So far we have the book “Hunt for the Jews: Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland“, which discusses “how the Germans were able to mobilize segments of the Polish society to take part in their plan to hunt down the Jews”. And we have dramatization films like Ida and Poklosie (Aftermath)

The 1946 Kielce Pogrom provides a sad study of how some Poles continued to kill even after the war had ended to try and finish what Germans could not – elimination of Jews from Poland. With that in mind please note a bill has been introduced in Poland making it illegal to mention any Nazi collusion. Such a bill of denial would be a tragedy for those of us who try to bring out examples of bad as well as good and learn from the past.

Right now we should remember a Polish team of mathematicians working with human intelligence for what they were: the first to crack the Nazi Enigma.

As I said at the start, this is no quiet affair. Time to stop overlooking. Let’s do this. Say it loud and proud, Poland broke the Nazi Enigma.

And for those looking, there’s a physical commemoration to Polish codebreakers at Bletchley Park, built in 2002 on the ground in the far back area by residences, behind a brick wall.

“Commemorative Plaque” for Polish cryptanalysts, first to break the German Enigma. Source: Bletchley Park

Where is the Revolution in Intelligence? Public, Private or Shared?

Watching Richard Bejtlich’s recent “Revolution in Intelligence” talk about his government training and the ease of attribution is very enjoyable, although at times for me it brought to mind CIA factbook errors in the early 1990s.

Slides that go along with the video are available on Google drive

Let me say, to get this post off the ground, I will be the first one to stand up and defend US government officials as competent and highly skilled professionals. Yet I also will call out an error when I see one. This post is essentially that. Bejtlich is great, yet he often makes some silly errors.

Often I see people characterize a government as made up of inefficient troglodytes falling behind. That’s annoying. Meanwhile often I also see people lionize nation-state capabilities as superior to any other organization. Also annoying. The truth is somewhere in between. Sometimes the government does great work, sometimes it blows compared to private sector.

Take the CIA factbook I mentioned above as an example. It has been unclassified since the 1970s and by the early 1990s it was published on the web. Given wider distribution its “facts” came under closer scrutiny from academics. So non-gov people who long had studied places or lived in them (arguably the world’s true leading experts) read this fact book and wanted to help improve it — outsiders looking in and offering assistance. Perhaps some of you remember the “official” intelligence peddled by the US government at that time?

Bejtlich in his talk gives a nod towards academia being a thorough environment and even offers several criteria for why academic work is superior to some other governments (not realizing he should include his own). Perhaps this is because he is now working on a PhD. I mean it is odd to me he fails to realize this academic community was just as prolific and useful in the 1990s, gathering intelligence and publishing it, giving talks and sending documents to those who were interested. His presentation makes it sound like before search engines appeared it required nation-state sized military departments walking uphill both ways in a blizzard to gather data.

Aside from having this giant blind spot to what he calls the “outsider” community, I also fear I am listening to someone with no field experience gathering intelligence. Sure image analysis is a skill. Sure we can sit in a room and pore over every detail to build up a report on some faraway land. On one of my private sector security teams I had a former US Air Force technician who developed film from surveillance planes. He hated interacting with people, loved being in the darkroom. But what does Bejtlich think of actually walking into an environment as an equal, being on the ground, living among people, as a measure of “insider” intelligence skill?

Almost three decades ago I stepped off a plane into a crowd of unfamiliar faces in a small country in Asia. Over the next five weeks I embedded myself into mountain villages, lived with families on the great plains, wandered with groups through jungles and gathered as much information as I could on the decline of monarchial rule in the face of democratic pressure.

One sunny day on the side of a shoulder-mountain stands out in my memory. As I hiked down a dusty trail a teenage boy dressed all in black walked towards me. He carried a small book under his arm. He didn’t speak English. We communicated in broken phrases and hand gestures. He said he was a member of a new party.

Mao was his leader, he said. The poor villages felt they weren’t treated well, decided to do something about it. I asked about Lenin. The boy had never heard the name. Stalin? Again the boy didn’t know. Mao was the inspiration for his life and he was pleased about this future for his village.

This was before the 1990s. And by most “official” accounts there were no studies or theories about Maoists in this region until at least ten years later. I mention this here not because individual people with a little fieldwork can make a discovery. It should be obvious military schools don’t have a monopoly on intel. The question is what happened to that data. Where did information go and who asked about it? Did others have easy access to data gathered?

Yes, someone from private sector should talk about “The Revolution in Private Sector Intelligence”. Perhaps we can find someone with experience working on intelligence in the private sector for many, many years, to tell us what has changed for them. Maybe there will be stories of pre-ChoicePoint private sector missions to fly in on a moment’s notice into random places to gather intelligence on employees who were stealing money and IP. And maybe non-military experience will unravel why Russian operations in private sector had to be handled uniquely from other countries?

Going by Bejtlich’s talk it would seem that such information gathering simply didn’t exist if the US government wasn’t the one doing it. What I hear from his perspective is you go to a military school that teaches you how to do intelligence. And then you graduate and then you work in a military office. Then you leave that office to teach outsiders because they can learn too.

He sounds genuinely incredulous to discover that someone in the private sector is trainspotting. If you are familiar with the term you know many people enjoy as a hobby building highly detailed and very accurate logs of transportation. Bejtlich apparently is unaware, despite this being a well-known thing for a very long time.

A new record of trainspotting has been discovered from 1861, 80 years earlier than the hobby was first thought to have begun. The National Railway Museum found a reference to a 14 year old girl writing down the numbers of engines heading in and out of Paddington Station.

It reminds me a bit of how things must have moved away from military intelligence for the London School of Oriental and African Studies (now just called SOAS). The British cleverly setup in London a unique training school during the first World War, as explained in the 1917 publication “Nature”:

…war has opened our eyes to the necessity of making an effort to compete vigorously with the activities — political, commercial, and even scientific and linguistic — of the Germans in Asia and Africa. We have discovered that their industry was rarely disinterested, and that political propaganda was too often at the root of “peaceful penetration” in the field of missionary, scientific, and linguistic effort.

In other words, a counter-intelligence school was born. Here the empire could maintain its military grip around the world by developing the skills to better gather intelligence and understand enemy culture (German then, but ultimately native).

By the 1970s SOAS, a function of the rapidly changing British global position, seemed to take on wider purpose. It reached out and looked at new definitions of who might benefit from the study and art of intelligence gathering. By 1992 regulars like you or me could attend and sit within the shell of the former hulk of a global analysis engine. Academics there focused on intelligence gathering related to revolution and independence (e.g. how to maintain profits in trade without being a colonial power).

I was asked by one professor to consider staying on for a PhD to help peel apart Ghana’s 1956 transition away from colonial rule, for only academic purpose of course. Tempted as I was, LSE instead set the next chapters of my study, which itself seems to have become known sometime during the second World War as a public/private shared intelligence analyst training school (Bletchley Park staff tried to convince me Zygalski, inventor of equipment to break the Enigma, lectured at LSE although I could find no records to support that claim).

Fast forward five years to 1997 and the Corner House is a good example of academics in London who formalized public intelligence reports (starting in 1993?) into a commercial portfolio. In their case an “enemy” was more along the lines of companies or even countries harming the environment. This example might seem a bit tangential until you ask someone for expert insights, including field experience, to better understand the infamous pipeline caught in a cyberwar.

Anyway, without me droning on and on about the richness in an “outside” world, Bejtlich does a fine job describing some of the issues he had adjusting. He just seems to have been blind to communities outside his own and is pleased to now be discovering them. His “inside” perspective on intelligence is really just his view of inside/outside, rather than any absolute one. Despite pointing out how highly he regards academics who source material widely he then unfortunately doesn’t follow his own advice. His talk would have been so much better with a wee bit more depth of field and some history.

Let me drag into this an interesting example that may help make my point, that private analysts not only can be as good or better than government they may even be just as secretive and political.

Eastman Kodak investigated, and found something mighty peculiar: the corn husks from Indiana they were using as packing materials were contaminated with the radioactive isotope iodine-131 (I-131). Eastman Kodak at the time had some of the best researchers in the country on its team (the company even had its own nuclear reactor in the 1970s), and they discovered something that was not public knowledge: those farms in Indiana had been exposed to fallout from the 1945 Trinity Test in New Mexico — the world’s first atmospheric nuclear bomb explosions which ushered in the atomic age. Kodak kept this exposure silent.

The American film industry giant by 1946 realized, from clever digging into the corn husk material used for packaging, that the US government was poisoning its citizens. The company filed a formal complaint and kept quiet. Our government responded by warning Kodak of military research to help them understand how to hide from the public any signs of dangerous nuclear fallout.

Good work by the private sector helping the government more secretly screw the American public without detection, if you see what I mean.

My point is we do not need to say the government gives us the best capability for world-class intelligence skills. Putting pride aside there may be a wider world of training. So we also should not say private-sector makes someone the best in world at uncovering the many and ongoing flaws in government intelligence. Top skills can be achieved in different schools of thought, which serve different purposes. Kodak clearly worried about assets differently than the US government, while they still kind of ended up worrying about the same thing (colluding, if you will). Hard to say who evolved faster.

By the way, speaking of relativity, also I find it amusing Bejtlich’s talk is laced with his political preferences as landmines: Hillary Clinton is setup as so obviously guilty of dumb errors you’d be a fool not to convict her. President Obama is portrayed as maliciously sweeping present and clear danger of terrorism under the carpet, putting us all in grave danger.

And last but not least we’re led to believe if we get a scary black bag indicator we should suspect someone who had something to do with Krav Maga (historians might say an Austro-Hungarian or at least Slovakian man, but I’m sure we are supposed to think Israeli). Is that kind of like saying someone who had something to do with Karate (Bruce Lee!) when hinting at America?

And one last thought. Bejtlich also mentions gathering intelligence on soldiers in the Civil War as if it would be like waiting for letters in the mail. In fact there were many more routes of “real time” information. Soldiers were skilled at sneaking behind lines (pun not intended) tapping copper wires and listening, then riding back with updates. Poetry was a common method of passing time before a battle by creating clever turns of phrase about current events, perhaps a bit like twitter functions today. “Deserters” were a frequent source of updates as well, carrying news across lines.

I get what Bejtlich is trying to say about speed of information today being faster and have to technically agree with that one aspect of a revolution; of course he’s right about raw speed of a photo being posted to the Internet and seen by an analyst. Yet we shouldn’t under-sell what constituted “real-time” 150 years ago, especially if we think about those first trainspotters…

BBC’s false history of long distance communication

One might think history would be trivially easy, given how these days every fact is on the Internet at the tips of our fingers. However, being a historian still takes effort, perhaps even talent. Why?

The answer is simple: “the value of education is not the learning of many facts but the ability of the mind to think”. I’ll let you try and search to figure out the person who said that.

A historian is trained to apply expertise in thinking, run facts through a system of sound logic for others to validate, rather than just leave facts on their own. It is a bit like a chef cooking a delicious meal rather than offering you a bowl of raw ingredients. Analysis to get the right combinations of ingredients cooked together can be hard. And on top of finding the results desirable, we also need ways to know the preparations were clean an can be trusted.

Take for example a BBC magazine article written about long distance communication, that cooks up a soup called “How Napoleon’s semaphore telegraph changed the world”.

This article unfortunately offers factual conclusions that are poorly prepared and end up tasting all wrong. Let’s start with three basic assertions the BBC has asked readers to swallow:

  1. The last stations were built in 1849, but by then it was clear that the days of line-of-sight telegraphy were done.
  2. The military needs had disappeared, and latterly the operators’ main task was transmitting national lottery numbers.
  3. The shortcomings of visual communication were obvious. It only functioned in daytime and in good weather.

First point: Line-of-sight telegraphy is still used to this day. Anyone sailing the Thames, or any modern waterway for that matter, would happily tell you they rely on a system of lights and flags. I wrote it into our book on cloud security. The BBC itself has a story about semaphore adoption during nuclear disarmament campaigns. As long as we have visual sensors, these signal days will never be done. Dare I mention the line-of-sight communication scene in a futuristic sci-fi film The Martian?

Second point: Military needs are not the only need. This should be obvious from the first point, as well as from common sense. If this were true you would not be reading a blog, ever. More to the stupidity of this reasoning, the French system resorted to a lottery because it went bankrupt. The inventor had pinned all his hope for a very expensive system on military financing and that didn’t come through. So the lottery was a last-ditch attempt to find support after the military walked.

semaphore-lottery

A sad footnote to this is the French military didn’t see the Germans coming in latter wars. So I could dive into why military needs didn’t disappear, but that would be more complicated than proving there were other needs and the system just wasn’t funded properly to survive.

Third point: Anyone heard of a lighthouse? What does it do best? Functions at night and in bad weather, am I right? Fires on a hill (e.g. pyres) also work quite well at night. Or a flashlight, such as the one on your cell-phone.

Try out the Jolla phone app “Morse sender” if you want to communicate over distance at night and bad weather using Morse code. Real shortcomings of visual communication come during thick smoke (e.g. old gunpowder battles or near coal power), which leads to audio signals such as the talking drum, fog horns, bagpipes and songs or cries.

Ok, so all those three above points are false and easily disproved, tossed into the bin. Now for the harder part, the overall general conclusion in two sentences from BBC magazine:

Smoke, fire, light, flags – since time immemorial man had sought to speak over space.

What France did in the first half of the 19th Century was create the first ever system of distance communication.

Shame that the writer acknowledges fire and flags here because those are the facts we used above to disprove their own analysis (work at night, still in use). Now can we disprove “first ever system of distance communication”?

I say this is hard because I’m giving the writer benefit of the doubt. Putting myself in their shoes they obviously see a big difference between the “immemorial” methods used around the world and a brief French experiment with an expensive, unfunded militaristic system.

As hard as I try, honestly I don’t see why we should call the French system first. Consider this passage from archaeologist Charles Jones’ 1873 “Antiquities of the Southern Indians

southern-indian-smoke-signals

Note this is a low-cost and night-time resilient system that leaves no trace. Pretty damning evidence of being earlier and arguably better. We have fewer first-hand proofs from earlier yet it would be easy to argue there were complex fire signals as far back as 150 BCE.

The Greek historian Polybius explained in The Histories that fire signals were used to convey complex messages over distance via cipher. A flame would be raised and lowered, turned on or off, to signal column and row of a letter.

6 The most recent method, devised by Cleoxenus and Democleitus and perfected by myself, is quite definite and capable of dispatching with accuracy every kind of urgent messages, but in practice it requires care and exact attention. 7 It is as follows: We take the alphabet and divide it into five parts, each consisting of five letters. There is one letter less in the last division, but this makes no practical difference. 8 Each of the two parties who are about signal to each other must now get ready five p215tablets and write one division of the alphabet on each tablet, and then come to an agreement that the man who is going to signal is in the first place to raise two torches and wait until the other replies by doing the same. 10 This is for the purpose of conveying to each other that they are both at attention. 11 These torches having been lowered the dispatcher of the message will now raise the first set of torches on the left side indicating which tablet is to be consulted, i.e. one torch if it is the first, two if it is the second, and so on. 12 Next he will raise the second set on the right on the same principle to indicate what letter of the tablet the receiver should write down.

It even works at night and in bad weather!

Speaking of which there may even have been a system earlier, such as 247 BCE. Given the engineering marvel of the lighthouse Pharos of Alexandria, someone may know better of its use for long-distance communication by line-of-sight.

Has the point been made that the first ever system of distance communication was not the French during their revolution?

I think the real conclusion here, in consideration of BBC magazine’s attempt to persuade us, is someone was digging for reasons to be proud of French militarism. Had they bothered to think more deeply or seek more global sources of data they might have avoided releasing such a disappointing article.

When native Americans demonstrated excellent long distance communication systems, European settlers mocked them. Yet the French build one and suddenly we’re supposed to remember it and say…oh la la? No thanks, too hard to swallow. That’s poor analysis of facts.