The police later indicated the pedestrian may have been killed while crossing the road.
The crash was reported at 8:23 p.m. According to the South Dakota Department of Public Safety, a 37-year-old driver of a 2022 Tesla was traveling eastbound on SD Highway 46 near mile marker 339 when the Tesla struck a 67-year-old man walking in the roadway. The man was taken to a nearby hospital with life-threatening injuries where he later died.
Last year, Boring Company management quit and cried foul on its safety practices.
‘We have consistently flirted with death’: Elon Musk wanted the Boring Co. to build a tunnel system below Las Vegas. Former employees say they feared for their lives while working there
This week Boring work has been halted after someone on the job needed nearly 20 rescue workers for a life-saving extraction.
Tunneling halted at Boring Company job site in Las Vegas after ‘crushing injury’ of worker reported
Historical pattern analysis of political assassinations reveals there is systematic convergence in weapons proliferation doctrine across ideologically disparate threat actors.
My 2010 assessment clearly documented fifteen years ago the Israeli military leadership characterizing the Gaza conflict as escalation inevitability:
…a senior Israeli army officer is calling a war with Gaza “a question of when, not if”. The rearmament of Hamas is held up as evidence of new and greater concerns.
This followed my earlier 2006 analysis of asymmetric warfare tactics normalizing weapons integration within civilian infrastructure:
Grenade launcher beside a baby’s bassinet
Charlie Kirk’s assassination today eliminated a prominent advocate for ubiquitous civilian armament doctrine. His outspoken tactical philosophy—weapons proliferation in all civilian spaces including proximity to children—demonstrates domestic convergent thinking with Iranian-proxy terror organizations Hamas and Hezbollah.
How did we stop all the shootings at gun shows? Notice there’s not a lot of mass shootings at gun shows, there’s all these guns. Because everyone’s armed. If our money and our sporting events and our airplanes have armed guards, why don’t our children?
Cross-platform analysis reveals weapons saturation doctrine appears across ideologically opposed threat actors, suggesting tactical utility transcends political motivation. This convergence indicates proliferation strategies serve operational objectives (e.g. Palantir “self-licking ISIS-cream cone“) rather than ideological consistency.
Historical precedent from multiple security environments demonstrates inverse correlation between weapons proliferation and sustainable security outcomes.
National security professionals should apply identical threat assessment methodologies to domestic proliferation advocacy and international terror group tactics. Both seek to embed weapons within civilian populations using identical justification frameworks.
Gaza’s escalatory cycles, American frontier experience, and Civil War reconstruction (not to mention many other conflicts) demonstrate consistent historical pattern: sustainable security emerges through institutional control mechanisms, and NOT a proliferation assumption that increased armament creates increased safety.
Proliferation strategies benefit actors seeking systemic instability rather than community protection.
Americans (especially the USAF) frequently misunderstand there was no deterrence effect of dropping nuclear bombs on Japan. Their misunderstanding instead fed an endless congressional-military-industrial funding cycle of unnecessary technological complexity, which undermines agility and outcome-driven response necessary for sustainable defense.
Current policy environment demonstrates dangerous convergence between domestic extremist doctrine and international terror group methodology. Federal troop deployment in American cities represents identical disproportionate response patterns as Gaza operations—both driven by institutional capture by eliminationist ideologies following systematic democratic breakdown.
Policymakers ignoring these historical convergence patterns compromise the security of communities they claim to protect through policies that serve instability actors trying to force military dictatorship rather than protect civilian populations.
Attacks from Russia on Poland have drawn NATO defense forces into direct armed conflict.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Polish parliament that Polish airspace had been breached 19 times. Polish F-16 fighter jets and Dutch F-35s plus other aircraft responded and shot down at least four drones.
NATO tells us “Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked seven times.”
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
What will be discussed for Article 4? The cost imbalance stands out most to me, as it represents the most fundamental challenge for NATO defense. Traditional air defense methods become economically unsustainable against swarm attacks of low-cost drones.
Poland says at least 19 drones were tracked in the attack. Consider that in context of Russia launching nearly 20,000 missiles, meaning nearly 15,000 one-way attack drones, at targets in Ukraine from September 28, 2022, through December 28, 2024.
The Polish are illustrating a dangerous NATO asymmetry perfectly: expensive fighter jets (F-35s operating at $36,000+ per hour) were sent to intercept Russian drones that cost a fraction as much. Even though Shahed drones only hit their target less than 10 percent of the time, such low cost means Russia can fire mass salvos almost daily and NATO will be desperate to force rapid deflation into symmetric or better defense spend.
This is not theoretical. Ukraine developed systems that cost around $5,000 against the Shahed drones that cost around $50,000 each. Meanwhile, an IRIS-T missile fired by NATO would cost around $450,000. Imagine spending nearly half a million dollars to stop a $35,000 drone, because that’s what just happened.
Defense against 19 drones for NATO? Nearly $10 million.
Firing 19 drones at NATO? Costs under a million for Russia.
Thus, with a 10:1 spend ratio, Poland shows NATO military technological superiority becomes their liability against Russian tactics of sloppy commercial grade drone swarms. The EU, like Ukraine, now urgently needs to innovate and deploy more logical interception methods, whether through directed energy weapons, electronic warfare, or lower-cost interceptor drones, to rapidly invert an economic attrition that Russia is deliberately imposing on the EU.
The drones are being made of commercial parts from companies headquartered in the United States, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Japan, and Poland… so Russia is also literally attacking NATO with its own commercial technology, optimized for mass psychological impact at low cost rather than battle domination.
And it reads to me like classic evil KGB plausible deniability (“navigation errors”) that systematically poison and drain a victim — Soviet dezinformatsiya updated for the drone age. Each “stray” drone forces the alliance into an overresponse, a dangerous attrition without hitting obvious red lines.
Poland theoretically could drag NATO into spending over $70 million daily just responding to terrorizing drone attacks, while Russia’s daily production costs would remain ten times less. NATO cannot ignore the airspace violations, so each cheap drone automatically triggers this massive response cost.
Also, here is the history of Article 4 invocations, which mostly have been local disputes by Turkey: